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THE FALL OF BAGHDAD
AND
THE MONGOL RULE IN AL-^cIRĀQ, 1258-1335

by

Pai-nan Rashid Wu

A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the
University of Utah in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of History

University of Utah

December 1974

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH GRADUATE SCHOOL

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من علمنی حرفاً کنت له عبداً

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TRANSLITERATION SYSTEM

ء	=	'	ض	=	d
ا	=	a	ط	=	ṭ
ب	=	b	ظ	=	ẓ
ت	=	t	ع	=	c (raised c)
ث	=	th	غ	=	gh
ج	=	j	ف	=	f
ح	=	h	ق	=	q
خ	=	kh	ك	=	k
د	=	d	ل	=	l
ذ	=	dh	م	=	m
ر	=	r	ن	=	n
ز	=	z	ه	=	h
س	=	s	و	=	w
ش	=	sh	ي	=	y
ص	=	ṣ			

The long vowels are marked with a line above the vowel: \bar{i} , \bar{a} ,

\bar{u} .

ABBREVIATIONS

BSOAS	Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
CAJ	Central Asiatic Journal
EI	Encyclopaedia of Islam
HJAS	Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies
IC	Islamic Culture
JA	Journal Asiatique
JAH	Journal of Asian History
JAOS	Journal of American Oriental Society
JEH	Journal of Economic History
JESHO	Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient
JRAS	Journal of Royal Asiatic Society
JSS	Journal of Semitic Studies
REI	Revue Etudes Islamiques

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ABSTRACT

Based upon both Arabic and Chinese sources, this study is an attempt to examine the consequences of the Mongol invasion of Baghdad. It has been commonly accepted that the Mongols destroyed the once prosperous civilization of the ^CAbbāsīd Dynasty (132-656/750-1258) and were responsible for the backwardness of the Muslim world today, that they massacred all the people of Baghdad, devastated the countryside, burned its libraries, and above all, that they destroyed the irrigation canals--the life line of Mesopotamia. All these allegations are now found to be without foundation, for medieval Muslim historians failed to observe the declining conditions of the latter ^CAbbāsīds while laying too much stress on the prosperous side of its earlier period. In order to have a clearer picture of the decline of the ^CAbbāsīds, the political, social, and economic conditions have been surveyed briefly in the first chapter where it is shown that long before the Mongol invasion of Baghdad, the once great Empire had already been in trouble and that its downfall was only a matter of time. The elimination of the ^CAbbāsīd caliphate in Baghdad only accelerated this process.

Having established that the ^CAbbāsīd Dynasty was no more than the ghost of its past glories, an attempt was made to show that the Muslim authorities tended to exaggerate the number of people massacred and the devastation of the cities wrought by the invaders.

No contemporary authorities supply us with any figures, which were only given by later chroniclers whose estimates became larger as time elapsed.

In fact, not only did the Mongols contribute very little to the devastation of Baghdad and its countryside, but they also kept its administration intact, albeit on a much smaller scale as a result of its being reduced from the metropolitan city to a provincial capital. Under the Mongol rule, al-^CIrāq soon regained the prosperous conditions of its past through reconstruction of silted canals and the promotion of trade. However, the policy of the Mongols in Persia was hindered by worsened relations with their cousins--the Mongols of the Golden Horde, and of the Chagatai--on the one hand, and the continuous threat posed by Mamluk Egypt on the other hand.

The Mongols in Persia were not the destroyers of the Muslim civilization, but helped to spread Islam to the peripheral areas of the Muslim world. This was the result of their impartial policy towards religions. Although Christians and other religious groups were placed in an equal position with the Muslims, the latter suffered little suppression. In fact, the Mongols were finally converted to Islam.

In conclusion, the study calls for further study of the subject on a broader perspective so that a true picture of the Mongol invasion of the Muslim world may be achieved.

INTRODUCTION

The Mongol conquests of the thirteenth century were never equalled in scope and range. At its height, the Mongol Empire covered the whole of Asia and part of Europe, an area extending from Korea to the boundaries of Germany and the shores of the Adriatic Sea. After the death of Chingiz Khan¹, the world conqueror, his empire was divided into four kingdoms, or khanates, which later became known as the Yuan Empire in China, the Chagatai Khanate in Central Asia, the Golden Horde in Russia, and the Ilkhanate in Persia.² Of these four khanates, those in China and Persia were dissolved and became extinct within less than a hundred years. However, the Mongols were remembered as the most atrocious and barbaric of all conquering peoples in history because their conquests resulted in the systematic elimination of the civilian population in a series of towns,³ and laid waste to whole regions. These accusations were far too exaggerated. Even in

¹There are various spellings for Mongol names and terms. The spelling for Chingiz Khan, for example, has no less than six forms, i. e., Ginghiz, Genghiz, Jinghis, Jenghis, Chinggis, and Chengis. Since the writer has no knowledge of the Mongolian language, the system of transliteration used for Mongol names and terms is adopted either from popular form or through Arabic nomenclature.

²In accordance with the nomad practice and his will, Chingiz Khan divided his Empire among the four sons of his chief wife, Borte. His youngest son, Tolui, received the Mongol proper, the eldest son, Juchi, the lands of Rus, the second, Chagatai, ma warā' al-nahr (Transoxiana), and the third son, Ogotai, the territories of Chinese Turkestan. No arrangement was made for China which was not conquered until 1278. Therefore, the four khanates were later established.

³These towns were Balkh, Marw, Nīsābūr, Herāt, Tus, Rayy, Qazwin, Hamadān, Marāghah, Ardabīl, etc. in Persia.

hard-hit Persia, the devastation wrought by the Mongols was limited to certain parts and to the towns which refused to submit to their hegemony. In South Persia, for example, the towns and cities which surrendered voluntarily to the invaders were left intact and continued to flourish. In the looted areas there was recovery, and before long even these areas once again became centers of industry, trade, and culture.⁴

History tells us that most conquests have been equally and indiscriminately devastating. Both the Saljūq conquest of Iran in the eleventh century and the invasion of Khurāsān a century later by the Oghuz of Balkh were as atrocious as those of the Mongols, yet the invaders were seldom condemned as criminals and heralds of destruction. Moreover, the fall of Jerusalem in 1099 A. D. to the first crusaders was followed by a horrible slaughter in which women and children were mercilessly massacred. Raymond of Agiles relates that "in the Temple and porch of Solomon men rode in blood up to their knees and bridle reins. . . . The city was filled with corpses and blood."⁵ Yet he justified these cruel acts committed by the crusaders as being "a splendid judgment of God that this place should be filled

⁴Bernald Lewis, Islam in History: Ideas, Men and Events in the Middle East (London: Alcov Press, 1973), p. 183. See also W. Barthold, Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion, with an additional chapter hitherto unpublished in English translated by Mrs. T. Minorsky and edited by C. E. Bosworth, and with further addenda and corrigenda by C. E. Bosworth. (3rd ed. London: Printed for the Trustees of the "E. J. W. Gibb Memorial" and Published by Messrs. Luzac and Co., 1968), p. 490.

⁵Quoted in A. C. Krey, The First Crusade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1912), p. 261. Also cited by J. L. La Monte, The World of the Middle Ages (New York: Appleton, 1949), p. 342.

with the blood of the unbelievers, since it had suffered so long from their blasphemies."⁶

The Mongols, who had neither a basic culture nor written records of their own, were bound to suffer from the distortion of facts expressed by their enemies. Referring to the Mongol Invasions, the records of the Arab chronicler Ibn al-Athīr and his English counterpart Matthew Paris, written from hearsay during times of stress of the first waves of invasion, were altogether hostile. In the Arab Middle East, a native chronicler at Mawsil (Mosul) by the name of Ibn al-Athīr wrote a monumental treatise entitled al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh (The Complete Chronicle) in which he describes the Mongol invasions of Khwārizm and eastern Persia as an enormous universal catastrophe. The distance that separates Baghdad from Central Asia must have contributed to his uncertainty in relating the event of that age. Except for a few incidents such as the capture of Bukhārā and Samarquand, Ibn al-Athīr did not quote any reliable eye-witnesses.⁷ Until his death in 630/1232-1233,⁸ he had no way of verifying the real horrors of which he had spoken. His opening statement in regard to the Mongol scourge was typical of later historians: "For some years I continued to refrain from mentioning this event, deeming it so horrible that I shrank from

⁶Ibid.

⁷Barthold, Turkestan, p. 39.

⁸The first refers to the Muslim calendar year; the latter to the Christian. When one date is used, it refers only to the Christian calendar year.

recording it, and ever withdrawing one foot as I advanced the other."⁹

The testimony of ^CAtā' Malik al-Juwaynī, the author of the Tārīkh-i Jahān Gushā (the History of the World-Conqueror) and a native of Khurāsān, also withheld his full narrative on account of its horrors.¹⁰ Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā, writing almost half a century after the fall of Baghdad in 656/1258, showed the same reluctance to tell the full story for the same reason. "Even a brief mention of it," he explained, "would be terrible to hear--how much worse its recapitulation in detail!"¹¹ Untold events were then left to the imagination of his readers.

Nevertheless, Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā's remarks on the Mongols, though comparatively few in number, showed some degree of truth and were in the main laudatory. On one occasion he stated that,

The sciences of the rulers of Islam were the sciences of language, like grammar and lexicography, and poetry and

⁹Ḥizz al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. ^CAbd al-Karīm Ibn al-Aṭhīr, al-Kamil fī al-Tārīkh (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1851-1876), XII, 354.

¹⁰Ala-ad-Din ^CAta-Malik Juvaini, The History of the World-Conqueror, translated from the text of Mirza Muḥammad by John Andrew Boyle. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1918). The transliteration of Persian names and terms in text will be in Arabic form and thus Juvaini is al-Juwaynī.

¹¹Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā, al-Fakhri: On the System of Government and the Moslem Dynasties, composed by Muḥammad son of ^CAli son of Tabataba, known as the rapid talker, translated by C. E. J. Whitting. (London: Luzac, 1943), p. 323. See also James Kritzeck, "Ibn-al-Ṭiqṭaqā and the Fall of Baghdād" in The World of Islam: Studies in Honour of Philip K. Hitti, ed. James Kritzeck and R. Bayly Winder (London: MacMillan, 1959), p. 179.

history. . . . As for the Mongol dynasty, all those sciences were rejected, and others were popular with them-- the science of finance and accounting for balancing the budget and estimation of revenue and expenditure, medicine for safeguarding bodies and constitutions, and astrology for choosing suitable occasions. Sciences and "culture" (ādāb) other than those were unpopular with them, and I have not seen them popular except in al-Mawṣil in the days of its prince Fakhr al-Dīn ʿIṣā , of whom I spoke above.¹²

On the other hand, he acknowledged the respect that Ghazan Khan (694-704/1295-1305) paid to jurists and the Qur'ān (Koran). In 698/1298, the great Khan visited the Mustansiriyyah Colledge, built by the ʿAbbāsīd Caliph al-Mustansir in 631/1234, during his regular visit to Baghdad. The Muslim scholars (ʿulamā') were sitting with the jurists in front of them, reading from copies of the Qur'ān in their hands. When the Khan's entourage passed the Shāfiʿite section, the group rose to greet him leaving the reading of the Qur'ān aside. The Khan asked Shaykh Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-ʿAqūlī, the principal Shāfiʿite scholar at the College, "How is it that you are allowed to rise in my honor and leave the word of God?"¹³

There is no doubt that the early Mongol conquests were orgies of killing and destruction, but they differed very little from those committed by the Saljuqs and Oghuz. After all, no conquerors can be judged fairly in the period of their conquests, more especially through the eyes of the conquered. On the other hand, the Mongols were not completely blood-thirsty. They declared war

¹²Ibn al-Tiṭṭaqā, p. 23; Kritzeck, p. 167.

¹³Ibn al-Tiṭṭaqā, p. 29; Kritzeck, p. 169.

only after they had exhausted every possible means of maintaining peace through the channel of peaceful negotiations. In the yasaq, the Code of Laws and Ordinances promulgated by Chingiz Khan, it was clearly stated that the declaration of war should be made according to the terms of the said Code.

When (the Mongols) have need to write any letter to rebels, and they must send an envoy, let them not threaten with the great size of their army and their numbers, but let them say only, if ye will submit yourselves obediently ye shall find good treatment and rest, but if ye resist-- as for us what do we know? [But] the everlasting God knoweth what will happen to you.¹⁴

Accordingly, 'Atā' Malik al-Juwaynī rightly commented that, unlike other great rulers and conquerors, the Mongols never indulged in violent and wordy threats when demanding submission or surrender.¹⁵

Moreover, the Mongols were not civilization destroyers either. The impression given by Ibn al-Tiḡtaqā of the Mongols in this regard speaks for itself. They did, he contends, try to preserve and even improve the civilization they inherited. Even the historian most critical of the Mongol destruction, the English

¹⁴Quoted from George Vernadsky, "the Scope and Contents of Chingiz Khan's Yasa" in *HJAS*, III (1938), 344-345. This practice of diplomacy was strictly observed by their Mongol Khans. For the history of the diplomatic missions which passed between Europe and Mongolia see Abel Rémusat, "Memoires sur les Relations politiques des Princesses Chretiens, et particulierement des rois de France, avec les Empereurs Mongols", *Memoires de l'Institut Royal de France*, VI-VII (1822-1824). In VII, 421-422, Abel Remusat gives an example of this correspondence. In a letter to the Pope Bayju Noyan writes, "Et si tu praeceptum Dei stabile et illius qui faciem totius terrae continet non audieris, illus nos nescimus, Deus scit." See also Asiz S. Atiya, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages (2nd ed. New York: Kraus Reprint Corp., 1965), Ch. X, 233-259; and Ch. VI of the present work.

¹⁵Juvaini, p. 25.

Orientalist E. G. Browne, after describing the Mongol invasion as "one of the most dreadful calamities which ever befel the human race," has to admit that "the period of Mongol ascendancy (1265-1337) . . . was wonderfully rich in literary achievements."¹⁶ The Russian Orientalist V. V. Barthold has adopted a milder attitude toward Mongol invasions. "It is true," he states, "that a cultured land had been conquered by a wild people still believing in the efficacy of human sacrifice." But he continues:

In reality, the results of the Mongol invasion were less annihilating than is supposed. . . . Besides a not numerous military contingent the Mongol Khans brought with them their cultured councillors [sic!] who helped them to establish their rule and to apply to the new country that harmonious and well-constructed governmental and military organization which had been elaborated at the time of Chinghiz Khan himself.¹⁷

In fact, Kubilai Khan was praised by Marco Polo as a king worthy of being ranked among the wisest sovereigns of his age--not merely as a great conqueror, but as a great ruler.¹⁸ The great Ghazan Khan of the Ilkhanites was commonly recognized as a great reformer of administration and justice, a protector of the peasantry, and a

¹⁶Edward G. Browne, A Literary History of Persia: Vol. III: The Tartar Dominion (1265-1502) (Cambridge: The University Press, 1920), pp. 4, 17.

¹⁷W. Barthold, Musulman Culture, translated from the Russian by Shahid Sujrawardy. (Calcutta: U. of Calcutta, 1934), p. 112.

¹⁸Marco Polo, The Book of Ser Marco Polo, the Venetian Concerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the East, translated and edited, with notes, by Colonel Sir Henry Yule, 3rd ed., revised throughout in the light of recent discoveries by Henri Cordier. (New York: C. Scribner's, 1903), I, 246-247, 331.

promoter of science, learning and architecture.¹⁹

Thus it would seem rash for the historians to categorize the Mongols as unrelenting destroyers, basing judgment upon their early acts and the records of a few contemporary writers from the conquered nations. Indeed, to be fair, any judgment of the Mongols should be based upon the subsequent period of their settled governments when they demonstrated a singular willingness to adapt themselves to the new environment and to repudiate their barbarous origins. The Mongols should also be judged by their freedom from bigotry and by their tolerance in matters of religion. In the framework of the mediaeval mind, they demonstrated true greatness by welcoming equally at their courts representatives of all faiths--Christian friars, Buddhist lamas, Jewish rabbis, and Muslim Culamā' --in addition to their own spiritual leaders.²⁰ Chingiz Khan, who did not belong to any of the established faiths, was always eager to consult the sages of various denominations on different matters of life and statesmanship. The execution of the last Abbāsīd Caliph al-Musta'ṣim billāh (640-656/1242-1258) by Hūlāgū, the grandson of Chingiz Khan and the founder of the Ilkhanite Empire in Persia, was performed after consultation with the Muslim

¹⁹J. A. Boyle, "Dynastic and Political History of the Īl-Khāns" in The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 5: The Saljuq and Mongol Periods, ed. by J. A. Boyle. (Cambridge: University Press, 1968), pp. 379-97.

²⁰William Woodville Rockhill, The Journey of William of Rubruck to the Eastern Parts of the World, 1253-55 as Narrated by Himself, with Two Accounts of the Earlier Journey of John of Pian de Carpine, tr. from the Latin, and edited with an introductory notice. (London: Hakluyt Society, 1900), pp. 225-235.

culama'.²¹ In the field of mutual understanding and cultural exchange, the contributions of the Mongols were significant. In order to encourage commercial intercourse among nations they imposed lower rates of customs than their predecessors, while protecting traders and policing roads. They established a regular system of posts, and allowed free passage everywhere.²² It was on account of the so-called "Pax Mongolica"²³ that Pegolotti wrote, "the road you travel from Tana to Cathay is perfectly safe, whether by day or night, according to what merchants say who have used it."²⁴ From the frequency of contacts, it has been said that "the unification of Asia by the Mongols was as important a fact for the commerce of the Middle Ages as the discovery of America for the men of the Renaissance. It was equivalent to the discovery of Asia."²⁵ The cultural exchanges resulting from the relative peace of the Mongol rule had such an influential effect upon the Europeans that Sir Henry

²¹Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1888-98), III, 127-128.

²²W. Heyd, Histoire du Commerce du Levant au Moyen-Age, edition francaise refondue et considerablement augmentee par l'auteur, publiee sous le patronage de la Societe de l'Orient Latin, par Furcy Raynaud. (2nd ed. Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1885-1886), II, 110-115, and passim.

²³According to Prof. Joseph Fletcher Jr. of Harvard University the so called Pax Mongolica is still a myth. However, in the absence of any substantial proof to the contrary, the older theory is maintained here.

²⁴Cited in Henry Yule, Cathay and the Way Thither (2nd ed. rev. by H. Cordier. (London: Hakluyt Society, 1915-16), III, 137-73.

²⁵Rene Grousset, Histoire de l'Asie (Paris: G. Cries, 1921-22), III, 130.

H. Howorth did not hesitate to say, "I have no doubt myself. . .that the art of printing, the mariner's compass, firearms, and a great many details of social life, were not discovered in Europe, but imported by means of Mongol influence from the furthest East."²⁶ The Turkish historian, A. Zeki Validi Togan, also writes: "The invasion of the Turks and the Mongols . . . was not a universal catastrophe. It accentuated a moment in history during which new regions entered the orbit of civilization."²⁷

The Muslims view the Mongol invaders as many times more destructive than the Germanic barbarians in European antiquity. The allegation is often made that their onslaught was more terrible and more permanent because they learned nothing from other civilizations and they themselves could not create anything new. According to this view, the Mongol invasion of Baghdad was the final catastrophe which ended the golden age of the once glorious 'Abbāsid dynasty and began the steep decline of the Arab civilization.²⁸ "A high Syrian government official" was once quoted as saying:

If the Mongols had not burnt the libraries of Baghdad in the 13th century, we Arabs should have had so much science, that we would long since have invented the atomic bomb. The

²⁶Howorth, I, xi.

²⁷A. Zeki Validi Togan, "Considerations sur la collaboration scientifique entre l'Orient islamique et l'Europe," REI (1935), 269.

²⁸B. Lewis, Islam in History, p. 179.

plundering of Baghdad put us back by centuries.²⁹

Such a statement reflects century-old chauvinism and no doubt lacks historicity.³⁰ The 'Abbāsīd caliphate had long lived on its past glory before the Mongol invasions. Objective modern scholars have begun to take a broader view of the Mongol invasions, and have arrived at different conclusions based upon the documentary evidence. Among them is Professor Constantine Zurayk, the distinguished historian of the American University of Beirut, who declares:

Some of us still believe that the attacks of the Turks and the Mongols are what destroyed the Abbasid Caliphate and Arab power in general. But. . .the fact is that the Arabs had been defeated internally before the Mongols defeated them and that, had those attacks been launched against them when they were in the period of growth and enlightenment, the Mongols would not have overcome them. On the contrary the attack might have revitalized and re-energized them.³¹

What seems to be the unforgivable crime committed by the Mongol invaders was the destruction of the 'Abbāsīd caliphate, the symbol of political and religious unity of the Muslim world. Many authorities emphatically stressed that the destruction of the caliphate dealt a deadly blow to the political and religious institution of Islam. In spite of its material impotence, the caliphate

²⁹Arnold Hottinger, "Patriotismus und Nationalismus bei den Arabern" Neu Zulher, 12 May 1957, cited by B. Lewis, Islam in History, p. 179.

³⁰See David Ayalon, "Studies on the Transfer of the Abbasid Caliphate from Baghdad to Cairo," Arabica, VI (1960), 59. Ibn Wasil said, "Islam has never suffered a greater and more decisive disaster than this."

³¹Constantine Zurayk, The Meaning of the Disaster, tr. by R. B. Winder (Beirut: Khayate's, 1956), p. 46.

still possessed a certain political and spiritual authority. A brief survey of the development of the caliphate is illustrative of the fact that its tragic extinction "scarcely did more than given finality to a situation that had long been developing."³²

Long before the Saljūq Turkish domination (463-590/1055-1194), the caliphate had already sunk into political insignificance. By the tenth century, the authority of the ʿAbbāsīd caliphate hardly extended beyond the precincts of Baghdad, and the caliphs were at the mercy of their foreign troops. Caliph al-Muqtadir (295-320/908-932) was twice deposed and was finally killed in a battle with the foreign mercenaries of one of his generals. Down to the first half of the twelfth century the caliph was beyond doubt the weakest of all political figures in the framework of the ʿAbbāsīd Empire. When Caliph al-Nāsīr li-Dīn Allāh (575-622/1180-1225) was able to throw off the Saljūq yoke, he extended his power beyond the walled city and reached as far as Syria and Egypt in the west and Khurāsān in the east. The restoration of al-Nāsīr was, however, short lived. At about this time there arose in Khwarizm a rival power headed by Muhammad ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ibn Takash (1200-1220). Whereas the Turkish sultans before him had been satisfied with political power extorted from the caliphs, Muhammad was aiming at setting up an anti-caliph of the house of ʿAlī so as to paralyze the Sunnite Caliph's spiritual

³²H. A. R. Gibb, Arabic Literature: an Introduction (2nd. ed. rev. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 14. See also G. Von Grunbaum, Medieval Islam: A Study in Cultural Orientation (2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 189.

power as well. Only the threat of the Mongol invasion of Khwārizm saved Baghdad from Muhammad's pre-meditated scheme.³³

Muhammad, the Khwārizm Shāh, was not the first to challenge the spiritual authority of the caliphate. The degradation of the spiritual power of the Abbāsīd caliphate was signaled in the reign of Caliph al-Muqtadir when, in 316/928, the Umayyad ruler of Spain, the great Abd al-Rahmān III (299-350/912-961), ordered that in the public prayer and on all official documents he should be styled "Khalīfah" and "Commander of the Faithful." Then the Ismā'īlī dynasty of the Fātimids (296-567/909-1171) in Egypt who claimed ancestry from the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fātimah was also another potential rival. Patron of the trade guilds, tolerant of Sunnites, Christians, and Jews, and with a sway ranging from the Atlantic to the borders of al-^cIrāq, the Ismā'īlī caliphate at Cairo consciously rivalled in magnificence the shrinking Sunnite caliphate in Baghdad. In 567/1171, the Fātimids were replaced by a Sunnite Ayyubid dynasty founded by the famous hero Ṣalāh al-Dīn (Saladin) al-Ayyubī. This gesture represented only the symbolic recognition of the Abbāsīd caliph's authority. In the first place, the Abbāsīd caliph was too weak to face a head-on confrontation with the powerful Saladin. Furthermore, during the early years of al-Nāṣir's caliphate, Saladin's reputation as the defender

³³ Khwārizm Shāh was the most powerful ruler in the Muslim world at that time. See Barthold, Turkestan, p. 19.

of the Islamic world gained great momentum as a result of his successes against the crusaders.³⁴ Al-Nāsir always approached Sultan Saladin as his nā'ib (deputy) with the utmost care and caution in the matter of military contribution, which he was unable to render to the Islamic hosts in their struggle with the crusaders. On the other hand, when the Mongol threat arose, the panic-stricken al-Nāsir implored the Ayyubids for help which was not forthcoming on account of Saladin's involvement with the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. Fortunately, the danger ended because of the unexpected death of the Great Khan, Chingiz. It is not surprising that the Spanish traveler, Ibn Jubayr, when mentioning the Caliph, had little to say about him and did not make a special case for him. He probably regarded the Caliph as a non-entity; and "the great hero of Islam is evidently Saladin."³⁵

In the reign of al-Mustansir (623-640/1226-1242), the successor of al-Nāsir, the caliphate was "still good",³⁶ to use the phrase of Ibn al-Tiqtāqā, but the power of the caliphs was challenged by the Hafsids (625-941/1228-1534) in Tunis.³⁷ In the reign

³⁴Gaston Wiet, Baghdad: Metropolis of the Abbasid Caliphate, tr. by Seymour Feiler. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), p. 138. Saladin restored Jerusalem to the Muslims in 583/1187 after the battle of Hattin.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibn al-Athīr, X, 192.

³⁷See Ch. II of the present work, pp. 94-97.

of al-Musta^cṣim (640-656/1242-1258), the last ^cAbbāsīd Caliph in Baghdad, the Ḥafṣīd ruler Abū ^cAbd Allāh Muḥammad (647-675/1249-1277) openly defied the caliph and was even bold enough to assume the title himself in the year 650/1252--less than a decade before the fall of Baghdad.³⁸ When Hūlāgū marched on to Baghdad from Persia, the Caliph's appeals to Egypt and Syria for help brought no response.

It is apparent, then, that the ^cAbbāsīd caliphs had been relegated to the background long before the Mongol invasion, and counter-caliphs had been declared in various regions of the Muslim world. Thus the disappearance of the ^cAbbāsīd caliphate in Baghdad created only a temporary shock to the Sunnite Muslims in part of the Muslim world--particularly rulers who needed the caliphal investiture to legitimize their rule. However, this need was not apparent in the case of Egypt and Hijāz which found substitutes for the caliph almost immediately after the fall of Baghdad. At the beginning of 659/end of 1260, when the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt sent a letter reporting his victory over the Mongols in the battle of ^cAyn Jālūt, he already addressed the Ḥafṣīd Caliph al-Mustansīr as "the Commander of the Faithful." This indicates that a substitute was found in the person of the Ḥafṣīd al-Mustansīr. Even before the Egyptian recognition, the Sharīf of Mecca, Abū Numayy, had already

³⁸The date is adopted from David Ayalon. Sources do not agree about the exact date on which the Ḥafṣīd ruler bestowed upon himself the title of caliph. They vary between 1252-1261. D. Ayalon, "Studies on the Transfer," pp. 41-59.

recognized the Ḥafṣid al-Mustansir as Caliph in 657/1259.³⁹ Then, in June 1261, Abū al-Qāsim Ahmad--son of Caliph al-Zāhir and uncle of the ḤAbbāsīd Caliph al-Mustansir--who managed to escape from the Mongol massacre and took refuge at Cairo, was re-installed as Caliph by Baybars I (658-665/1260-1277), assuming the title of al-Mustansir. Consequently, the caliphs in Egypt were "even more powerless and ineffectual than the later ḤAbbāsīds in Baghdad had been."⁴⁰ On the whole, it seems self-evident that the disappearance of the last legitimate Caliph created no vacuum in the institution of the caliphate.

Although the Mongols came as heathens to establish an alien state in the Islamic heartlands, they left as ardent patrons of Islam. Apparently Hūlāgū Khan, the conqueror of Baghdad, was influenced by his Christian wife and had leanings towards Christianity. But this did not eliminate his deference toward his Muslim advisers who stood equally high in his esteem. Under the rule of his great grandson, Ghazan Khan (a zealous Muslim), Islam was made the state religion. Ghazan Khan built many mosques and endowed Muslim colleges with extensive funds. After a lapse of seventy-five years, from 617/1220 to 694/1295, Islam again returned to its ascendance. Finally, there is one feature that is generally neglected by historians in spite of its importance to the spread of

³⁹Ibid., p. 45.

⁴⁰Thomas W. Arnold, The Caliphate, with a concluding chapter by Sylvia G. Haim (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1967), p. 98.

Islam in the Far East. The Mongol Khans played a distinct role in the encouragement of Muslim missionaries among their own subjects. Concerning this role, Professor Beazley made the following observation:

It was at this very time, as a matter of history, that Moslem perfidia began its permanent conquest of the Malay world, began successfully to compass the seas and lands of the Archipelago in search of proselytes, began to penetrate even to the interior of Java and Sumatra.⁴¹

The Mongol contributions to Islam appear to be greater than has usually been recognized by traditional writers.

The purpose of this thesis is to re-examine the Mongol rule of the Ilkhanite Empire in al-^CIrāq along the framework surveyed above. It is hoped that through re-examination and re-interpretation of some original sources, a broader picture of the Mongols in al-^CIrāq will emerge as a brief and modest contribution to Mongolian Islamic studies.

⁴¹C. R. Beazley, The Dawn of Modern Geography (London: Longman, Green, and Co., 1897-1906), III, 234.

CHAPTER I

THE ^CABBASIDS ON THE EVE OF MONGOL INVASION

Within a few decades of its establishment in al-^CIrāq,¹ the ^CAbbāsīd dynasty (132-656/750-1258) rose to become a great world power. Its capital, Baghdad, officially known as the City of Peace (Madīnat al-Salām), was founded in 144/762 by the second ^CAbbāsīd Caliph, al-Mansūr (136-158/754-775), and soon became the heart of a world civilization. It was later adopted as the scene of the One Thousand and One Nights during the illustrious reign of Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd. It was, as al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī put it, "a city with no peer throughout the whole world."² Nevertheless, the period of its prosperity and stability was short in comparison with its long existence. The destruction of Baghdad by the Mongols in 656/1258, though generally regarded as the end of the ^CAbbāsīds, did not completely terminate their line of succession, and the caliphate lingered on in Cairo from 659/1261 until the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 936/1517 when the caliphate was transferred by Salīm I (918-926/1512-1520) to

¹The term al-^CIrāq, denoting the southern Mesopotamia, is used for convenience to distinguish the modern state of Iraq which covers a larger area than the medieval al-^CIrāq. For geographical divisions of Mesopotamia see Ch. IV, 145-148.

²Abū Bakr Ahmad b. ^CAlī al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh Baghdād, aw Madīnah al-Salām, ed. by Muḥammad Hamid al-Faqīh. (Al-Qāhirah: Matba'ah al-Sa'adah, 1931), I:119. Cited also by Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs from the Earliest Times to the Present (7th ed. London: MacMillan Co., 1961), p. 302.

Istanbul. There is no support from contemporary accounts of a statement, originally made by the older historian Mouradgea d'Ohsson in 1787 and often repeated since, that the last of the line of the ^cAbbāsīd caliphate bequeathed his right of succession to the Ottoman Sultan, thus enabling his Turkish successors to claim the title and dignity of Caliph.³

As a potential political authority, the ^cAbbāsīd caliphate began a steep decline around the year 334/946 when the Buwayhids occupied Baghdad and became the real power behind the caliphal throne.⁴ Then in 450/1055, the Saljuqs under the leadership of

³History revealed that the early Ottoman sultans who had lived before the conquest of Egypt in 936/1517 customarily assumed the title of the caliphate and were addressed as Caliphs by many lesser amirs and admirers. See Thomas W. Arnold, The Caliphate (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1924), pp. 129-158. For D'Ohsson's statement see his Tableau General de l'Empire Ottoman (Paris: L'Imprimerie de Monsienr, 1787), I, 269-270.

⁴This concept is accepted commonly by scholars. See ^cAbd al-Azīz al-Dūrī, Dirāsāt fī al-^cAbbāsiyyah al-Muta'akhkhirah (Baghdad: Sharikah al-Rabitah, 1945) and H. A. R. Gibb, "The Caliphate and the Arab States," in A History of the Crusades, ed. by Kenneth M. Setton, vol. I: The First Hundred Years, ed. by Marshall W. Baldwin (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969). Also a Japanese scholar Makoto Shimizu, "Abbasu-Chō ni Okeru ni tzuite," in Toyōshi Kenkyū, XVIII:4 (March 1960), pp. 530-545; XIX:1 (July 1960), pp. 65-87. Shimizu divides the ^cAbbāsīd dynasty into three periods. The first period, known as the Golden Age, extended from its foundation in 132/750 to 221/836. It was the extension of the Umayyad dynasty. The second period, 221-279/836-892, was the domination of the Turkish slaves in the new capital, Samara'. The third period, 279-334/892-945, witnessed the extreme development of Bureaucracy since the time of al-Mu^ctadīd (279-289/892-902). In this period, the personal power of the caliphs became weaker and factional struggle ascended among the military and civilian personnel. By the time of the establishment of amīr al-umarā', the internal power of the ^cAbbāsīd dynasty collapsed. In 334/945, when the Buwayhids occupied Baghdad, the ^cAbbāsīd dynasty, in its narrow sense, came to an end.

Tughril Beg (429-455/1037-1063) entered Baghdad and took the Buwayhids' place as masters of the ^CAbbāsīd Empire which had been reduced to merely a province or two. By the time when the ^CAbbāsīd Caliph, al-Nāsīr li-Dīn Allāh (575-622/1180-1225) was able to throw off the last Saljuq Sultan, Tughril II in 587/1191, he encountered other formidable enemies emerging from the steppes of Central Asia: first the Khwārizmians, and afterwards the greatly feared Mongols, who were destined to become world conquerors.

Did the Mongols put a "violent and untimely end"⁵ to the ^CAbbāsīd caliphate? Actually, the caliphate had long ceased to be "an effective institution and the Mongols did little more than lay the ghost of something that was already dead."⁶ Like the fall of the Roman Empire, no one single factor can be cited as the cause of the downfall of the ^CAbbāsīd Empire: just as it is hardly possible to give a plausible reason for the end of the Roman Empire, so it is equally difficult to point out what brought about the end of the ^CAbbāsīd Empire. Nevertheless, many symptoms of dissolution were present in the latter part of the ^CAbbāsīd period.

Political Situation

Internal political decline began with Caliph al-Mu^Ctaṣīm

⁵William Muir, The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline and Fall, with a new introduction by Zeine N. Zeine. (Beirut: Khayats, 1963), p. 598.

⁶Bernard Lewis, "The ^CAbbāsīds," The Encyclopedia of Islam (New ed. Leiden: E. J. Leiden, 1960), I, 21.

(218-227/833-842) and his inauguration of a Turkish bodyguard to override the turbulent Arab military aristocracy within his realm. The reign of Hārūn al-Rashīd (170-193/786-809), the fifth ^CAbbāsīd Caliph and the prince of the Arabian Nights, is generally regarded in legend and history as the zenith of the ^CAbbāsīd power, but in it were also embedded the seeds of future decline. The frontiers of the Empire had started to roll back both in the east and in the west due to the expansion of the Byzantines and the Khazars. Local hereditary and independent dynasties arose in North Africa and Persia. Revolts against the ^CAbbāsīds abounded, and the one in nearby Khurāsān threatened the very existence of their Empire and eventually cost the Caliph's life. In 192/808 Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd set out for Khurāsān on an expedition against the rebel, Rafi^C ibn Layth. But he died the next year at Tūs.

After Hārūn al-Rashīd's glorious reign, the ^CAbbāsīd state began to betray signs of breaking up. Despite the fact that the caliphate reconquered Egypt in 291/905, and exterminated the semi-independent rule of the Tulunids, it was apparently exhausted by these military efforts. In addition, the caliphate was busy in checking the disrupting influences of the unruly and heterodox Qarmatians.⁷ Finally, the Muslim state was weakened by financial disorders and factional rivalries in the imperial forces which crippled

⁷The movement of the Qarmatians will be discussed later. For general introductory account see L. Massignon's "Qarmatians," EI, II, 767-772.

the caliphate. In the throes of these upheavals, Egypt and Syria were lost to another Turkish dynasty, founded by an officer of the former Tulunid forces, namely Muhammad ibn Tughj. Later he obtained caliphal tacit recognition when he received the old Iranian title of "Ikhsid" in 328/939 from Caliph al-Rādī (322-329/934-940). The tribes of northern Syria and Mesopotamia were organized under the chiefs of the House of Hamdān, whose two principalities, based at Mawsil and Aleppo, remained the hotbeds of dissatisfaction and rebellion against the ^CAbbāsids. In western Persia, the Daylamites, having broken out of their mountains and ravaged the settled provinces, had at length been brought under the organized control of three brothers of the House of Buwayh. They formed a bloc of principalities extending along the eastern frontiers of al-^CIrāq from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. Finally, in 335/946, the Buwayhid prince of Khūzistān, Mu^Cizz al-Dawlah, entered the City of Peace and annexed al-^CIrāq to his own principality.⁸

The political disintegration, along with economic and social decadences, according to the modern Iraqi historian, ^CAbd al-^CAzīz al-Dūrī, was caused by the Turkish slaves employed from the time of al-Mu^Ctasim for security measures.⁹ Since the founding of the

⁸H. A. R. Gibb, "The Caliphate and the Arab States," in A History of the Crusades, ed. by Kenneth M. Setton, vol. I. The First Hundred Years, ed. by Marshall W. Baldwin. (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), p. 82.

⁹^CAbd ^CAzīz al-Dūrī, Dirāsāt fī al-^CUsūr al-^CAbbāsiyyah al-Muta'akhkhirah (Baghdad: Matba'ah al-Siryan, 1945), pp. 12ff.

dynasty, two antagonistic groups of the Arabs and Persians had striven for favor at the court. The Persians who had been in ascendance came out victorious after the civil war waged between the two sons of Hārūn al-Rashīd, al-Amīn and al-Ma'mūn. Proud of their noble descent, the Arabs became embittered and were further alienated by al-Ma'mūn's decision to stay in Marw. Revolts in Baghdad and the domineering Persians in the court persuaded the Caliph to move back to the old capital. The rupture once established was difficult to amend. The Caliph now had to use Turkish slaves as mercenaries to strengthen his position and counterbalance the influence of both the Persians and the Arabs. In al-Mu^ctasim's reign, more Turkish slaves were acquired to meet the depletion of Arab man-power¹⁰ in the defence of the Empire from the threat of the Babāk rebellion (which was finally crushed in 223/838) as well as the Byzantine encroachments on the borders, and the increasing turbulence of both Syrians and Egyptians.¹¹

The Arabs who settled in the former garrison cities of al-^cIrāq were transformed by the growth of urban civilization and the development of trade into townsmen and ceased to constitute effective military units.¹² Moreover, the Arab tribes, such as those of Mudār and others from Yemen, who were the backbone of the military strength of the caliphate, were in constant feud with each other and could

¹⁰ Prof. Subhi Labib pointed out in his Seminar in Middle Eastern History, at University of Utah, March 6, 1973.

¹¹ al-Dūrī, Dirāsāt, p. 12ff.

¹² Gibb, "The Caliphate," p. 82; and Jurji Zaydan, Umayyads and Abbasids, tr. by D. S. Margoliouth (London: Luzac, 1910), p. 217.

hardly render useful service in the defence of the government. With the establishment of the Empire, the Arab armies lost the opportunity of plunder and became regularly paid functionaries from the ordinary imperial revenue. Such a system, Harold Bowen remarked, "offended all the instincts of the Arabs," and they either returned to their old practice of raiding, or settled and became abiding citizens and thus abandoned arms altogether.¹³ Whatever the reasons may be for the employment of the Turkish slaves, they became involved in the succession struggle by the members of the ^CAbbāsīd House and their decisive influence outweighed both Persians and Arabs.¹⁴ The civil war of al-Amīn and al-Ma'mūn had already offered a clear example of the fact that the support of the army was the decisive factor in the problem of succession.¹⁵

The price for obtaining the loyalty of these Turkish soldiers was high. First of all, the tyranny and lawlessness of the Turkish mercenaries obliged the Caliph to remove the seat of the caliphate from the City of Peace to Samarrā' (or surra man ra'ā)¹⁶ in 221/836.¹⁷ As a result, the Caliph alienated the Baghdadis from his support in times of adversity. Furthermore, the Caliphs were

¹³ Harold Bowen, The Life and Times of ^CAlī Ibn ^CIsā, "The Good Vizier" (Cambridge: University Press, 1928), p. 18.

¹⁴ Gibb, "The Caliphate," p. 34.

¹⁵ Zaydan, p. 217.

¹⁶ The meaning of this term is "whoever sees it rejoices."

¹⁷ Ibn al-Athīr, VI, 319.

constrained to assign to the Turks high places in his palaces, or to give them positions of influence at his court and among his close escorts. Some of them were even promoted to key posts in public service as army generals, thus opening the door for them to become virtual despots. This enabled them to play decisive roles in the politics of the ^CAbbāsids. In the reign of al-Mutawakkil (232-247/847-861), son and successor of al-Mu^Ctaṣim,¹⁸ the Turkish body-guard became so domineering at the court that they participated with the crown prince al-Muntasir (247-248/861-862) in a conspiracy where they murdered the Caliph himself. Such a precedent dealt a fatal blow to the once omnipotent caliphate. Henceforth occupants of the throne were humiliated and sometimes deposed, murdered, or blinded by those turbulent army commanders. For fifty-six years, when the caliphs were residing at Samarrā', the Turks were virtually masters of the Empire.¹⁹

However, the most salient problems created by the Turkish mercenaries were those connected with economy of the state. The cost of the mercenaries became a great burden to the state and was beyond its economic means. As a result, tax extortions prevailed-- a problem that will be examined later.

¹⁸There was al-Wathīq (277-232/837-842) between these two caliphs.

¹⁹Tabarī, III, 1710; Amir Ali, A Short History of the Saracens: Being a Concise Account of the Rise and Decline of the Saracenic Power and of the Economic, Social and Intellectual Development of the Arab Nation (London: MacMillan & Co., 1955), pp. 281-283.

The steep decline in the Caliph's authority is demonstrated by the grant of the title amīr al-umārā' to Ibn Rā'iq Muhammad, governor of the province of al-^CIrāq, whose name was thrust by the military into the Friday khutbah side by side with the Caliph al-Rādī (322-329/934-940).²⁰ This unthinkable practice was probably dictated by the financial bankruptcy of the central government on account of the refusal of many governors and tax-farmers to pay their normal tributes. This rendered the Caliph a titular figure-head whose authority ended with the appointment of a vizier. In such capacity, Ibn Rā'iq was given the right to control the army and the finance of the caliphate. The supreme position of amīr al-umārā' lured many covetous adventurers, such as Bajkam, Ibn Rā'iq's own general, the Barīdī brothers, Abū ^CAbd Allāh and Yūsuf, and the Hamdānid Hasan and ^CAlī, to fight one another for supremacy. Tuzun, a Turkish officer, was the last to occupy that office before the coming of the Buwayhids.

With the advent of the Buwayhids to Baghdad, the Caliph was stripped of whatever privileges and dignity left for him by the amīrs. A permanent amirate with hereditary rights was established

²⁰ Ibn al-Athīr, VIII, 241, 507. His name was ordered to be mentioned in the khutbah in all pulpits, with the exception of the pulpits of Baghdad. Only Aḍūd al-Dawlah, the Buwayhid Sultan, introduced the innovation to have his name conjoined with that of the Caliph in the khutbah at Baghdad. See Amir Hasan Siddiqi, Caliphate and Kingship in Medieval Persia (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1942), p. 53, n. 1.

and the Caliph could no more appoint his vizier.²¹ In his impotence, the Caliph was given a fixed allowance by his own subordinates, and even its payment to him was at times at the mercy of the Buwayhids.²² On one occasion during the reign of Bakhtiyār^c Izz al-Dawlah (356-367/967-977), the second Buwayhid Sultan in Baghdad, he decided independently to declare Holy War (al-Jihād) against the Byzantines in the year 361/971; and on this pretext he tried to force Caliph al-Muṭṭī^c (334-363/946-974) to contribute 400,000 dirhams--a sum he did not possess. The only way for him to comply with the request was by selling some of his jewels and furniture.²³ The Caliph was quoted to have said:

The Sacred War would be incumbent on me if the world were in my hands, and if I had the management of the money and the troops. As things are, when all I have is a pittance insufficient for my wants, and the world is in your hands and those of the provincial rulers, neither the Sacred War, nor the Pilgrimage, nor any other matter requiring the attention of the Sovereign is a concern of mine. All you can claim from me is the name which is uttered in the Khutabah from your pulpits as a means of pacifying your subjects: and if you want me to renounce that privilege too, I am prepared to do so and leave everything to you.²⁴

²¹Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Ya^cqūb Ibn Miskawayh, Tajārib al-Ummam, ed. and tr. by H. F. Amedroz and D. S. Margoliouth, The Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1920-21), V, 399 and Siddiqi, p. 51.

²²Cl. Cahen, "Buwayhids," EI (New ed.), I, 1353.

²³Eclipse, V, 330.

²⁴Ibid. Ibn al-Athīr, VIII, 456.

These words, though intended to evade the demand and to gain sympathy, vividly illustrate the decline in the political power of the Caliph and his subservience to a merciless master.

Being Shi^Cites, the Buwayhids of course had no regard for the ^CAbbāsids whom they considered usurpers of the title and only worthy of the abject humiliation which befell them. Mu^CIzz al-Dawlah (320-356/932-967), the Buwayhid conqueror of Baghdad, had even once thought of replacing the ^CAbbāsīd caliphate by an ^CAlid one; but because of political considerations he was advised to drop such a design.²⁵

While the caliphate reached its lowest ebb under the Buwayhids, another Turkish nomadic group, the Saljūqs, came out of Central Asia to save it from complete perdition. They gave new life to the enfeebled caliphate. By conquering Persia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Asia Minor, they once again reunited the scattered provinces of Islam which had fallen under the control of different local dynasties independently from the caliphate. As new converts to Sunnite Islam, they vehemently fought the Byzantines and repelled their Anatolian inroads. They recovered Syria and the Holy Land from the Shi^Cite Fātimid caliphate in Egypt and started a wave of terror against Christian pilgrims from western Europe as well as the native eastern Christians.²⁶

²⁵Ibn al-Athīr, VIII, 399.

²⁶Stanley Lane-Poole, Muhammāden Dynasties (Beirut: Khayats, 1966), p. 150.

Nevertheless, the Caliphs were left little room to exercise their temporal power, though they were able to preach more freely in the atmosphere of their new Sunnite supporters. It was related that at the beginning, Tughril Beg (429-455/1037-1063), the first Great Saljūq, did not even conceive the idea of taking over the administration in Baghdad from the hands of the Caliphs. However, due to the lack of any lively interest in the assumption of power on the part of the Caliph and the wit of Tughril's vizier, ^cAmīd al-Mulk al-Kundarī,²⁷ Tughril decided in the end to control the seat of the caliphate.²⁸ The caliphate was further isolated by the Saljūqs from its distance provinces where many independent dynasties had arisen. Nizam al-Mulk, the most illustrious vizier of the Saljūqs, who inherited the former practices of tax-farming developed and systematized a feudal regime in al-^cIrāq. Land was granted to or taken by officers in return for military service. These grants, in theory and usual practice, were limited to a term of years and were always revocable.²⁹ But with the decline of the

^{27c}Amīd was a title of high officials of the Sāmānid-Ghaznavid administration and the Saljūqs extended it throughout their empire. According to W. Barthold, the title ^cAmīd al-Mulk was held under the Sāmānids and Ghaznavids by sāhib al-barīd. ^cAmīd al-mulk al-Kundarī, who might begin his career in this way, kept his former title when became vizier. See Cl. Cahen, "^cAmīd," EI (New ed.), I, 434.

²⁸Siddiqi, p.114, n. 3.

²⁹Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History (London: Grey Arrow, 1958), pp. 147-148.

central authority, these new feudatories began to assume a new phase of permanently settling down in their territories and ultimately aspired to complete independence. After the death of Nizām al-Mulk in 485/1092, which was followed shortly by that of Sultan Malik Shāh, the Saljūq Empire itself was divided into small segments known as Atabegates.

The Abbāsīd caliphate was so weakened under the Saljuqs that it could not take advantage of the confused situation that was created by the long internecine wars of succession to the sultanate among the sons of Malik Shāh whose empire fell apart in the Atabegs' hands.³⁰ From Caliph al-Mustarshid (512-529/1118-1135) down to Caliph al-Mustadī' (566-575/1170-1180), there was little else to say beside the fact that they continued to occupy a restricted throne surrounded by a shadowy court under a vizier.³¹ Finally, in the reign of al-Nāsir li-Dīn Allāh, an attempt to restore the political as well as spiritual status of the caliphate was contemplated. But it was "the flicker of an expiring flame."³² The Caliph succeeded in playing one faction off against another and maneuvered a number of political alliances.³³ He concluded a pact with Qizil Arslan,

³⁰ During the twenty-five years of Mustazhir (487-512/1093-1118), whether in the history of the fanatical strife at home or of the startling Crusade of the Christians in the Syrian land, the Caliph's name was hardly mentioned. Muir, The Caliphate, p. 585.

³¹ Ibid., p. 589.

³² Ibid., p. 591.

³³ With these alliances he hoped that some of them might work to his favor. Even though they contradicted each other, until he saw what was more advantageous for him to do. Herbert Mason, Two Statesmen of Mediaeval Islam (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), p. 91.

sāhib of Hamadān, and managed to keep Tughril II, the last Saljūq Sultan, in abeyance within Baghdad. After the murder of Qizil in 587/1191, the Caliph entered in a new alliance with Muḥammad Takash, the Khwārizm Shāh, who finally killed Tughril II in battle of 590/1194 at Rayy. Unfortunately for him, he found in Takash a far more formidable claimant to the sultanate than the crumbling house of the Saljūqs. In 591/1195, after his victory over the caliphal army at Hamadān, Takash demanded the title of Sultan from his religious superior and requested the inclusion of his name in the Friday khutbah at Baghdad.³⁴ The Caliph refused to acquiesce to these requests and afterwards succeeded in inciting one of his close allies, namely Ghiyāth al-Dīn of the Ghurids, to attack Takash. In the ensuing battles, the Ghurids inflicted heavy losses on the Khwārizm Shāh's major allies, the Qara Khitays, thus forcing the new pretender to retreat to his original frontiers where he was temporarily pacified by the Caliph.³⁵

As soon as 'Alā' al-Dīn, son and successor of Takash, had rid himself of the Ghurids, he renewed his father's claim to the sultanate. Once again the demanded was turned down. In 614/1217, 'Alā' al-Dīn decided to invade Baghdad and to depose the Caliph who was declared "unworthy of his office."³⁶ However, he was overtaken

³⁴Ibn al-Athīr, XII, 108-109 and 88; Juvaini, pp. 303-304.

³⁵Ibn al-Athīr, XII, 138.

³⁶Quoted from Siddiqi, p. 166.

by an unusually early snowstorm in the mountains of Kurdistān. Next year, the project of a second attack was impeded by the invasion of the Mongols whom the Caliph had reportedly invited to check 'Alā' al-Dīn's advance.³⁷ For the nonce, al-Nāsir was free from threat by the Khwārizm Shāh, yet his action virtually "brought misery upon western Asia, or at least accelerated its arrival," by arousing Mongol ambition.³⁸

After al-Nāsir's death, the caliphate once again sank into lethargy under his weak and incompetent successors. By the time of al-Musta'ṣim, the last 'Abbāsīd Caliph, the only man who dared, and sometimes with success, to combat the Mongols was Jalāl al-Dīn, son of 'Alā' al-Dīn, rather than the Caliph. However, Jalāl al-Dīn died in 628/1231 after being pursued by the Mongols. Consequently, all resistance against the Mongol advance was paralyzed.³⁹ The road to the conquest of the Islamic world was thus open to the Mongols.

Social Conditions

While the 'Abbāsīd Empire was weakened politically by the

³⁷ Jūzjānī, pp. 956-968; Muir, p. 592. Although W. Barthold refuted the idea of al-Nāsir's "inviting the Mongols," recent research confirms it. See Mason, pp. 111-112. The Caliph even entered an alliance with the Ismā'īlī ruler of Alāmut, and it is possible that he invited the Mongols to pursue his aim. See Hodgson; and G. E. Browne. See also Ibn Kathīr, XIII, 107-108.

³⁸ M. J. de Goeje, "Caliphate," Encyclopaedia of Britannica 11th ed. (Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1910), V, 53.

³⁹ Ibid.

presence of the Turks, its social disturbances were also complicated by it. The Turks terrorized the population of Baghdad, plundering private homes and attacking women and children.⁴⁰ When they, the populace, reacted violently in self-defense, the Turks put them to the point of the sword, wounding and murdering more people. These criminals were never stopped or punished; and the Caliph had no choice but to seek refuge for himself and his court far away from his own capital.

In reality, social disturbances which had marked the Islamic Empire from its inception, now reached indescribable limits. Social injustice created by the Umayyads was instrumental in bringing forth the success of the ^CAbbāsids, who skillfully formed favorable alliances with the discontented segments of the population. During the latter period of the Umayyads, the mawālī,⁴² whose status was inferior to that of the Arabs, combined with the Shi^Cites, who repudiated the right of Sunnite succession, and both became the core of the ^CAbbāsīd revolution against the Umayyad rule in Damascus.⁴³

⁴⁰ Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 264.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² This means clients and its singular form is mawlā.

⁴³ In addition, there was tribal strife among the Arabs settled in Persian territory. The most eminent of these tribes was the Yamānites. See M. A. Shaban, The ^CAbbasid Revolution (Cambridge: The University Press, 1970), pp. 156-163.

Consequently, the ^CAbbāsids made common cause with the ^CAlids, or Shi^Cites, by emphasizing the rights of the House of Hāshim to the caliphate. At the same time, they emerged as champions for the cause of the oppressed mawālī, who had been suffering from economic and social grievances and were promised restoration of the rule of justice in accordance with the Holy Scripture and the Sunnah, namely the Qur'^{ān} and the Traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. These alliances, though effective in overthrowing a common mighty foe, were very precarious and could not long survive. When the bond that held them together was dissolved, they found their interests in sharp contrast with one another. The ^CAbbāsids therefore broke that unnatural alliance and decided to eliminate their old supporters. The execution of Abū Muslim in 137/755, however, did not preclude the ^CAbbāsids from relying upon another mawālī party, the aristocratic Barmakids, for their expertise in state affairs.⁴⁴ With them, the star of the Persians ascended at the court and the influence of the Arab aristocracy was diminished. Henceforth, the struggle between the Persians and the Arabs for supremacy at the court gained momentum. In the course of the struggle, literary polemics emerged under the title of Shu^Cūbiyyah.⁴⁵

⁴⁴The House of Barmakid controlled the vizierate from Khalid till Ja^Cfar when Harūn al-Rashīd overthrew them in 187-803. See Hitti, pp. 294-295 and Lewis, p. 84.

⁴⁵For this movement see Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies, ed. by S. M. Stern. Tr. from the German by C. R. Barber and S. M. Stern. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1966), I:137-163, and H. A. R. Gibb, "The Social Significance of the Shu^Cūbiyya," Studies on the Civilization of Islam, ed. by Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), pp. 62-73.

The Shu^cūbiyyah movement, emerged during the end of the Umayyad dynasty, was an anti-Arab superiority movement developed out of the discontents of the non-Arab Muslims who, in spite of their advanced cultural achievements, suffered from the misrule of the Arabs. In the time of the ^cAbbāsids, the Shu^cūbites claimed not only equality with Arab Muslims, but also superiority for the mawālī, mainly Persians, over the Arabs in almost every aspect of life. However, the movement centered mainly around literary polemics. Few people outside the literary circle were involved. The movement continued unabated until the ascendance of the Turkish slaves in the tenth century.

However, the most serious problems facing the ^cAbbāsids were those of the movements of discontent with strong religious coloring, usually in the form of Shi^cite revolts.⁴⁶ The Shi^cites, who claimed that ^cAlī and his descendants were the sole legitimate heirs to the Prophet, were soon disillusioned by the fact that the ^cAbbāsids offered no more religious support to their ranks. Movements led by ^cAlids against these "^cAbbāsīd usurpers" recurred frequently. As the central authority weakened, a number of Shi^cites seized power in outlying parts of the Empire. The Idrisids established themselves in Morocco in 172/788, and the Fātimids in the rest of the Northwest of Africa in 296/909 and later in Syria after the close of 3rd/9th century. Finally, the Buwayhids captured Baghdad and they were also Shi^cites.

⁴⁶Lewis, The Arabs in History, pp. 99-100.

In fact, nearer home, the tables were turned in favor of the Shi^cites. As a result of their persecution by the ^cAbbāsīd government they became, in the minds of the people, a holy sect. Since the advent of the ^cAbbāsīds, the current of Shi^cism became widespread in all centers of urban culture and in all circles from the court itself and the bureaucracy to the rising bourgeoisie and the general populace in most cities.⁴⁷ Not only did this phenomenon appear again and again among successive viziers and their families, but it could be found among ruling houses and even among the ^cAbbāsīd Caliphs themselves.⁴⁸ Qādīs, scholars, and poets professing Shi^cism appeared in all provinces, including even distant Syria which had been hostile to Shi^cite propaganda from the very beginning.⁴⁹

The Shi^cite's insubordination found expression in the violent Zanj rebellion of 255-250/869-883.⁵⁰ Moreover, in the course of the Zanj rebellion, another Shi^cite movement of significance and more lasting effect was started by one of the votaries of the

⁴⁷Claude Cahen, "Mouvements populaires et automomisme urbain dans l'Asie musulmane du Moyen Age," *Arabica* VI (1959), pp. 27-28. Also Adam Mez, *The Renaissance of Islam*, tr. by Salahuddin Khuda Bakhsh an D. S. Margoliouth (Patna: Jubilee Printing, 1937), pp. 66-67.

⁴⁸Hamilton A. R. Gibb, "Government and Islam under the Early ^cAbbasids: the Political Collapse of Islam," *L'Elaboration de l'Islam* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961), p. 117. Caliph al-Mu^ctadid, for example, was one of them.

⁴⁹Mez, p. 60.

⁵⁰For the Zanj rebellion, see Theodore Noldeke, *Sketches from Eastern History*, tr. by John Sutherland Black and revised by the author. (Beirut: Khayats, 1963), pp. 146-175. Also al-Dūrī, *Dirāsāt*, pp. 164-174.

Ismā'īlī sect, named 'Abd Allāh ibn Maymūn al-Qaddāh in 260/873-4.⁵¹ He began to discuss the doctrines of Ismā'ilism through an organization of "the most subtle and effective means of politico-religious propaganda."⁵² From their base, the Ismā'ilis sent out missionaries across the lands of Islam to preach a new esoteric doctrine, known in Arabic as batiniyyah. According to their interpretation, every verse in the Qur'ān had two meanings: the one is exoteric and literal and the other esoteric and known only to the initiates. The religious truth could be understood by the discovery of an inner meaning of which the outer form (zahir) was a veil intended to keep that truth from the eyes of uninitiates.

This new Ismā'īlī propaganda found its fertile soil in al-'Irāq, and the mission was carried out by Hamdān al-Ash'ath, surnamed Qarmat, who was an Iraqi peasant.⁵³ He came to associate himself with Ismā'īlī doctrine about 260/874 before the death of the afore-mentioned 'Abd Allāh.⁵⁴

Ultimately he became the leader of the movement in al-'Irāq, with his brother-in-law 'Abdān as second in command, and by 277/890 he built himself an official residence, called Dār al-Hijrah, in the neighborhood of al-Kūfah.⁵⁵ In 287/899, his followers

⁵¹Hitti, p. 443.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Ibid., and S. M. Stern, "Ismā'ilīs and Qarmatians, L'Elaboration de l'Islam, p. 102.

⁵⁴Lewis, The Arabs in History, pp. 107-108; L. Massignon, "Karmatians," Encyclopedia of Islam, II, 767.

⁵⁵Ibid.

succeeded in founding a state independent of the ^CAbbāsīd caliphate in al-Aḥsā on the western shore of the Persian Gulf under the leadership of Abū Sa^Cīd al-Ḥasan al-Jannābī, originally a missionary of Qarmat.⁵⁶ They raided neighboring areas, laid waste most of lower al-^CIraq, and cut the caravan-routes of pilgrims. Their atrocities culminated in 318/930 in the seizure of Mecca and the carrying off of the Black Stone (al-Ka^Cabah) which they kept for twenty-one years.⁵⁷ This was, however, their last offensive move.⁵⁸

Until the Buwayhids established themselves in Baghdad, the Shi^Cites found it fertile ground for their movement. Despite the fact that "at no time did the Buwayhids plan the persecution of the Sunnis by the Shi^Cis,"⁵⁹ their policy was in every way encouraging to the development of the heterodox sect. Shortly after his entry into Baghdad, Mu^Cizz al-Dawlah created a sort of "^CAbbasid-shi^Ci condominium" to free the Shi^Cites from the obligation of a certain taqiyyah, or dissimulation.⁶⁰ The ^CAlids were thus separated from the jurisdiction of the ^CAbbāsīd naqīb⁶¹ and were placed under their

⁵⁶Massignon, p. 768; Hitti, p. 444.

⁵⁷Ibn al-Athīr, VIII, 136-154.

⁵⁸Ibid., and Ibn Hawqal, p. 210. At the time al-Jannābī established in Bahrayn, Maṣūṣ al-Yamān and ^CAlī bin al-Faḍl also settled down in Yamān. Later, the famous missionary Abū ^CAbd Al-lāh al-Shī^Ci, to whom the Fatimids owed their throne, came to North Africa from the Yaman in 280/893. See Stern, "Ismā^Cīlīs and Qarmatians," p. 100.

⁵⁹Cahen, "Buwayhids or Buyids," p. 1352; and Ibn al-Athīr, VII, 173.

⁶⁰Literally, it means caution, fear. See Hitti, p. 440.

⁶¹Naqīb means leader.

own.⁶² In addition, he openly inaugurated two new Shi^Cite official ceremonies, which became the source of much confusion between his co-religionists and the Sunnites in later times. The one was the lamentations of 'Āshūrā' which was performed on the tenth of Muharram in commemoration of the martyrdom of al-Husayn, and the other the festival of Īd al-Ghadīr, or Ghadīr Khumm, in memory of the alleged appointment of ^CAlī by the Prophet as his sole successor. The celebration of these ceremonies always created disturbances in the capital and provoked clashes between the two sects. In 354/966, the celebration of 'Āshūrā' led to open rioting and looting in the capital, resulting in injury to many people of both creeds.⁶³

Consequently, the Shi^Cites who had heretofore been strong and numerous in the quarter of al-Karkh in East Baghdad expanded into other quarters in Baghdad including Nahr al-Tābiq in West Baghdad and Sūq al-Silāh, Bāb al-Tāq, Sūq Yahyā and al-Furdah in East Baghdad.⁶⁴ Shi^Cite schools were also erected, such as Dār al-^Cilm of the vizier Sābūr, who endowed it from religious properties (waqfs).⁶⁵ With all these developments, clashes between the two sects multiplied. The most insignificant incident often turned into a riot. Hatred

⁶²Cahen, "Buwayhids," p. 1352; and ^CAbd al-Rahmān b. ^CAlī Ibn al-Jawzī, Kitāb al-Muntazam (Hyderabad: al-Ma^Carif, 1938-43), Viii, 56.

⁶³Ibn al-Athīr, VIII, 413.

⁶⁴Ibn al-Jawzī, VIII, 56.

⁶⁵Cahen, "Buwayhids," p. 1352; Ibn al-Jawzī, VII, 173.

between the sects played a considerable role in the fall of the caliphate in Baghdad.⁶⁶

Besides the Sunnite and Shi^Cite quarrels, other sectarian fights between the Hanbalites and Shafi^Cites and between Hanbalites and Ash^Carites also gave rise to much bloodshed and destruction.⁶⁷ All these conflicts could seldom be dissociated from the movement of ḥayyārūn (sing. ḥayyār)--literally meaning rascals, tramps, or vagabonds--who grew into a distinct class of trouble makers. The ḥayyārūn first appeared in Baghdad in the latter part of the second/ninth century. By the time of the civil war between al-Amīn and al-Ma'mūn in 198/812, they served in the army and numbered about fifty thousand.⁶⁸ They also appeared in other large cities, although with different designations.⁶⁹ Despite the fact that they attacked and looted stores, markets, and the homes of the rich dignitaries, they were not regular "robbers and thieves," as some Muslim historians proclaimed. They only constituted a class of people who were stricken with dire poverty and abject deprivation with no political rights. They simply consolidated their numbers to give vent to their political and economic grievances.⁷⁰ In 364/974, they

⁶⁶Gustave E. von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam: A Study in Cultural Orientation (2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 189.

⁶⁷A. A. Duri, "Baghdād," EI (New ed.), I, 900-902.

⁶⁸al-Tabarī, III, 872, 877, 881-883.

⁶⁹Fr. Taeschner, "Ḥayyār," EI (New ed.), I, 794.

⁷⁰Abd Ḥazīz al-Dūrī, Tārīkh al-ʿIrāq al-Iqtisādī fī al-Qarn al-Rabīʿ al-Hijrī (Baghdad: al-Maḥarīf, 1948), p. 86; and his "Baghdād," p. 900. Also Ibn al-Jawzī, VII, 174, 220; and Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 115.

seized the tax collection from the public authorities and later terrorized the merchants. Ultimately, in 380/990, they controlled Baghdad and appointed their own officials in every district;⁷¹ for four years, from 422/1030 to 425/1033, their leader, al-Burjuni, practically ruled the capital.⁷² They continued pillage and arson in many quarters during the Saljūq domination. When Caliph al-Nāsir eliminated the last Saljūqs, he was able to deflect their destructive nature by organizing their ranks into a new group called al-futuwwah.⁷³

Another form of mass disorder was the recurring revolts of the common people, the ḥammah,⁷⁴ who suffered economic hardship and oppression. However, it is very difficult to dissociate the violence of the ḥammah from the sectarian fights. In 654/1256, for example, when a fight broke out between the Sunnites and the Shi'ites, the soldiers sent to keep order joined the crowds of the ḥammah in the ensuing turmoil and pillage. In this incident the Karkh quarter was looted and several of its palaces were burned, and a number of people

⁷¹ Ibn al-Jawzī, VII, 153.

⁷² Ibn al-Jawzī, VIII, 66, 75-76.

⁷³ Ibid., VIII, 77; and also Badri Muḥammad Fahad, al-ḥammah bi-Baghdād fī al-Qarn al-Khāmis al-Hijrī: Baḥth Tārīkhī fī al-Hayyāt al-Ijtimā'iyah li-Jamāhir Baghdād (Baghdād: al-Irshād, 1967), p. 289.

⁷⁴ For the definition of the ḥammah, see Fahad, pp. 11-12. Also Ira Lapidus, Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 92.

were killed.⁷⁵ In spite of the fact that the revolts of the C⁻ammah were against the foreign domination of the Buwayhids and Saljūqs, economic hardship was essentially at the root of all these troubles.⁷⁶

The C⁻ammah had long suffered from economic oppression,⁷⁷ but economic conditions in the latter part of the C⁻Abbāsīd period were further aggravated by the frequent occurrence of natural calamities. Fires, inundations, and epidemics caused much hardship to the C⁻ammah, leading to the dislodgment of people and resulting in a decrease of population.⁷⁸ Not only were many lives lost in the floods, but the flood waters also caused much sickness. Epidemics were not uncommon in the Middle Ages as a result of those floods, although curiously enough most chroniclers register the damage done by the floods without referring to the epidemics that followed. Illustrations of those conditions may, however, be deduced from similar circumstances in relatively modern times. Even in more recent times--despite the advancement of medical knowledge--casualties resulting from these epidemics have been alarming. In 1831, a most destructive flood in Baghdad was followed by a plague, as reported

⁷⁵Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, pp. 314-315; al-Dūrī, "Baghdad," p. 902.

⁷⁶See Fahad, p. 310.

⁷⁷See next section on economic decline

⁷⁸Ibid.

by E. A. Wallis Budge.⁷⁹ The plague came from the north-west in March and crowds of natives fled to al-Basrah. An estimate of half of the population of 80,000 left Baghdad as soon as the rumor of the approach of the plague reached the city. However, many of them either were blocked by the flood-water or were robbed and stripped by the Bedouins, and had no choice but to return to the city. On April 10, it was reported that a thousand citizens of East Baghdad succumbed in a single day, and in another some 1,040 followed to the grave. For many days thereafter, the daily toll of deaths averaged one thousand. It was said that in the month of April, 30,000 (sic!) people died and that altogether two-thirds of the population were carried away by the plague.⁸⁰ Another plague which took place in 1773 was reported as having carried off victims at the rate of 2,000 a day, and an elderly man recalled that "one could walk from one end of the city to another and hardly meet a person or hear a sound."⁸¹

Although these were extraordinary examples, they nevertheless illustrated somewhat the decrease in population during the latter period of the ^cAbbāsids.⁸² By the middle of the fourth/tenth

⁷⁹E. A. Wallis Budge, By Nile and Tigris (London: John Murray, 1929), pp. 191-192.

⁸⁰Ibid. Also A. N. Groves, Journal of a Residence at Baghdad during the Years 1830 and 1831 (London: J. Nisbet, 1832), pp. 101-104.

⁸¹Groves, p. 11.

⁸²B. Spuler speaks of inadequacy of available military manpower during the Mongol invasion of Baghdad in his Mongol Period, p. 19.

century, the population of Baghdad began to dwindle.⁸³ The number of the inhabitants of the city by the time of the Mongol invasion must have been reduced greatly due to those political, social, and economic disorders as well as the recurrence of natural calamities. However, it is difficult to estimate the population of Baghdad at that time on account of the absence of any precise demographic information in contemporary sources. Modern scholars try to deduce some figures based upon various methods, but they differ tremendously. Some assert that the number was as little as 200,000 to 300,000; others claim it was two millions. Few substantiate their claims with convincing evidence based on original source material.

A. A. al-Dūrī based his estimate of one and a half million upon the total aggregate of baths in 383/993, the licenses of qualified doctors in the reign of al-Muqtadir, the number of participants in the last Friday of the month at the mosque of al-Mansūr and that of al-Rusāfah, and the number of river boats from the end of third/ninth century.⁸⁴

On the other hand, J. C. Russell, a specialist in medieval demography, contends that the population of Baghdad at its height must have been 300,000. He based his findings upon a comparative view of medieval demographic evidence. Taking the area of Baghdad

⁸³ al-Muqaddasī/Ranking and Azoo, p. 189.

⁸⁴ al-Dūrī, "Baghdad", p. 898.

given by Le Strange,⁸⁵ he calculated it as having 3,000 hectares,⁸⁶ an obvious mistake,⁸⁷ and then multiplied every hectare by an average of a hundred souls. This, he concludes, "would have been right for an empire of 20 million inhabitants."⁸⁸ While correcting Russell's miscalculation, J. Lassner, who also adopted Le Strange's figure, stated that the area of Baghdad was 7,000 hectares. On comparison with the population of Constantinople, Lassner claimed that the total population of Baghdad could have reached 280,000, but he further confused the issue by saying that "a figure twice that does not seem altogether impossible."⁸⁹ From the afore-mentioned estimates and discussions, one may conjecture that the inhabitants of the city varied greatly in numbers. Another author, namely, Robert McC Adams argues that Russell's figure of 300,000 people in Baghdad is too low, and he seems to accept E. Herzfeld's estimate of

⁸⁵Le Strange, Baghdad, pp. 40-46, 323-326. The area given by him was twenty-one square miles, which is also confirmed by al-Duri, ibid., p. 898. See also Map III.

⁸⁶Hectare is a metric unit of area equalling to 2.471 acres.

⁸⁷The correct calculation is 7,000 hectares as the area of both sides was 20½ square miles.

⁸⁸J. C. Russell, Late Ancient and Medieval Population, vol. 38, pt. 3 of Transactions of the American Philosophical Society (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1958), pp. 88-89.

⁸⁹Jacob Lassner, Topography of Baghdad in the Early Middle Ages: Text and Studies (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1970), pp. 158-160.

over a million.⁹⁰ Coke's one million, and Lapidus' 200,000 to 300,000 are, in the absence of any supporting documents, sheer conjecture.⁹¹

From the above survey, it would appear that we have no reliable information on the numerical estimate of the population of Baghdad during the height of the ^cAbbāsids. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that the inhabitants of Baghdad during the Mongol invasion must have been depleted. During the two and a half centuries of Buwayhid and Saljūq supremacy, Baghdad was gradually destroyed by floods, civil disorder, and fires. Towards the end of the fifth/eleventh century, many quarters of the city were in ruins, "kharābāt".⁹² In the sixth/twelfth century, the Andalusian pilgrim and famous geographer, Ibn Jubayr, described the western part of the city as "wholly overcome by ruins," although he did not fail to observe that some seventeen quarters of the city were still in existence.⁹³ About half a century later, Yāqūt, another great geographer, described West Baghdad as a series of isolated quarters

⁹⁰ E. Herzfeld, "Geschichte der Stadt Smarra," Die Ausgrabungen von Smarra, VI (1949); Robert McC Adams, Land Behind Baghdad: A History of Settlement on the Diyala Plains (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 90 and 180, n. 27.

⁹¹ A. Coke, Baghdad: the City of Peace (London: Butterworth, 1957), p. 257. Ira M. Lapidus, Middle Eastern Cities: a Symposium on Ancient Islamic, and Contemporary Middle Eastern Urbanism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 61.

⁹² Makdisi, "Topography," p. 282.

⁹³ Ibn Jubayr, p. 234. There were four most populous quarters: (1) Qurayyah, suburb near the Bridge of Boats; (2) Karkh; (3) Quarter of the Basrah Gate; (4) Shārī^c Sūq al-Māristān. See also Le Strange, Baghdad, p. 333.

each with a wall and separated by a wasteland full of ruins.⁹⁴

With regard to East Baghdad, the official seat of the caliphate since 251/865, Ibn Jubayr spoke of the Palaces of the Caliphs which covered an area of more than a quarter of the whole of the eastern city, and the magnificent markets and "a population that none could count save God Most High" ⁹⁵ How populous East Baghdad was at that time is equally difficult to ascertain. The political and social disorders had already forced many people, including numerous members of the important merchant class, to migrate elsewhere for security and for the safety of their business. Since the second half of the third/ninth century, breaches in the canals, and the decay of the irrigation systems led to the abandonment of arable lands and thus further depopulating the countryside as well as Baghdad.⁹⁶ Taking all these factors into consideration, the population of Baghdad in the years before the Mongol advance into Mesopotamia could not have exceeded half of its original population at the zenith of the ^CAbbāsīd power.

Economic Decline

The rise of the ^CAbbāsīds coincided with a time when

⁹⁴Yāqūt, Mu^Cjam al-Buldān, I, 232, 441, 444, 534, 635; II, 88, 167, 234, 459, 512, 783, 917; III, 193-4, 197, 231, 279, 291, 489; IV, 117, 252, 255, 385, 432, 457, 713-4, 786, 841, 845.

⁹⁵Ibn Jubayr, p. 237.

⁹⁶See Chapter V below.

expansion, and incidentally of fresh supplies of booty, grew to be more limited and rather sporadic. The ^CAbbāsids then had to look for other sources of revenue from countries already settled in order that they might be able to meet their onerous needs for both their own private spending as well as public governmental expenditure. The income of the empire could be divided into three categories: the sadāqah⁹⁷ and zakāt⁹⁸ revenue; the fay⁹⁹ revenues; the ghanimah¹⁰⁰ revenues.¹⁰¹ Not all these revenues, however, are "assets of the Treasury" (huquq bayt al-māl). Only a fifth of the ghanimah, for instance, would go to the Treasury. Similarly, the proceeds of sadāqah, or zakāt, were destined for a particular class of the Muslim community. The revenues that were intended for the expense of the administration, the pay and all allowances of the army, and the cost of public works and governmental buildings came from the fay' revenues, which consisted of the kharāj, or land tax levied upon Muslims and non-Muslims alike from the various territories as a whole, the jizyā, or poll-tax levied upon non-Muslims

⁹⁷Literally, sadāqah means alms-giving.

⁹⁸Literally, zakāt means legal alms.

⁹⁹Tribute from lands conquered by Muslims.

¹⁰⁰Booty revenues.

¹⁰¹See Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam; being the 2nd ed. of the Sociology of Islam. (Cambridge: University Press, 1962), pp. 308-309. In addition, see also Nicholas P. Agnides, Mohammed Theories of Fiance (Lahore: Premier Book House, 1961).

only,¹⁰² and the levies upon trade.¹⁰³ However, the jizyā lapsed upon conversion to Islam. As a result, the basic revenues of the empire fell heavily upon the land tax and trade levies. By the time of al-Mutawakkil, the land tax amounted to 75 per cent of all governmental income.¹⁰⁴

From the outset, great attention was paid to agricultural development. New canals were dug, while old ones blocked by the accumulation of sediment and already unusable by the end of the Sassanid dynasty (226-641 A. D.) were re-opened. Much of this restoration was undoubtedly done in Mesopotamia, where agriculture was a traditional practice, but large revenues from Khurāsān indicate that areas as remote as Central Asia were by no means overlooked.

Mesopotamia is known for its fertile delta formed by the Twin Rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, but it is not by nature an agricultural country.¹⁰⁵ Sophisticated systems of irrigation

¹⁰²In early Islam jizyā and kharāj are used interchangeably as land taxes. For its evolution see articles in Encyclopedia of Islam by Cl. Cahen, "Djizyā'," pp. 559-562.

¹⁰³al-Dūrī, Tārīkh al-Iqtisādī, pp. 108-158. The rate of trade levy was about ten per cent upon merchandise owned by non-Muslims and imported into Muslim territory.

¹⁰⁴M. Shamsuddin Mia, "Some Aspects of Revenue Administration Under the Early Abbasids with Reference to al-Mutawakkil," JPHS, XIV:3 (July, 1966), p. 174, and also Jahshiyārī, pp. 280-88.

¹⁰⁵Although the Mesopotamian plain is known for its fertility and productivity, Ahmad Sūsah's statement that it is by nature an agricultural country needs qualification. See his Irrigation in Iraq; its History and Development (Iraq: New Publishers, 1945), p. 6.

must be constantly maintained for efficient cultivation. Unlike the Nile, the floods of the Tigris and Euphrates do not coincide with the cultivation seasons in that they come either too early or too late for the crops. From the middle of the third/ninth century the declining political authority of the caliphate began to affect the care of the canals and the treatment of recurring floods. Yet, the struggles between the chiefs, i. e. amīrs, and amīr al-umara', as well as disturbances caused by the army led to further destruction. As a result, much cultivable land was destroyed.¹⁰⁶ The Buwayhids, Mu^cizz al-Dawlah and Adūd al-Dawlah, were credited for repairing the breaches in the canals, and in Nahrawan canal in particular.¹⁰⁷ But they soon fell into disuse. "Then we hear no more of such activities."¹⁰⁸ Towards the end of the ^cAbbāsids, floods became more frequent and dangerous. The most destructive of them took place shortly before the Mongol invasion, and most of the crops were washed away.¹⁰⁹

All these adverse developments indicate a steady decline in agricultural production and with it a reduction of government income. Yet, the extravagance of the court and the building of palaces continued lavishly. The employment of Turks as mercenaries since the reign of al-Mu^ctasim to replace the jund, the Arab army, rapidly drained government resources. As early as 252/867 the salary paid to

¹⁰⁶Yāqūt, I, 252.

¹⁰⁷Eclipse, V, 446-448.

¹⁰⁸al-Dūrī, "Baghdad," p. 899.

¹⁰⁹See Ch. VI.

the Turkish mercenaries amounted to 200,000,000 dīnār̄s which was equivalent to two years' income of the whole empire.¹¹⁰ When the soldiers did not receive their pay in time, there were recurrent riots and serious disturbances. Constantly in need of money, the ^CAbbāsīd Empire from very early times devised various measures to obtain what it needed from other sources. Tax-farming, the putting up of offices for auction, the sale of crown lands, and the confiscation of private fortunes were practiced. Nevertheless, the Treasury often remained empty.¹¹¹ The deficit was caused by the refusal of the tax-farmers to pay their dues. In most cases, the local governors, who became exceedingly powerful, were both tax-farmers and army commanders,¹¹² thereby creating a situation in which the Caliphs became incapable of enforcing the laws of the land.

The problem of military annuities paid to their armed forces continued to plague the Buwayhid Sultans. To solve the problem the Buwayhids generally adopted a system of land grants, iqṭā', already somewhat in existence before them, and used this revenue towards

¹¹⁰ al-Ṭabarī, III, 1685; Levy, Social Structure, p. 323; and Shimitzu, 45.

¹¹¹ Ann K. Lambton, "Reflections on the Iqṭā'^C" in Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of H. A. R. Gibb, ed. by G. Makdisi. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 364-5.

¹¹² The financial difficulty led to a wholesale extension of the farming of taxes. But, the money received from the farming of the taxes soon ceased to be sufficient to pay the army and their troops. Then the land was assigned, not to the tax-farmers, but to the military. These military soon established their independences. The Central Government in the last did not get help from the provincial government set up by them.

paying the military. But extortion soon arose in lands occupied by the military adventurers who had little regard for the interest of their subjects or for the country's long-term economic and social progress. As long as they were paid, they were satisfied.¹¹³ Sometimes, they even went to the extent of requisitioning the houses and landed estates of innocent and law abiding subjects for no ostensible reason besides extortion. Consequently, many people were forced against their will to emigrate.¹¹⁴ With these independent amirates, the domain and the income of the caliphate were reduced. During the Saljūq period, the iqṭā' system imposed by the Buwayhids became the order of the day, and the iqṭā' became hereditary either through the good graces of the Sultans or by usurpation.¹¹⁵ After the height of the Saljūqs, petty independent principalities multiplied with the result that the caliphate was ultimately deprived of its resources.

The expenses of the military were, however, regarded as small in comparison with the vast amounts spent on the royal household generally.¹¹⁶ The expenses of the royal household, with all its

¹¹³ Tax-farming had its defects. People who farmed the land usually had no permanent interest in it and were concerned mainly with squeezing as much as they could from it in the shortest possible time. Tenure was normally one year, though could be extended.

¹¹⁴ Eclipse, V:298-9; also in C. E. Bosworth, "Military Organization of the Būyids of Persia and Iraq," Oriens, XVIII-XIX (1967), p. 159.

¹¹⁵ Lambton, Landlords, Ch. III. Also Cl. Cahen, "Iktā'" Encyclopedia of Islam, New ed., p. 462. Cahen quotes the military officers saying, "The fief belongs to us, it is our property, we pass it on to our children from father to son and in return for it we are willing to run the risk of death."

¹¹⁶ Levy, The Social Structure, p. 323.

numerous branches, together with the cost of the buildings required to house them and their harems and huge retinues, were much greater. In addition, a great number of musicians and talented performers surrounding the Caliph were also paid generously from the Treasury. Finally there was the large and usually discontented clan of Hāshimites, who claimed kinship with the Prophet and the Caliph and thus were entitled to State pensions, which were regularly paid to them.¹¹⁷

Levies on trade were also on the decline. Disturbances and riots forced many rich people to move out of the capital. Houses in Baghdad were deserted and their owners actually paid people to live in them and keep them in good repair. Once the center of a lively concourse of traders and customers, the capital became in 393/1000 the playground of sparrows and pigeons.¹¹⁸ Great seaports such as al-'Ubullah, al-Basrah, and Sīrāf were either destroyed by rebellions or natural calamities. The Zanj rebellion sacked the former two sea ports and cut off Baghdad from the Persian Gulf, while the latter was badly damaged by an earthquake in 369/977.¹¹⁹ By the time the Fātimids settled in Egypt, Arab trade with the Far East was diverted from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea.

Trade activities between al-^cIrāq and the Orient in the

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 323.

¹¹⁸ Adam Mez, p. 7.

¹¹⁹ George Fadlo Hourani, Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 52.

first part of Abbāsid times was brisk as a result of the recession of the West into an agrarian society in which trade played only a subordinate role,¹²⁰ and to the rise of the T'ang Empire (618-907 A.D.) in China after five centuries of internal dismemberment.¹²¹ Chinese sources showed that after the Arab traders arrived at the T'ang court in 651 A. D., regular intercourse followed.¹²²

Muslim sources, on the other hand, tell us very little about when or how the Arab traders first came to China. Although there was information on the Shi'ite settlement on an island in one of the large rivers of China, opposite a port, and on the Ibadite merchants trading with the Chinese in the middle of second/eighth century,¹²³ the earliest Muslim narratives on the "East-West" trade relations date back only to the third/ninth century. They are conveniently collected by Abū Zayd Hassan of Sirāf in a work entitled Silsilat al-Tawārikh.¹²⁴ However, the trade was interrupted by the rebellion of Huang Ch'ao in 264/878 who besieged and sacked Canton,

¹²⁰Subhi Labib, "Egyptian Commercial Policy in the Middle Ages," in Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, ed. by M. A. Cook. (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 63-65.

¹²¹T'se-fu yuan-kuei, quoted in Chang Hsing-lang, Chung-hsi chiao-t'ung shi-liao hui-pien (Taipei: Shih-chieh Shu-chu, 1962), III, pt. 2, pp. 60-64.

¹²²T'ang shu, ed. Liu Hsu (Chi-ming ed. Taipei: Chi-ming Shu Chu, 1962), I, 10.51a; Hadi Hasan, A History of Persian Navigation (London: Methuen, 1928), p. 99; and Hourani, p. 63.

¹²³Hourani, p. 63.

¹²⁴There are many translations in European languages. For convenience, Renaudot's translation is used here. Eusebius Renaudot, Ancient Accounts of India and China by Two Mohammedan Travellers who Went to Those Ports in the 9th Century (London: S. Harding, 1733).

the seaport, and massacred many foreign merchants.¹²⁵ After this incident, the Kalah, or Kedah, in Malacca, the predecessor of the modern Singapore, took the place of Canton as the terminus of the East-West trade, where the Muslims and Chinese continued to meet. Soon, confusion overclouded China until 960 A. D., when the Sung Dynasty (960-1279 A. D.) emerged. Commercial activities resumed under the patronage of the new Empire and were carried on by the Mongols.

The Sung Dynasty, realizing the profit from the trade, made great efforts to attract overseas commerce directly with their country. Embassies were sent "to invite the foreign traders of the South Sea" to come to China and promises of favorable trading conditions were made. To encourage those who were particularly interested in promoting trade, the Chinese government even endowed them with official positions.¹²⁶ Furthermore, on their homeward journey, the Chinese officials would bid them goodbye with a feast and entertainment.¹²⁷ The efforts of the Chinese government in stimulating foreign trade achieved remarkable results.

The imperial storehouses were shortly packed with ivory, rhinoceros horns, pearls, jade, incense and scented woods and all the precious merchandise of the southern sea. To find a market for these goods the local officials of the empire were ordered to induce the people to purchase them with gold, piece-goods, rice and straw.¹²⁸

¹²⁵Ibid., pp. 41-42.

¹²⁶Sung shi, po-na ed., 85.

¹²⁷Ibid., and also Chang Hsing-lang, pp. 248-250.

¹²⁸Hirth and Rockhill, p. 19.

By 976 A. D., the revenue from foreign trade amounted to 300,000 min.¹²⁹ From 1128 A. D. to 1134 A. D., the revenue in Chuan-chou alone reached 980,000 min a year.¹³⁰ In 1159 A. D., Canton and Chuan-chou collected 2,000,000 min from trade profits.¹³¹

The revival of trade activity in China coincided with the rise of the Fātimids in Egypt whose economic policy rivaled that of ^CAbbāsīd caliphate. In addition to this challenge posed by the Fātimids, the persistent troubles of al-^CIrāq caused by the Zanj and later the Qarmatians reduced the flow of trade to the Persian Gulf.¹³² As a result, merchants abandoned their houses and migrated to other commercial centers. We find them settled in Southern India and North Africa. In the middle of the fourth/tenth century, the famous geographers al-Mas^Cūdī and al-Istakhrī reported that Arab settlements in Southern India had become well established.¹³³ There were Arab colonies in Daybūl, Bahara, al-Mansūrah, and Multān, and other places. Al-Mas^Cūdī also reported that in Saymūr alone, near the present Bombay, there was a Muslim community of about 10,000

¹²⁹Min, among other terms, was the term for a string of round coins. This term was frequently used during the Sung and earlier times. In theory a string should contain one thousand cash, but in actual transaction a smaller number was often accepted. See Lien-sheng Yang, Money and Credit in China, a Short History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 34-35.

¹³⁰Chang Hsing-lang, pp. 248-252; Hirth and Rockhill, pp. 18-19.

¹³¹Chang Hsing-lang, Chung-hsi chiao-t'ung, pp. 284-252.

¹³²Cl. Cahen, "Buwayhids," p. 1355. The complete segregation of Syria from Mesopotamia brought about by the Fātimid and Byzantine conquests also contributed to its decline in trade.

¹³³Elliot, I, 24-27.

people from Baghdad, al-Basrah, ^CUman, Sīrāf, and other countires.¹³⁴

Apparently, Arab trade with India benefited from their proximity and by the favor shown by the Indian rulers to the Muslim merchants.¹³⁵ The merchants were allowed to settle first on the western coast and then on the eastern. However, the exact date of their first settlements is difficult to ascertain. Shaykh Zayn al-Dīn in his Tahafat al-Mujāhidīn confirmed this by saying, "As for the exact date there is no certain information with us. Most probably it must have been two hundred years after the Hijrah."¹³⁶ The Muslim merchants, instead of carrying their merchandise from East to West or vice versa across the Indian Ocean, now distributed it in Cairo and the Egyptian emporia to the Venetians and the Genoese through whom the goods were transmitted to the actual consumers in Europe.¹³⁷

As a result of external competition and internal upheavals, Baghdad was relegated to a second place, at its best, in the commercial activity since the third/ninth century. The declining condition was so marked toward the end of fourth/tenth century that al-Muqaddasī, writing in 376/985-6 shortly after the Fātimid conquest of Egypt in 357/969, described the City of Peace by saying,

¹³⁴ Al-Mas^Cūdi, Le Prairies d'Or. Text ed. et tr. par C. Barbier de Meynard et Pavet de Courteille. (Paris: l'Imprimere Imperiale, 1861-1930), II: 85.

¹³⁵ A. Appadorai, Economic Conditions in Southern India (1000-1500 A. D.) (Madras: University of Madras, 1936), II:498.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 495.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

"It formerly was the best of all the possessions of the Muslims, and a most splendid city, far above our description of it, but after that the power of the Caliphs declined, it fell from its former state, and its population dwindled."¹³⁸ On the other hand, he saw the rise of al-Fustat, the old Cairo, and said, "al-Fustat of Miṣr (Egypt) in the present day is like the Baghdad of old; I know of no city in Islam superior to it."¹³⁹ Ships plied to it from the Islamic lands as well as from the Byzantine Empire and its territories in southern Italy and the Levant.¹⁴⁰ As in Southern India, we also find in North Africa many persons bearing family names derived from Muslim Eastern cities as remote as Wāsit, al-Basrah, Nīsābūr, and Samarqand active in trade business.¹⁴¹

Furthermore, writing in the middle of sixth/twelfth century, al-Idrisī reported that ^CAdan (Aden) was the port from which ships started for Sind, Hind (India), and ^Sīn (China). Many eastern goods, i. e., iron, weapons, musk, aloes, porcelain, pepper, galanga, camphor, piece-goods, tin, etc., arrived at ^CAdan and from there were transhipped to ^CAydhāb on the west coast of the Red Sea. The goods were then carried along the land routes to Aswan or Qūs and then on the Nile to Alexandria, where they were made available

¹³⁸ Muqaddasī/Ranking and Azoo, p. 189.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 323.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ See S. D. Goitein, Studies in Islamic History and Institutions (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), p. 285.

for the Venetian and Genoese traders.¹⁴²

In comparison with the great movement of goods by sea between the Middle East and the Orient, commercial traffic by land was relatively less preferred. Although the land-routes to the Far East were well-known since antiquity and caravan traffic was the most common means of communication and trading among the Arabs, the long, insecure and rugged nature of the routes made them less favorable than the sea-routes.¹⁴³ Traffic to India was hampered by difficult roads in the mountains of Afghanistan, while traffic to China had to pass through regions occupied by wild Turkish tribes who frequently interfered with it. Even the merchants from Samarqand, Bukhara, and other cities in Central Asia usually preferred the sea-route and went to China through al-Basrah.¹⁴⁴ After the fall of the Samanid Empire in 390/999, political conditions presented another obstacle to these undertakings. After the fall of the Samanids, eastern Iran and Transoxiana were divided between two Muslim Turkic powers: the Qarakhanids of Kashgaria, who took Transoxiana, and the Ghaznavids of Afghanistan, who took Khurāsān. Later in 431/1040, the Ghaznavids were beaten at the battle of Dandanaqan by another Turkic band, the Saljūqs, who finally captured Khurāsān and

¹⁴² Al-Idrisi, Geographie d'Edrisi, traduite en français d'après deux manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du roi et accompagnée de notes par P. Amédée. (Paris: Impr. Royale, 1836-40), I, 51-52.

¹⁴³ This is the famous Silk Road or the Khurāsān Road. See W. Heyd, Histoire du Commerce du Levant au Moyen-Age (Reprint. Amsterdam, A. M. Hakkert, 1959), I:38-40; also A. Stein, "Innermost Asia; Its Geography as a Factor in History" Geography Journal LXV:5 and 6 (May and June, 1925).

¹⁴⁴ al-Dūrī, Tārīkh al-Iqtisādī, pp. 150-154.

drove them back into Afghanistan and India. Even at the height of their power, the Saljuqs were constantly feuding--first with the Qarakhanids, later with the Khwarizmians.¹⁴⁵

Land-route trade with southern and central Russia and Europe was active, however, because "commercial navigation in the Mediterranean was limited to the parts under Muhammadan rule"¹⁴⁶ Trade with Northern countries was extensive, because slaves were a commodity very much in demand in the Islamic world. These activities are attested to not only by the writings of famous geographers, but also by the enormous number of Islamic coins found in different parts of Europe.¹⁴⁷ The majority of these coins belonged to the period from the end of the first/seventh to the beginning of the fifth/eleventh century.¹⁴⁸ However, most of these coins found in Europe belonged to the Samanids--rarely from Egypt and the western Muslim world--and were of the period between the end of the second/eighth and the middle of fourth/tenth century.¹⁴⁹

The scarcity of Muslim coins in the interior of Europe since the middle of fourth/tenth century coincided not only with

¹⁴⁵ René Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes; a History of Central Asia, tr. from the French by Naomi Walford. (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970), pp. 141-170.

¹⁴⁶ Kramers, "Geography and Commerce," p. 94.

¹⁴⁷ al-Mas'ūdī, II:15-18; Beazley, II:462; al-Dūrī, Tarīkh al-Iqtisādī, p. 153; Kramers, "Geography and Commerce," p. 100; and Labib, "Egyptian Commercial Policy," p. 64.

¹⁴⁸ Labib, "Egyptian Commercial Policy," p. 64; also his Handelsgeschichte Ägyptens im Spätmittelalter (1171-1517) (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1965), p. 5.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.; Mez, p. 472 and Heyd, I, 59.

the declining ^CAbbāsīd caliphate as the center of world commerce, but also with the disappearance of the Jewish merchants, called al-Rādāniyyah by the Muslims.¹⁵⁰ Ibn Khurdadhbīh, writing in 256/870, informs us that these Jewish merchants who knew Arabic, Persian, Greek, Frankish, Spanish, and the Slavonic languages, traveled regularly between the Eastern and Western countries.¹⁵¹ From the Western countries they imported slaves, furs, and swords in exchange for Oriental luxuries such as silk, gems, amber, pearls, musk, camphor, aloes-wood, cinnamon, etc. They were from the south of France and traveled by sea to Egypt and then to India. Others went overland from Ceuta to Egypt and from Syria to the Indus. "Often," remarked Adam Mez, "they preferred the overland route from Antioch to the Euphrates, proceeding thence via Baghdad to the Persian Gulf."¹⁵² However, since the fourth/tenth century, there is no mention of them, for "the rise of Muhammadan marine commerce drove the foreign middlemen out."¹⁵³ This was due to the rise of the Karimites (al-Kārimīyyah)¹⁵⁴ in Egypt presumably since the

¹⁵⁰ These Radanites formed a kind of Jewish corporation specializing in eight but precious imports as mentioned below.

¹⁵¹ Abū al-Qāsim ^CUbayd Allāh Ibn Khurdadhbīh, Kitāb al-Masālik wa-al-Mamālik, ed. by M. H. de Goeje. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1967), pp. 153-155. See also Labib, Handelsgeschichte Ägyptens, p. 5; Aziz S. Atiya, Crusade, Commerce and Culture (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), pp. 196-197; Mez, p. 471; and Kramers, "Geography and Commerce," p. 102.

¹⁵² Mez, p. 471.

¹⁵³ Ibid., and Atiya, p. 197.

¹⁵⁴ These Karimites became a kind of Muslim corporation specializing in massive imports such as pepper, spices, cotton, ivory, ebony, etc. from Asia and Africa.

fourth/tenth century under the early Fatimids.¹⁵⁵

Furthermore, there were disturbances in the Slavic north since the fourth/tenth century, as the Northmen advanced into the Caspian Sea from the Volga. They invaded and pillaged the area several times, and in 358/969 destroyed the metropolis of the Khazars. Consequently, the Khazars' visit to the Muslim land ceased at this time.¹⁵⁶ The Khazars, whose Empire was situated by the Caspian Sea and the mouths of the Volga, had been active middlemen between the Muslim land and Eastern Europe. Although this trade had been less important for the exchange of merchandise, the Khazar Empire had been a kind of buffer-state between the Muslim and Christian Empires. As such it furthered the transmission of many Islamic and oriental products which found their way into Christian countries.¹⁵⁷

Also in the fourth/tenth century, merchants from the Frankish kingdoms arrived at Cairo, and during the next century they con-

¹⁵⁵Atiya, *Crusade, Commerce and Culture*, p. 197. For the Karimites, see E. Ashtor, "The Karimi Merchants," *JRAS*, 1956, pp. 45-65; Walter J. Fischel, "The Spice Trade in Mamluk Egypt: A Contribution to the Economic History of Medieval Islam," *JESHO*, I:2 (April 1958), pp. 157-174; S. D. Goitein, "New Light on the Beginnings of the Karim Merchants," *JESHO*, I:2 (April 1958), pp. 175-184; Gaston Wiet, "Les Marchands d'Epices sous les Sultans Mamlouks," *Cahiers d'Histoire Egyptienne*, VII:2 (Mai 1955), pp. 81-134; and Subhi Labib, "Al-Tijārat al-Kārimīyyah wa-Tijārat Miṣr fī al-^CUṣūr al-Wustā" *Majallat al-Jam^Ciyyah al-Misriyyah lil-Dirasat al-Tārīkhiyyah* (*Bulletin de la Societé Egyptienne d'Etudes Historiques*), IV (1952), pp. 5-63.

¹⁵⁶Mez, p. 472.

¹⁵⁷Kramers, "Geography and Commerce," p. 101.

tinued to strengthen and widen their commercial contacts with Egypt. Finally, in 549/1154, the Pisans succeeded in obtaining a trade treaty and a funduq¹⁵⁸ in Cairo, in addition to their funduq in Alexandria.¹⁵⁹

In sum, the rise of the Fāṭimids with their commercial policy, in addition to disorders in al-^CIrāq and the Persian Gulf, diverted trade activity to Egypt via the Red Sea. "It was now Cairo and Alexandria, not Baghdad and Basra, which were among the most important emporia."¹⁶⁰ Even during the period of the Crusades, the markets of Baghdad relatively revived by the trading impetus given by the Latin settlement, could regain neither their dominance in commercial activity nor could they recapture their former prominent position. It was not until the Mongols ruled al-^CIrāq, and the security of communication both on land by sea attained, that trade activity in the Persian Gulf and thus of Baghdad was to a degree resumed. The rise of Hurmuz on the Persian Gulf and its later development into an important commercial emporium during the Mongol time will be discussed in a later chapter.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸This Arabic funduq, meaning hostelry, is derived from the Greek pandokeion. Through Arabic, this word passed into European languages as fondaco, fondachi, foneechi, and fundicum.

¹⁵⁹Labib, "Egyptian Commercial Policy," p. 66.

¹⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 67-68.

¹⁶¹It will be discussed in Ch. III.

Conclusion

Brief as it is, the above discussion shows clearly that toward the end of their rule, the ^CAbbāsids were only the shadow of their past glories. Before the coming of the Mongols, the ^CAbbāsīd Empire had been twice conquered by the steppe nomads, the Buwayhids and the Saljūqs. The authority of the Caliphs had been reduced to the appointment of their viziers, and their domains were reduced to a province or two. Following their dwindling political power, the caliphate's spiritual authority was later challenged by various rival caliphates in Spain and North Africa as well as in Central Asia. Despite the imminent danger of the Mongol invasion, a call for the jihād brought no response from the Muslim world. Internally, the caliphate was weakened by factional differences among the Sunnites and the Shi^Cites, and this was further aggravated by the economic decline. The man-power shortage presented another serious problem in the face of such a formidable enemy as the Mongols.

On the other hand, the Mongols under their leader Chingiz Khan had successfully demonstrated their military prowess by conquering a part of northern China and Persia. Chingiz died in August 1227 A. D. during an attack on the Tangut Mongols, called Hsi-hsia by the Chinese. After a regency lasting two years, Ogotai was unanimously elected as Great Khan in 1229 A. D. It was in his reign that the Mongol institutions were formulated. Ogotai enlarged the capital Qara Qorum in Mongolia, introduced the cultivation of fruit and vegetables, organized the supply of food by imports from China,

and established various political institutions. However, most importantly, he took an active interest in the preparation of new military expeditions. After several years of reorganizing, new armies again started their advance towards the West around the year 1236. It was at this time that the Mongols devastated the European terrains. Only the death of Ogotai in 1241 A. D. saved Europe from complete subjugation to the Mongol hordes. Nevertheless, the Mongol tide began to rise, and the next expedition was aimed at the Islamic world. In 1248 A. D., a mission was sent by Eljigitei, the commander of Western Asia, to St. Louis in Cyprus to deliberate on concerted efforts between the far West and the Far East to destroy the Islamic world. Actually when the Franks attacked Egypt, the Mongols began to invade al-^cIra^q with Baghdad as their target.

CHAPTER II

THE FALL OF BAGHDAD

Invited by Caliph al-Nāsir, Chingiz Khan launched his attack upon the Khwārizm Shāh, 'Alā' al-Dīn Muhammad, the most powerful ruler in the Muslim world,¹ and after the first encounter put him to flight. With the retreat of the Khwārizm Shāh and his army, many cities in Khurāsān were left defenseless. Yet, they refused to surrender. After rejecting the Mongol calls to surrender, they were taken by storm and then suffered massive massacre. To the people, the invasion seemed to have been a natural calamity, for they had no idea as to who the invaders were and whence they came. Only the historians of the next generation realized how these things had come about. By this time, the descendants of Chingiz Khan succeeded in building a vast empire extending from the Pacific to the heart of Europe.

Chingiz Khan, a Mongol title meaning "Universal Ruler,"²

¹The empire by now was very vast and ill-knitted. The swollen army of Kipchak slaves oppressed the people and exhausted the treasury. The bureaucracy was alienated by their exaction, and the religious leaders were disturbed by the rupture with the Caliph. The commercial classes, moreover, resented the rising burden of taxation. Thus, the Shah could depend upon the loyalty of few of his subjects. See Barthold, Turkestan, pp. 322-380.

²The meaning of this term is still inconclusive. The present one is adopted from Paul Pelliot. See Pelliot, "Les Mongols et la Papauté," Revue de l'Orient Chretien, XXIII (1922-23), XXIV (1924), and XXVIII (1931-32.)

was born in 1167³ and his original name was Temujin. At the age of about ten, he lost his father, Ysaugai, a powerful tribal leader. In accordance with Mongol custom, the loyalty of his tribesmen terminate at the death of their leader. Temujin's mother, nevertheless, made a valiant attempt to hold the tribe together until he reached manhood and began to display his genius as the leader of the whole of the Mongol people. After he subdued the Keraits and Naimans, the kin of the Mongols, in 1203 and 1206 respectively, he was hailed as supreme ruler of the Mongol peoples at a quriltai,⁴ Grand Assembly, in the spring of 1206. He then embarked on a series of successful campaigns at Chin (1115-1234) in northern China and Qara-Khitai (1124-1213) in Eastern Turkestan.⁵ He died a few years after the conquests in Persia.

Although the Mongol Empire survived the death of its founder, Chingiz Khan, its unity was not preserved. The Empire was divided in accordance with the decree of Chingiz Khan into four parts among his principal wife's four sons. The Great Khan's will was promptly carried out, but the dispute over succession constituted a grave problem that came to a head after Ogotai's death in 1241.

³The date is also uncertain. Some authorities place his birth twelve years earlier.

⁴This is a Mongol term indicating the meeting of all Mongol aristocracy to decide most important matters. See Yanai Watari, "Mong-ku Ku-li-er-tai tzu yen-chiu" in Yuan ch'ao tzu-tu shih, tr. from the Japanese by Ch'en chieh and Ch'en Ching-chuen (Taipei: Commercial Press, 1963), pp. 51-129.

⁵See Barthold, Turkestan, pp. 323-380; K. A. Wittfogel and Chia-sheng Feng, History of Chinese Society: Liao (907-1125) (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1949), particularly pp. 619-673.

The choice of Kuyuk as the successor of Ogodai foreshadowed an outbreak of hostilities between the Great Khan, Khan of Mongolia, and Batu, the Khan of the Golden Horde and son of Juchi, the eldest son of Chingiz Khan. War between them became imminent. In 1248, on his way to subjugate Batu (1226-1256), Kuyuk Khan (1246-1248) died of gout and alcoholism after a reign of less than two years. His death precipitated new crises in the succession, in addition to the hostility that had existed between the House of Ogodai and the House of Juchi. After Kuyuk, the House of Ogodai had no obvious candidate for the throne, while Batu of the House of Juchi enjoyed renown and influence as the senior prince of the Mongol Empire and was recognized by the princes as having the decisive vote. However, there was a third contender, Mongke from the House of Tolui, the youngest son of Chingiz Khan who ruled Mongolia proper. His mother, Sorqoqtani Beki, was in particular determined to press the claims of her eldest son. Following a fierce struggle among all the princes, the choice finally fell upon Mongke with strong support from Batu.

Thus decided, a quriltai was held in 1251 to solemnly proclaim Mongke as Great Khan. Immediately after the ceremony, a great trial of those princes accused of forming a conspiracy against Mongke's life followed. The trial ended with the murder of the atabeg of Siremun, Kuyuk's nephew, and the execution of seventy-seven amirs.⁶ Siremun and the other princes were for a time pardoned, but

⁶Barthold, Turkestan, p. 479; M. Le Baron C. D'Ohsson, Histoire de Mongols, depuis Tchinguiz-Khan jusqu'a Timour Bey ou Tamerlan (The Hague, 1834-35), II, 269.

several years later, Mongke had Siremun thrown into the water and drowned. Queen Oghul Gaymish, mother of Kuyuk Khan, and Siremun's mother, Qadaqach Khatun,⁷ were also put to death. A purge then followed. In conjunction with all these developments, two large armies were sent to the west to destroy Mongke's enemies, i. e., the Chagaitaids of Transoxiana⁸ and the Ogoduids.⁹

In view of the situation that developed after the death of Kuyuk, it is doubtful that Mongke made his decisions at the quriltai of 1251 to send expeditions into both China and Western Asia. If the decision had thus been made as commonly believed,¹⁰ Mongke was too occupied with his trials and military expeditions to the ulus¹¹ of Chagatai and Ogodai to carry out his vows. The Chinese official history of the Mongols, Yuan shih, mentioned nothing of the expeditions until the second year of Mongke's reign. The Yuan shih stated that Hūlāgū, the brother of the Great Khan and the conqueror of Baghdad, was ordered to conquer Western Asia and Kubilai, another brother and the founder of the Mongol Yuan dynasty in China, to conquer

⁷Khatun is a Turkish term meaning lady.

⁸Both spellings of Transoxiana and Transoxania are correct. It is an area between the Jaxartes River, or Syr Darya and Oxus River, or Amu Darya.

^{9c}Ala-ad-Dīn ^cAta-Malik Juvaini, The History of the World-Conqueror, tr. from the text of Mirza Muhammad Qazvini by John Andrew Boyle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), II: 579-596.

¹⁰D'Ohsson, III:106; and Boyle, "History of the Īl-Khāns," p. 340.

¹¹Ulus means the fief in Mongolian.

China.¹² 'Atā' Malik al-Juwaynī also remarked that after Mongke settled the business with the princes, he "turned his attention to the administration of the realm and the straightening of the crooked, and the righting of the wrong, and the chiding of the wicked, and the suppression of the seditions."¹³ The first thing he did was to appoint his two brothers to undertake the expeditions to the East and West. However, Hūlāgū did not set off until the summer of 1253.¹⁴

Mongke's expeditions, of course, fell within the framework of Chingiz Khan's dream of world empire. He once had stated proudly "One sun in heaven, one Lord on earth."¹⁵ His duty was thus to complete the execution of Chingiz Khan's will, which Ogodai had only been able to fulfill in part.¹⁶ However, the internal situation after the ascension of Mongke also suggests another possibility. It may be conceived that Mongke tried to explore new channels to divert the attention of the Mongol princes from internecine struggle to new conquest. Conquests mean more booty and in turn would satisfy the greedy princes who coveted the throne. Mongol princes

¹²Yuan shih, ed. Sung Lien et al. (Taipei: Chi-Ming Book Co., 1962), 3.8.

¹³Juvaini, II, 95.

¹⁴The Chinese source mentions that he left for Western Asia in the sixth month of the lunar calendar year which coincided with the end of August and the beginning of September. However, Muslim sources say that it was in October.

¹⁵Spuler, The Mongol Period, p. 5.

¹⁶Ogodai who reigned from 1229 to 1241 dispatched General Batu to Europe against the Christians. However, Baghdad was among those regions to be conquered.

from all ulus were ordered to support the western expedition and deliberations were carefully planned.¹⁷

When Hūlāgū bade farewell to his brother, he was enjoined to conform without variation to the yāsaq¹⁸ of Chingiz Khan: that is, to spare and protect those who submitted, but to pillage and put to the sword, without distinction of age or sex, all who resisted his authority. He was further instructed to annihilate the Ismā^cīlites and to destroy completely their castles.¹⁹ After this task had been successfully accomplished, he would march on to Baghdad, the seat of the ^cAbbāsīd caliphate, and attack the Caliph "only if he refused to render his allegiance."²⁰

It is not clear why the Ismā^cīlites were made an unprecedented case in this expedition. Never had any state been the sole target of complete destruction. Jūzjānī, the author of Tabaqāt-i Nāsiri, remarked that Mongke's decision to wipe out the Ismā^cīlites was induced by Shams al-Dīn, Imām qādī of Qazwīn, of Sunnite faith. These Sunnite Qazwīnis were close neighbors of the Shi^cite Ismā^cīlites and there had long been a feud between them. On several journeys to China, Shams al-Dīn, for reasons of protection against attacks by the fanatic Ismā^cīlites, always wore a coat of mail under

¹⁷Boyle, "History of the Il-Khans," p. 340.

¹⁸Mongol term for code.

¹⁹Boyle, "History of the Il-Khans," p. 340; D'Ohsson, III, 107.

²⁰Boyle, "History of the Il-Khans," p. 340.

his clothes. This peculiar behavior finally became known to Mongke who summoned Shams al-Dīn and asked him the reason behind it. Seizing this as an opportunity to incur Mongke's wrath against the Ismā^cīlites, he said that he wanted to safeguard himself against those heretics whom he described as a danger not only to Sunnites but also to the Mongols.²¹ Upon his ascension to the throne, Mongke decided to destroy the Ismā^cīlites, according to D'Ohsson.²² However, the Jacobite chronicler, Bar Hebraeus, known as Abu'l Faraj in Arabic, pointed out that the Mongols had already for some time been at war with the Assassins, another name for that fanatic sect. It was through their activities that one of the Mongol chiefs, named Chagatai,²³ had been assassinated.²⁴ The expedition against the Assassins was in the nature of a punishment.

With regard to the ^cAbbāsīd caliphate, the conquest had

²¹Uthmān ibn Siraj al-Dīn Jūzjānī, Tabakāt-i-Nāsirī, A General History of the Muhammadan Dynasties of Asia, including Hindustan, from A. H. 194 to A. H. 658 and the Irruption of the Infidel Mughuls into Islam, tr. from original Persian manuscripts by H. G. Raverty (London: Gilbert & Rivington, 1881-1889), pp. 1189-1196. Also Yuan shih, 3.8. Kitbuqa was ordered to conquer Mulāhids in the autumn 1252.

²²D'Ohsson, III, 170.

²³One source says this Chagatai is the son of Chingiz Khan. However, this is doubtful because Chagatai, son of Chingiz Khan, died at his ulus. See Juzjani, p. 1148, and Barthold, Turkestan, p. 473.

²⁴Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography of Gregory Abū'l Faraj, Being the First Part of his Political History of the World, tr. from the Syriac by Ernest A. Wallis Budge. (London: Oxford University Press, 1932), I:415.

been contemplated long before Hūlāgū's expedition.²⁵ The Mongols first came into contact with the Abbāsids during the reign of the first Great Khan, Chingiz, who had been reportedly invited by Caliph al-Nāsir to save him from an attack by Khwārizm Shāh. The conquest of Khwārizm was thus started. After defeating Khwārizm Shāh and capturing his capital, Urgench, Chingiz Khan dispatched his general, Chormaqaṅ, to attack Baghdad, according to Yuan-ch'ao pi-shih (Secret History of the Yuan Mongols).²⁶ The expedition took place around 1219-20 which is in agreement with the appearance of the Mongol hordes in Upper Mesopotamia as reported by Ibn Kathīr.²⁷ The Yuan-ch'ao pi-shih further mentioned that subsequent to the succession of Ogodai in 1229, he sent, after consulting Chagatai, a reinforcement to Chormaqaṅ, who was still in the West. This time, again according to the Yuan-ch'ao pi-shih, the caliphate in Baghdad was brought to submission.²⁸ This latter event was also made known to John de Plano Carpini, the envoy of Pope Innocent IV

²⁵ Negotiations have been reached between the Mongols and the Christians to attack Egypt and Iraq. See Aziz S. Atiya, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages (2nd ed. New York: Kraus Reprint, 1965), pp. 238-245; and Eric Voegelin, "The Mongol Orders of Submission to European Power, 1245-1255," Byzantium: International Journal of Byzantine Studies XV (1940-41), pp. 378-413.

²⁶ Yuan-ch'ao pi-shih, ed. with comentary by Ch'en Ping-ho (Taiwan: Commercial Press, 1968), p. 170. The date of this conquest, according to Grousset, was April 1221. Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes, p. 239.

²⁷ Ibn Kathīr, XIII, 86, 94. Muslim sources also confirmed that the first Mongol raid in Mesopotamia took place in 1220. See later discussion in this chapter.

²⁸ Yuan-ch'ao pi-shih, pp. 176, 178.

(1243-1254) to the East, and was recorded in his narratives. He related that after Cirpodan, the general who was sent by Ogodai, subdued the Kergis²⁹ and the Armenians, he went on to sack and conquer, even as far as the dominions of the Sultan of Aleppo. The same army, John de Plano Carpini continued,

attacked the territory of the Caliph of Baghdad, which it also subdued. Every day they pay them as tribute four hundred besants, in addition to brocades and other gifts. Every year the Tartars send envoys telling the Caliph to come to them, and every year he sends magnificent presents with the tribute, begging them to release him from this obligation. The Emperor accepts the presents, nevertheless he sends for him to come.³⁰

The Baghdad affair was once again brought up by Kuyuk in the quriltai of 1246 in which he was elected Khan. At the end of the quriltai, when the representatives of various countries participating in the enthronement were taking leave of the new monarch, Kuyuk Khan sent to the Caliph of Baghdad by way of his ambassador a message of severe threat as consequence of a complaint made against him by Siremun, the son of Chormaqan, who was then in Persian Iraq.³¹

²⁹The Circassians, or Cherkess. However, according to Painter, this is untrue. See R. A. Skelton, Thomas E. Marston, and George D. Painter, The Vinland Map and the Tartar Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 291.

³⁰Christopher Dawson, The Mongol Mission; Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, tr. by a Nun of Stanbrook Abbey. Ed. and with an introduction by Christopher Dawson. (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), p. 32; and Manuel Komroff, Contemporaries of Marco Polo (New York: Boni & Liveright, 1928), p. 24.

³¹David Price, Chronological Retrospect, or Memoir of the Principal Events of Mohammed History (London: J. Booth, 1821), II, 511. Bar Hebraeus, I, 411. J. A. Boyle, The Successors of Genghis Khan, tr. from the Persian of Rashid al-Din (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 184.

At the event of Kuyuk's ascension to the throne, the ^CAbbāsīd Caliph was among other rulers who sent ambassadors to the Mongol court. The chief qādī Fakhr al-Dīn was the Caliph's delegate on that occasion.³² However, no further action was taken by Kuyuk Khan in connection with this incident because he died in March or April or 1248.³³

By now, the Mongols had subdued a vast area of the Islamic Empire. The subjugation of so many Muslim subjects within these frontiers whetted Mongolian appetite to try to control and dominate the chief religious institution in the Muslim world, an idea differing little from those of the Buwayhids and the Saljuqs. With the Caliph on their side, they would have a legitimate claim to rule over their Muslim subjects with little difficulty.

On the other hand, Muslim sources give the earliest Mongol raid upon Upper Mesopotamia as far back as 1220. The first Mongol hordes according to Ibn Kathīr (d. 1372), invaded the region in 1220 and reached as far as Irbīl.³⁴ The next year, the Mongols marched on to Irbīl again from Ādharbayjān and raided in the vicinity of Baghdad.³⁵ The Mongols finally withdrew from Mesopotamia and

³²Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, Successors, p. 181; Bar Hebraeus, p. 411.

³³This is in accordance with Yuan-shih. In the Chinese lunar calendar, it was in the third month of 1248. See Pelliot, "Les Mongol et la Papauté."

³⁴Ibn Kathīr, XIII, 86, 94.

³⁵Kamal al-Dīn abi al-Fadl ^CAbd al-Razzāq Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, al-Hawādith al-Jāmi'a wa-al-Tajārib al-Nāfi'a fi al-Mia al-Sābi'a, ed. by Mustāfa Jawad (Baghdād: al-Maktabah al-^CArabiyyah, 1932), p. 99.

only returned to raid it with their conquest of the Khwārizmian Empire. Following the conquest of Khwārizm in 1230, Upper Mesopotamia was always under Mongol menace till 1238. In 1236, Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu', the Sultan of Mawsil (Mosul) submitted to the authority of the Mongols and before long helped them in their siege of Irbīl as well as in the attacks on Baghdad.³⁶ Two years later, after they had again looted Irbīl and laid it waste, the Mongols came very close to the City of Peace. The armies of the caliphate, led by Mujāhid al-Dīn, the Dawitdār, and Sharīf al-Dīn Iqbāl Sharābī, the chief of ulama' (Muslim learned men), sallied forth and put them to flight, just as in their previous skirmishes.³⁷ However, late in that year the Mongols came back again in full array and defeated the Muslim armies. They departed with great booty. Until Hūlāgū's expedition into Western Asia, the Mongols' last raid on the vicinity of Baghdad was in 1245. Hitherto the Mongols made many raids into Upper Mesopotamia and reached as far as the outskirts of the Abbāsīd capital, but they could not hold on to the area.

The Road to Baghdad

Hūlāgū's expedition into Western Asia was very deliberately

³⁶Juvaini, II, 607-611; Bar Hebraeus, pp. 419-422. See also S. D. Goiten, "Glimpse from the Cairo Geniza on Naval Warfare in the Mediterranean and on the Mongol Invasion," Studi Orientalistici in Onore di Giorgio Levi Della Vida (Roma: Istituto per l'Oriente, 1956), I, 398-401.

³⁷E. Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources: Fragments towards the Knowledge of the Geography and History of Central and Western Asia from the 13th to the 17th Century (Reprint. New York: Noble, 1967), I, 115-116.

prepared and planned. From all the armies of the East and West in the Mongol Empire, two persons out of every ten were requested to join the expedition. Thus, the army included many contingents from the subjects of all the Mongol princes--sons, brothers, and nephews of the Great Khan.³⁸ Chinese recruits, "skilled in the working of engines of war and in throwing naphtha" were sent with the army. The roads which led toward Western Asia were cleared and bridges were either repaired or built. All pasturage on both sides of the route from the Khangai Mountains to the Oxus was reserved for the Mongol horses. Feasts were given in turn by Mongol amirs and Hūlāgū himself. In the month of Rabī^c al-Awwal of 651/May 1253, Hūlāgū returned to his own ordu (domain) to settle his own affairs and remained there for some time. Finally, both he and his army set off for the West in Sha^cbān 651/October 1253.³⁹

Almost three years, according to Muslim sources, or a year, according to Yuan shih, before Hūlāgū marched on to Western Asia, an army under the most trusted general Kitbuqa, had been sent to attack the Mulhids, i. e., the Ismā^cīlites. With Kitbuqa's advance, the Mongol authority was reestablished over the main towns of the Iranian plateau and some of the lesser Ismā^cīlite strongholds also had been captured before Hūlāgū's arrival.⁴⁰

³⁸"He dismantled some of his castles, but made only token demolitions at Alamut, Maymuniz and Lamasar, and asked for a year's grace before presenting himself in person." Quoted from Bernard Lewis, The Assassins: A radical Sect in Islam (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 92.

³⁹Juvaini, p. 611.

⁴⁰Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I, 256. Yuan-shih, .8.

Hūlāgū's march was made at a leisurely pace and it took more than twelve months for him to reach Samarqand, where he was magnificently entertained by Mahmud Yalwach's son, Mus^Cud Bey, Governor of mā warā' al-nahr, that is, Transoxiana, an area between the rivers of Syr Darya and Amu Darya. After four days, he marched on to the vicinity of Kish, where he was met by Amīr Arghūn Aqa, the Governor of Khurāsān. Proceeding in the same leisurely manner, Hūlāgū occasionally received homage from different rulers and sultans. At times, he sent out express couriers to various local rulers and informed them of his intention to chastise the Ismā^Cīlites and called upon them to render service to his marching host, or otherwise suffer the consequences of their insubordination.

At the beginning of Rabi^C al-Awwal 654/March-April 1256, upon reaching the district of Zawa, Hūlāgū ordered General Kitbuqa to reduce Kuhistān. General Kitbuqa rejoined the main army at Tūs where Hūlāgū was entertained by Amīr Arghūn Aqa and Izz al-Dīn Tāhir. At this time emissaries were sent to demand the submission of the Grand Master of the Assassins, Rukn al-Dīn Khur Shāh. However, the Grand Master vainly tried to avert the danger with diplomatic intrigues and diversions. The Mongols moved on and reached Demavend and thence advanced to Shahdiz. Hūlāgū captured the city in two days. Once again he sent new emissaries to Rukn al-Dīn ordering him to present himself in person. Rukn al-Dīn evaded the demands by sending his son with a contingent of three hundred soldiers to Hūlāgū but agreed to demolish all the castles.⁴¹ When the huge

⁴¹Juvaini, pp. 721-724.

army appeared before Alamut, the headquarters of the Assassins, and began a close siege of the citadel, the Grand Master yielded. At the end of Shhwāl 654/November 19, 1256, according to Juwaynī,⁴² or perhaps one day later, according to Rashīd al-Dīn,⁴³ he submitted in person to the Khan. Notwithstanding, some castles still refused to surrender and even on his instruction, two places disregarded the order. These two were the great Rudbar strongholds of Alamut and Lamasar. Both commandants of the fortresses held out; but finally the commandant of Alamut was forced to surrender. Lamasar held out for a few more years and in the end it also submitted to the Mongols in 656/1258.⁴⁴

The Mongol Ultimatum

Once the rule of the Assassins was wiped out in Persia, the road to Baghdad seemed clear. Hūlāgū proceeded cautiously and with deliberation as he had done through Central Asia. In Rabi^c al-Awwal 655/March-April 1257, he moved on by way of Qazwīn to Hamadān where he was joined by Baiju coming from Ādharbayjān. After consulting with Hūlāgū Khan, Baiju was sent to conquer Rūm, Anatolia. On 19 Rabi^c al-Ākhr 655/26 April 1257, Hūlāgū Khan arrived at Dinawar, a short distance from Baghdad. Suddenly, for unknown reasons, he returned to Hamadān in the middle of Rajab/June. He also appeared in Tabriz for a while and later back to Hamadān. On 10 Ramadān/21

⁴³Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I, 208.

⁴⁴Juvaini, II, 721-724.

September, he sent his first message to the court of Baghdad.⁴⁵ In this message, he denounced the Caliph for his failure to participate in his campaign against the heretic Ismā'īlites. It further signaled to the Caliph al-Musta'ṣim the triumphs attained by the Mongol armies since the days of Chingiz Khan and reminded him of the fact that the houses of Khwārizm, Saljūq, and the rulers of Daylam, as well as the Atabeks and others had all been subdued by their hosts in spite of their former greatness and power. Since the gates of Baghdad had not been closed to them, how could they be closed in the face of the Mongols. "Nevertheless, let bygones be bygones." If the caliphate submitted, the message continued, "then it should dismantle its fortifications, fill the ditches with rubble and save the country for the sake of its people."⁴⁶ Afterwards, the Caliph should present himself to the Mongol Khan, or, at least one of the following three persons, either al-'Alqamī the vizier, Sulaymān Shāh, or the Dawitdār, should represent him. In that case, the Caliph could retain his dominions; if not, the Mongols would march on Baghdad.⁴⁷

After receiving the envoy with great courtesy, the Caliph consulted his vizier, Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Muhammad Ibn al-'Alqamī, who advised the Caliph to comply with the Mongol demands. But the

⁴⁵Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I, 267; and Boyle, "History of the Il-Khans," p. 346. According to Howorth, Baiju who arrived at Hamadān to meet Hūlāgū warned him of the power of the Caliph and the difficulty of approaching this dominions. Howorth, III, 109. S. Runciman also rightly pointed out, "Hulagu approached the campaign with some trepidation." S. Runciman, *A History of Crusades* (Cambridge: University Press, 1954), III, 302.

⁴⁶Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I, 267-268.

⁴⁷Ibid., I, 268-269; and Howorth, III, 116.

Dawitdār, Mujāhid al-Dīn, and other high officers, who were at odds with the vizier, refused and warned their master against the vizier's intrigue.⁴⁸

The Caliph then decided to put off sending his messengers and sent instead an aggressive reply to the Khan carried by Sharīf al-Dīn Ibn al-Jawzī, a person of eloquence, and with him Badr al-Dīn Mahmud and Zankī al-Nakhjawānī.⁴⁹ The reply ran as follows:

Oh, young man only just commencing your career, who show such small regard for life, who, drunk with the prosperity and good fortune of ten days, deem yourself superior to the whole world, and think your orders equivalent to those of destiny, and irresistible. Why do you address me a demand which you cannot secure? Do you think by your skill, the strength of your army, and your courage, that you can make captive even one of the stars? You are probably unaware that from the east to the west, the worshippers of God, religious men, kings and beggars, old men and young ones, are all slaves of this Court, and form my armies; that after I have ordered these isolated defenders to gather, I shall first settle the affairs of Iran, and will then march upon Turan and put each man in his proper place. . . . If, however, you desire war, I have thousands of troops who, when the moment of vengeance arrives, will dry up the waves of the sea.⁵⁰

In spite of this defiant and irritating reply, Hūlāgū, who was well aware of the power of so formidable a personality as that of the Caliph whose forces had already defeated the Mongols on several occasions, reacted cautiously. Again, he sent his envoys with another message warning the Caliph that God had given the empire of the world

⁴⁸Boyle, "The Death of the Last ^CAbbāsīd Caliph: A Contemporary Muslim Account," Journal of Semitic Studies, VI (1961), pp. 152-153.

⁴⁹For the name Zankī al-Nakhjawānī, see Boyle, ibid., p. 153.

⁵⁰Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I, 269. This quotation is from Howorth, III, 116.

to the descendants of Chingiz Khan and that he should prepare for war. But all these warnings were of no avail. In Shawwāl 655/October–November 1257, the Khan decided to attack Baghdad. In conjunction with this, Hūlāgū consulted Ḥusām al-Dīn, an astrologer of Sunnite faith, who had accompanied the Khan at the instance of the Great Khan, Mongke. Being a Sunni, he no doubt sympathized with the Caliph and thus foretold that the expedition to Baghdad would be followed by six grave events; all the horses would die, and the soldiers be attacked with pestilence; the sun would not rise; rain would not fall; there would be violent hurricanes and earthquakes; plants would cease to grow; and the Emperor would die during the year.⁵¹ On hearing this opinion, he turned to another Muslim adviser, Naṣir al-Dīn al-Tūsī, a Shi^Ci, who refuted Ḥusām al-Dīn's claims and assured Hūlāgū that none of these events would occur. He further reiterated that "Hūlāgū will reign in place of al-Musta^Cṣim."⁵² Thus assured of the success of his enterprise, Hūlāgū decided to march on Baghdad.

Hūlāgū's precautions were self-evident, if we recall that the Mongol armies had previously fought the forces of the caliphate without being able to gain superiority over them. Furthermore, the supreme position of the Caliph in the Muslim world, although on the wane at the time, was a power that Hūlāgū could hardly overlook. As

⁵¹ Quoted from Howorth, III, 115. See also ^CAzzāwī, al-^CIraq bayn Ihtilalayn, p. 166.

⁵² Boyle, "History of the Īl-Khāns," p. 346.

the head of Islam, he could take advantage of his tremendous political hegemony over the sultans of Syria, Egypt, and the West if the caliphate were cornered. But the test of the Caliph's authority over the rest of the Muslim world proved rather shadowy and no one came to the rescue of Baghdad. The sultans of Syria and Egypt were divided in their policies toward the Mongol invasion.⁵³ The sultans of Mawsil, Fārs, and Rūm had surrendered to the Mongols and had agreed to pay tribute. They even sent their cavalries to assist the Mongols in their attacks on Muslim cities. To make certain that the caliphate was completely isolated, Hūlāgū induced the commandant of Dartank fortress, Husām al-Dīn ḤAkah, to betray his own lord by giving him as an appanage the castles of Warudan and Marj. Dartank was strategically situated on top of a high mountain and overlooked the security of the road through which Hūlāgū's army had to pass from Hamadān to Baghdad. It had proved beyond a shadow of doubt to be "the key to al-^CIrāq al-^CArabī."⁵⁴

It was reported that Husām al-Dīn ḤAkah had long been at odds with the Caliph. But Ibn al-Tiqtāqā told another version of the story. It was about this time, Ibn al-Tiqtāqā related, that Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu' received two requests respectively from Hūlāgū asking for

⁵³In fact, they were busy fighting among themselves. When they heard of the sack of Baghdad, the amirs of Damascus proposed to surrender. But Baybars I, not yet the ruler of Egypt, disagreed and left for Egypt, now ruled by Qutuz. See Seyyidah Fatima Sadeque, Baybars I of Egypt (Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 37.

⁵⁴D'Ohsson, IV, 222.

catapults and siege equipment, the other from al-Musta^Csim asking for a band of musicians. "Look at the two requests," Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu' said, "and weep for Islam and its people!"⁵⁵ This speaks plainly of the fact that the Caliph could not get support from the rulers of the Muslim states.

The Sack of Baghdad

The whole situation was to the advantage of the Mongols who then converged on Baghdad. They came from four directions. Baiju was apparently recalled by Hūlāgū from Rūm. He descended from the north through Mawsil and was to encamp to the west of Baghdad where he would wait for the arrival of other forces from the east. An army, commanded by Balaghai, Tutar, and Quli, advanced from the east through Shahrazur and Daqūq, and another, commanded by Kitbuqa, came from the south through Luristan, Bay^Cat, Khūzistān. The main forces under Hūlāgū's command came to the east side of the city by way of Kirmanshāh and Hulwān, through the so-called Khurāsān Road.

While the Mongol armies were advancing from four directions, the Caliph had dispatched his commander, Dawitdār, to the banks of the Diyālā River between Ba^Cqubah and Bājisrā on the great Khurāsān

⁵⁵ Ibn al-Tiqtaqā, p. 43, and Kritzeck, p. 177. Later Husām al-Dīn ^CAkah seemed to have repented of his treachery. Through a friend he made known at Baghdad the plans of the enemies and declared that if the Caliph would send him one corps of trained horsemen, or if the Caliph would acknowledge him as ruler of these fortresses, he would provide 100,000 Turkomans and Kurds. With these, he would stop the advance of the Mongols against Baghdad. His proposition was not accepted by the Caliph. At the same time, his intrigue was brought to the ears of Hūlāgū and he sent Kitbuqa to have him killed. D'Ohs-son, IV, III; Howorth, III, 118; Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I, 277-278.

Road; but when Dawitdār was informed of the arrival of Baiju's army from the north to the northwest of Baghdad, he crossed the Tigris at Baghdad to join battle in the neighborhood of Anbār with Sughunchaq, or Sūnjāq, the van of Báiju. In this encounter, the Muslims defeated the Mongol invaders for the first, and also the last, time. When Baiju arrived in person, he inflicted a defeat upon Dawitdār's army and many were killed and some fled either to Baghdad or Hillah and Kūfah.⁵⁶ The Muslim defeat resulted from a flood caused by the breaking of the dikes of a branch river of the Euphrates. Sources vary as to who was responsible for the breaking of dikes, the Mongols or the Abbāsīd vizier, Ibn al-^CAlqamī, Wassāf, Rashīd al-Dīn, Bar Hebraeus, and others suggest that this action was precipitated, not by the Caliph's vizier, but by the Mongols themselves.⁵⁷ Jūzjānī, on the other hand, accuses the vizier of betrayal in that he had sent a body of men the night before to break the dikes of the Bashi-riyyah canal, a branch of the Dujayl.⁵⁸

Following the defeat of the Muslim army, the Mongols pursued the enemy up to the western side of Baghdad where the inhabitants had already fled and left an empty city.⁵⁹ On 15 Muharram/19 January, according to Ibn al-Fuwatī,⁶⁰ other Mongol armies also arrived at

⁵⁶Boyle, "History of the Īl-Khāns," p. 347; and Howorth, III, 121.

⁵⁷See Howorth, III, 122.

⁵⁸Jūzjānī, p. 1241.

⁵⁹Khisbak, p. 52.

⁶⁰Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I, 286; Quatremere, p. 280.

Baghdad. Hūlāgū Khan encamped to the east of Baghdad opposite Burj al-^CAjamī, the Persian Tower, and the Halbah Gate where the main attack was directed. Balaghāi quartered his army outside the northern walls of the city, facing Bāb Sūq al-Sultān, the Gate of the Sultān Market, while Kitbuqa arrived with his army at the Kal-wādh Gate toward the southeast of Baghdad.⁶¹

Immediately, the Mongols proceeded to erect mangonels and naphta throwing machines on all sides of the city, and fighting started on 22nd Muharram/29 January.⁶² During this interval, the Caliph tried twice to negotiate with Hūlāgū, but on both occasions his envoys were turned back. The siege lasted only six days,⁶³ and on 28 Muharram/4 February, a breach in the Burj al-^CAjamī gave the Mongols access to the fortifications. Shortly before or after the actual fighting had started, it was reported that Hūlāgū ordered several messages fastened to arrows and shot into the city in an attempt to appeal to several classes of people for help. The messages stated that "sayyids, qādīs, ^Culamā', officials, merchants, and persons who do not fight, will be safe and secure from our rage and vengeance."⁶⁴ As a consequence of these messages, Raverty

⁶¹Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 325.

⁶²Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I, 286; Quartremere, p. 280.

⁶³According to the Chinese source which was in accordance with some Muslim authorities, the fighting lasted six days. However, some Muslim sources said it lasted for about forty days. See Jūzjānī, p. 1243.

⁶⁴Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 324; Jūzjānī, p. 1244; and ^CAzzāwī, al-^CIrāq bayn Ihtilalāyñ, p. I, 174. D'Ohsson, III, 233; Howorth, III, 123; and Reuben Levy, A Baghdad Chronicle (Cambridge: University Press, 1929), p. 256. Quotation is from Jūzjānī.

pointed out,

a great number of scurvy patriots among the Baghdadis deserted their posts, and gave up fighting; and, by this means, the Mughals were enabled to approach the Burj-i-^CAjamī, and drive out of that important post the weak number now left to defend the walls on that side.⁶⁵

It was also reported that many military leaders from the caliphal army joined the Mongols after the walls were taken.⁶⁶

Up to this moment, the Caliph repeatedly attempted to parley with the Mongols and failed. Seeing that all was over, the Caliph had no choice but to surrender. On 4th Šafar/10th February, the Caliph accompanied by three thousand sayyids, ulamā', qādīs, and officials as well as his sons presented himself to the Khan.⁶⁷ The surrender gave the Mongols the green light to pillage.⁶⁸ Part of the city was set on fire and the tombs of the Caliphs at al-Rusāfah and others were destroyed.⁶⁹

⁶⁵Jūzjānī, p. 1244.

⁶⁶See Boyle, "The Death," p. 159. It is said that Hūlāgū soon after the sack of Baghdad told Sulaymān Shāh, "Many military leaders have joined us."

⁶⁷The Chinese source related that the Caliph tried to escape in a boat with Dawitdar, but had to abandon it because he found his way was barred by a bridge of boats. Yuan shih, 3.697a.

⁶⁸Different dates were given by the Muslim authors. Fourth Šafar was given by Rashīd al-Dīn and Našīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī, as well as others. Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I, 291; Boyle, "The Death," p. 159. Furthermore, the number of sons who accompanied the Caliph was confusing. Some said one son, some two, and some three, and even four. Našīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī gave one, in Boyle, "The Death," p. 159. Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic gave three, I, 291. See also Jūzjānī, p. 1249 and Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 326. The latter gave two.

⁶⁹Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I, 292-293; Le Strange, Baghdad, p. 343.

After a week's massacre, Hūlāgū commanded that the massacre, pillage, and devastation should cease, as he had just been advised that Baghdad had become his domain.⁷⁰ Already, except for a small number, the entire population of the city was reported to have been massacred. The number varies from 800,000 to 2,000,000.⁷¹

In the midst of these terrible events, Hūlāgū toured the Caliph's palace and fetched the Caliph's public treasures. The Caliph was finally induced, through promises and threats, to reveal his hidden personal treasure, which was piled high like a mountain. An inventory was immediately ordered to be made in the al-Mustansiriyyah College.⁷² Soon after that, on the 14th Safar/20th February, Hūlāgū left the city and in the village of Waqaf he sent for the Caliph.⁷³ On that day, the Caliph met his death.

For a time, it appeared the life of the Caliph would be spared by the Khan, but he was dissuaded from clemency by the Muslims themselves, probably the Shi^cites, jointly with the Christians. It was natural that the Christians wanted to see the end of the caliphate,

⁷⁰Rashīd al-Dīn, I, 293. The city delegated Sharāf al-Dīn al-Marāghī, Shihāb al-Dīn al-Zanjānī, and al-Malik Dil Rāst to ask Hūlagu for clemency. The date was obscure, but it took place between the 9th Safar to the 14th, after Hūlāgū's visit to the Caliph's palace. We know little about these three people.

⁷¹See later discussion.

⁷²Coke, p. 150.

⁷³There is, said Boyle, in fact no previous mention of a village like Waqaf. Neither of the two villages have been identified. But he believed that it must have lain somewhere along the road to Khanīqan. Boyle, "The Death," p. 160, n. 1 and his "History of the Īl-Khans," p. 349.

but the substitution of a Sunnite Caliph by an infidel ruler, even in the eyes of the heretic Shi^Cites, was a catastrophe to the Muslim world.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, Muslim sources indicated that the decision to exterminate the caliphate was precipitated by the Shi^Cite Muslims. Again, Husām al-Dīn warned Hūlagū of the portents that might happen if the Caliph were executed. But Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī answered to that warning by saying,

No such portents arose when Yahya [St. John the Baptist], the Innocent, was put to death, when the Prophet, Muhammad, died, and when the Imām, Husian, was unjustly martyred.⁷⁵

He thus concluded that nothing was likely to happen now. Others made a last effort to save the Caliph's life and said,

If Hulāu⁷⁶ should pour out the blood of the Khalifah on the ground, both he and the Muzhal army will be swallowed up in an earthquake; and therefore it behoveth not to slay him.⁷⁷

Of course, all these warnings had no effect upon the decision of Hūlagū who believed that "God had given the empire of the world to the descendants of Chingiz Khan."⁷⁸ Yet, the statement that influenced Hūlagū most of the danger of the caliphate was presented by

⁷⁴There were numerous events indicating that the Shi^Cites had tried to replace the ^CAbbāsīd Caliph with the descendants of ^CAlī. Prof. Atiya, writing about the disunity of the Muslim in the time of Crusade, deplored, "Even in the imminent danger of the Crusaders, their hostilities never subsided." This is strengthened with the event of Mongol invasion. See Atiya, Crusade, Commerce, and Culture, p. 52.

⁷⁵Jūzjānī, p. 1253.

⁷⁶This is a closer Mongolian pronunciation of Hule'u, and is represented by the Alau of Marco Polo, the Hulawu or Hōlawu of Armenian sources.

⁷⁷Jūzjānī, p. 1252.

⁷⁸Howorth, III, 127.

the sultan of Mawsil Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu' and other infidels;⁷⁹

If the Khalifah continued alive, the whole of the Musal-
mans which are among the troops and other Musalman peo-
ples who are in other countries, will rise, and will bring
about his liberation, and will not leave thee, Hulāu,
alive.⁸⁰

How frightful this could be to Hūlāgū who believed that if the Caliph
continued to live, an outbreak of the Muslims was certain to take
place. After all considerations, he decided to put the Caliph to
death.

The manner in which the Caliph was put to death shows the
respect, if not the fear, of Hūlāgū towards "the successor of the
Prophet, and the true Imām, and the absolute master of all life and
property."⁸¹ He was said to have put the Caliph to death in accordance
with the Mongol method of executing their own princes--forbidding the
shedding of blood on the ground.⁸² The Caliph was rolled in carpets
and trampled to death under horses hoofs.⁸³ For three years and a
half after his death and until Abū al-Qāsim Ahmad was restored to
the Abbāsīd caliphate at Cairo, the Sunnite Muslims were temporarily
without their traditional head.

Before he retired first to his ordu near Hamadān, and then

⁷⁹"In idels" here, according to Jūzjānī, mean Shi^cites. Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Howorth, III, 127.

⁸²Boyle, "History of the Īl-Khāns," p. 349; and Howorth,
III, 128.

⁸³Howorth, III, 128. Sources again were not in agreement
with one another. Marco Polo and Sir John Mandeville, along with
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, stated that the Caliph was starved to death
in a tower full of treasure. See Marco Polo, I, 64. Boyle, "History
of the Īl-Khāns," p. 348 and "The Death," p. 159.

to Ādharbayjān where he stayed for over a year, Hūlāgū left the local administration in Baghdad to the Muslims except for a Mongol representative called shahnah in whose hands the surveillance of policies remained. ^CAlī Bahadur⁸⁴ who was the first to enter the city was entrusted with this responsibility and his first orders were to "rebuild Baghdad, remove the slain and dead animals, and reopen the bazaars."⁸⁵ At the same time he dispatched his cousin, Buqa-Timure, to complete the conquest of southern al-^CIrāq and Khūzistān.

Completing the Conquest in Iraq

The fall of Baghdad made all other conquests in al-^CIrāq easy. The rest of al-^CIrāq submitted to the Mongols without much resistance except at Wāsīt and Irbīl. Even before the fall of the City of the Caliphs, the Shi^Cites from Hillah had submitted to Hūlāgū and related to him a Shi^Cite story that he was destined to become the master over al-^CIrāq, that is, Mesopotamia. Hūlāgū was overjoyed and a body of one hundred Mongol soldiers was sent to protect the tomb of ^CAlī at Najaf.⁸⁶ Now that Baghdad had been

⁸⁴He was Mongol but with a Muslim name. According to Boyle, his original Mongol name was Asutū. Boyle, "The Death," p. 160, n. 4.

⁸⁵Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I, 295. Quoted from Boyle, "History of the Īl-Khāns," p. 349, and his "The Death," p. 160. For the activity of the restoration see also Grigor of Aknac^C, History of the Nation of the Archers (The Mongols), ed. with an English translation and notes by Robert P. Blake and Richard N. Frye. XII (December, 1949), pp. 269-443.

⁸⁶Howorth, III, 132; Boyle, "The Death," p. 161.

subjugated, Hūlāgū sent Buqa-Timur to test the goodwill and the allegiance of the people of Hillah and al-Kūfah. Informed of their arrival, the people of Hillah built a bridge over the Euphrates for the army to cross and received them gladly.⁸⁷ On 10th Šafar/16th February, Buqa-Timur left Hillah for Wāsīt where they arrived seven days later. The inhabitants of the latter city, however, refused to surrender and fought the Mongols. But after a week's fierce struggle, the city was captured and about 400,000 people were put to the sword. Then the Mongols proceeded to Khūzistān and the town Shustar submitted. Al-Kūfah and al-Basrah followed suit and submitted to the Mongol yoke without the approach of any army.⁸⁸

Subsequent to these events, Irbīl was also captured by the Mongols after a long siege. When Hūlāgū marched against Baghdad, he dispatched another general, Arqayu, to attack the fortress of Irbīl.⁸⁹ At first, the governor, Tāj al-Dīn Šalāyah, intended to surrender and came out to meet Arqayu. When he returned to the gate of the city, he was refused admittance and told that the Kurdish garrison refused to surrender. He then presented himself to Arqayu and was sent to the court of Hūlāgū where he met his death. At the same time, Arqayu assailed the city whose inhabitants resisted the Mongol attack gallantly. They made a sortie and destroyed the siege apparatus and

⁸⁷Howorth, III, 132; and Jūzjānī, p. 1261, n. 7.

⁸⁸Boyle, "The Death," p. 161.

⁸⁹Boyle, "History of the Īl-Khāns," p. 349; Howorth, III, 132; and Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I, 299. The name of this general had another variation, Urqatu. See Boyle and Howorth.

many Mongols. Then Arqayu consulted Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu' who had already sent reinforcements several times and was advised to abandon the siege until the summer. Later, the city was taken and turned over to Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu'.⁹⁰

However, turbulence in al-^CIrāq was not completely quelled. In 657/1259, when Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu' died after his visit to Hūlāgū in Marāgha a year earlier, his son and successor, al-Malik al-Sālih Ismā^Cīl, in collaboration with the Egyptians revolted against the Mongols. Hūlāgū accordingly dispatched General Sandāghū to set siege to the city. For twelve months the people proved themselves so bravely in the fighting that they withstood thirty mangonel attacks by the Mongols. Finally, the Mongol leader ordered a halt to the fighting, but continued the siege until the city was out of provisions. In Ramadān 660/1261, the Mongols entered the city and massacred most of its inhabitants. The rest were carried away as prisoners.⁹¹ Thus, the Mongols at last completed their conquest of al-^CIrāq and retained the country under their rule until the end of the dynasty in 734/1335.

After a rest in Ādharbayjān and Marāgha for over a year, Hūlāgū embarked upon another campaign against the Ayyubids in Syria. The Syrian conquest, under the leadership of Kitbuqa, had little lasting effect. For a short while the Mongols were successful in holding some cities, but were eventually defeated by the Mamluk Sultan

⁹⁰Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I, 297-299; Jūzjānī, p. 1263; and Howorth, III, 132-133.

⁹¹Boyle, "History of the Īl-Khāns," p. 354.

Baybars I (658-675/1260-1277) at ^cAyn Jālūt (the Spring of Goliath) in Ramadān 658/September 1260. It was a turning point in the struggle between Islam and the Mongols, for this proved that the Mongols were not invincible.

Analyses and Discussions

It is commonly accepted that the Mongol conquest of Persia and Baghdad this time was much less devastating than those of Transoxiana a generation before. Nevertheless, the sack of Baghdad was regarded as a veritable scourge to the Muslim world. The tragic death of the last Caliph and his companions at the end of the ^cAbbāsīd caliphate in Baghdad, the murder of thousands of citizens of the capital, and the plunder and the burning of innumerable public buildings and private houses made a deep and exaggerated impression upon the popular mind. Most of these events are "reported, even by the most sober historians, with some details which undoubtedly have been suggested by a colorful fancy rather than by a faithful recollection of the actual events."⁹² It is hoped that through careful analyses of the contemporary conditions and various factors a clearer picture of Mongol destruction will be revealed.

The execution of Caliph al-Musta^cṣim was, of course, a great blow to the Muslim world which experienced for the first time in its history that the Muslims, at least the majority of Muslims, had no

⁹²Giorgio Levi Della Vida, "A Christian Legend in Moslem Garb," Byzantion, International Journal of Byzantine Studies, XV (1940-1941), pp. 144-157.

Caliph on whom the blessing of God could be invoked in the Friday khutbah. To these Muslims, it is the end of a world, if not the world. The sentiment of the Muslims in regard to the destruction of the ^CAbbāsīd caliphate in al-^CIrāq is well illustrated by Ibn Wāsil (604-697/1207-1298) who stated that "Islam had never been afflicted by a greater and more decisive calamity than this one."⁹³

Nevertheless, for a long time, the name of the ^CAbbāsīd Caliph was not mentioned in the khutbah in many Muslim lands and in his place was the name of a rival caliph. Starting with ^CAbd al-Rahmān III, the Caliph of Umayyad Spain, various ambitious rulers sprang up to assume the title of Caliph. The last rival Caliph before the Mongol invasion was Abū ^CAbd Allāh Muḥammad, the ^Hafsid ruler of Tunis, who in 650/1252 assumed the title of Caliph.⁹⁴ Soon after the fall of Baghdad, the Sharīf of Mecca, Abū Numayy, was persuaded by the well-known mystic and philosopher, Ibn Sab^Cīn of Tunis, to recognize the ^Hafsid Caliph. A letter of homage was sent from Mecca to Tunis in 657/1259 and was read publicly in an official ceremony. With this recognition from the birthplace of Islam, a new caliphate in Tunis was temporarily installed for all the Muslims, even if Richard Hartmann's theory that the Mamluks also paid their homage to the Hafsids is not acceptable.⁹⁵ However, when Baybars I came to

⁹³ Ibn Wāsil, Mufarrij al-Kurūb, cited in D. Ayalon, "Transfer of the Abbāsīd Caliphate," p. 19.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 44.

⁹⁵ For Hartmann's theory see his "Zur Vorgeschichte des ^Cabbāsīdischen Schein-Califates von Cairo," Abhandlungen der deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1947, no. 9, pp. 3-11. Also B. Lewis, "^CAbbāsīds," p. 21.

power, he invited an ^CAbbāsīd refugee who was able to escape the Mongol massacre, Abū al-Qāsim Ahmad, to Cairo and restored the ^CAbbāsīd caliphate in his name at Cairo. The motive behind this restoration was, of course, the need to acquire legitimate status from a theocratic head of Islam.

During the ebb of the Caliph's religious and political power, one last function of his was retained through the exposition of the Sunnite theologians; that is his power to confer upon princes the title of honor. A diploma of investiture sent by him or a title of honor conferred by him would satisfy the demands of the religious law and tranquilize the tender consciences of the subjects of an independent prince. The need for legitimization was apparently felt by these princes. To them the extinction of the caliphate indirectly endangered their authority to rule.

Throughout the years of vicissitudes, the Muslim community, ummah, had already developed its own independence of the caliphate. The existence of the Caliph was no more than the tool of many princes whose titles, secured by the sword, would not be legitimate without caliphal blessing. However, the restoration of the legitimate ^CAbbāsīd caliphate in Cairo gave the ummah a Caliph from whom they derived blessings and the princes the legitimization of their status. Consequently, it is not without justification to say that the Mongol invasion simply resulted in the transfer of the caliphate from Baghdad to Cairo. The excitement of the restoration was vividly illustrated by Abū Shāmah (600-665/1202-1267) who recorded,

The Muslims (an-nās) of Cairo and Egypt, rejoiced greatly over this event and thanked God for the return of the

^cAbbāsīd Caliphate after the infidel Tatars had extinguished it by killing the Caliph al-Musta^csim.⁹⁶

The second accusation of the Mongols by Muslim historians was the slaughter of the mass of Baghdad's population. Due to the exaggerated number, which varies from 800,000 to 2,000,000, the Mongols were described as the most savage in human history. Even the lower figure is unduly exaggerated. Strangely enough, concerning the number of people killed by Mongol savagery, contemporary authorities are either silent, such as Jūzjānī and Ibn Khallikān (d. 1282), or obscure, such as Bar Hebraeus. Jūzjānī, who was always bitter against the Mongols, mentioned only briefly the event that the Mongols murdered all the eminent men who remained behind in Baghdad after the Caliph had surrendered himself to Hūlāgū.⁹⁷ On another occasion, he mentioned that there were still people who survived the massacre and were put under the control of a Mongol shahnah.⁹⁸ Ibn Khallikān, the compiler of the great Biographical Dictionary and a contemporary of the Mongol sack of Baghdad, maintained discreet silence on the event in his Dictionary.⁹⁹ Bar Hebraeus in his Chronography related to us that "tens of thousands of men" were slain.¹⁰⁰ Actually, the

⁹⁶Quoted from Ayalon, "Transfer," p. 50.

⁹⁷Jūzjānī, p. 1248.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 1260. This shahnah is obviously ^cAlī Bahādur. The number of people that survived was reported to have exceeded 10,000.

⁹⁹He compiled his book about the year 654/1256. He was a native of Arbela, near Mawsil and died at Damascus in 681/1282. Ibn Khallikān, Wafayat al-A^cyañ, tr. by Baron M. G. De Slane (Paris: Oriental Translation Fund, 1843-70).

¹⁰⁰Bar Hebraeus, I, 431.

estimates now possessed were provided by later authors, and as A. A. Duri pointed out, were mounting as time lapsed.¹⁰¹

Chinese sources, on the other hand, provided some interesting descriptions of the Mongol assault upon the city of Baghdad. Kuo Kan, a Chinese general in the Baghdad expedition, recorded that the city had a strong army of several hundred thousand. When Kuo Kan's army arrived at the city, it defeated a caliphal army of 70,000 strong, and then began a merciless slaughter in the whole of the western city. The sack of the eastern city followed.¹⁰² However, he did not discuss the massacre committed by the Mongols after the fall of Baghdad. Another Chinese authority also remained silent about the massacre in the eastern city. The record of Ch'ang Te, a Taoist sent by the Great Khan to Hūlāgū, stated that when the royal army of the Mongols arrived at the city, an encounter took place and a victory was won against a 400,000 man caliphal army! The inhabitants of the western city were slaughtered following its demolition. Then, the army besieged the eastern city which was taken in six days. In this siege, the number of deaths amounted to 100,000.¹⁰³ While the Chinese sources talked about the slaughter in the western side of Baghdad, they mentioned nothing of the sort in the eastern side. This may

¹⁰¹Duri, "Baghdad," p. 902. The following table will show the discrepancies among authors. Rashīd al-Dīn (d. 717/1318): 800,000; Ibn Al-Fuwatī (d. 723/1323): 800,000; al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1347): 1,800,000; al-^cUmarī (d. 750/1349): 1,800,000; Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1372): 800,000, 1,800,000, 2,000,000; Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1405): 1,300,000; Maqrizī (d. 845/1442): 2,000,000.

¹⁰²Yuan shih, 149.3a.

¹⁰³Chang Hsing-lang, III, 294.

imply that the Mongol massacre in the eastern city was relatively unimportant in comparison with that of the western side.

Furthermore, modern scholars believing the figures given by the Muslim authorities were exaggerated came up with their own estimates. A. A. Duri, the most recent, gave a figure exceeding a hundred thousand.¹⁰⁴ ^CAbbās al-^CAzzāwī, an authority in Iraqi history, agreed with 80,000.¹⁰⁵ René Grousset, moreover, simply stated 90,000.¹⁰⁶ However, all these estimates fall short of substantial testimony, and further research is needed into other aspects.

As shown in the first chapter, the population of Baghdad during the apex of the ^CAbbāsīd power was difficult to estimate due to the lack of demographic information. Although modern scholars gave their own estimates, their differences varied markedly. However, in the course of the 4th/10th century, the declining political, social, and economic conditions gradually reduced its population. By the time of the Mongol invasion, the recurrence of natural calamities further reduced its number. All these developments pointed to the fact that the population of Baghdad in the 7th/13th century was much smaller than that of 3rd/9th century.

However, it is still arguable that the population of Baghdad during the Mongol invasion was suddenly swollen, because the "inhabitants of the districts of Dujayl, al-Ishāqī, ^CIsā canal and Malik

¹⁰⁴Duri, "Baghdad," p. 899.

¹⁰⁵al-^CAzzāwī, al-^CIrāq bayn Ihtilalayn, I, 4.

¹⁰⁶Grousset, Empire of the Steppes, p. 356.

canal took refuge in Baghdad."¹⁰⁷ This statement appeared to have been oversimplified. There is no doubt that when the Mongol general, Baiju, and his army crossed the Tigris at Takrīt and descended to the districts of Baghdad, the people fled in fright to the city, but how many of them could afford to pay boatmen golden bracelets, embroidered brocades, or several dinars in order to cross the Tigris to East Baghdad?¹⁰⁸ Such demands would surely discourage many poorer people from entering the city and turn them away from it. Even if the number of refugees that had arrived at Baghdad was as great as some Muslim chroniclers supposed it to be, the city itself, upon which the Mongols finally laid siege, was scarcely able to accommodate them.

At this time, East Baghdad was no longer as prosperous and as spacious as it had been in the 4th/10th century. (See Map II) In the second half of the 5th/11th century, great changes took place. These changes resulted in the building of new city to the south of the three older quarters of al-Ruṣāfah, Shamasiyyah, and Mukharrim, which now have fallen into ruins. Consequently, new suburbs sprang up round the palaces of the Cliphs during the reigns of al-Muqtadi, and of his successor al-Mustazhir in 488/1095 who surrounded these new suburbs by a wall, which was in existence until the Mongol invasion. On the other hand, West Baghdad became farm fields whose

¹⁰⁷ Ibn al-Tiqṭaqā, p. 322.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

products were the main supply of the eastern counterpart.¹⁰⁹

How large an area of the eastern city with its suburbs is not a very important question, so far as the walled city is concerned. The walled city had an area not more than two square miles, of which the caliphal quarters occupied approximately one-third of the total.¹¹⁰ A large number of gardens, baths, mosques, schools, and public buildings further reduced the living space. Even if the refugees were compelled to "live in schools, mosques and in the wide roads,"¹¹¹ East Baghdad with its limited area would not be able to shelter a population more than a few tens of thousands.

The Mongol slaughter and plunder, on the other hand, were neither unreserved nor ruthless. Before the fall of the city, the Mongols had appealed to the "sayyids, qādīs, ulamā', officials, merchants, and persons who do not fight" for submission. These people along with the military leaders must have been saved. In addition, during the looting, quite a few special classes of people were protected and spared. First of all, there is general agreement among historians that the Christians in Baghdad were saved by the order of the conqueror's wife, Doguz Khatun, a Nestorian Christian herself.¹¹² The Shi'ites, together with their spokesman, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī, who showed their submission to the Mongols in the course of siege, were also largely spared the horror of massacre.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹Ibn Jubayr, p. 236.

¹¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹¹Ibn al-Tiḡtaqā, p. 322.

¹¹²Howorth, III, 127; Bar Hebraeus, p. 431.

¹¹³Spuler, Mongol Period, pp. 19-20.

Then came the merchants as a protected class. Those merchants who had traveled to Khurāsān and beyond and had adhered to the Mongol orders were given yarliqs, or firmāns, of safe conduct and were thus protected from molestation.¹¹⁴ Their neighbors who sought refuge in their houses were also saved.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, the Mongols, as a rule, always valued skilled persons whom they used to build their own palaces. Thus, there is no doubt that many artisans of the city also escaped slaughter as they remained in their houses.¹¹⁶ Finally, those who hid themselves in wells and conduits came out alive after a week's butchery.¹¹⁷ It is now apparent that a considerable number of Baghdadis were able to escape their grim fate. Immediately after the massacre, bazaars were ordered to reopen.

Obviously, the number of massacred should be far smaller than our medieval informants' estimates. Based upon the above discussion, although a precise figure is impossible to determine, a bold estimate around 50,000 and not exceeding 100,000 is highly probable. The exaggerated number given by the Muslim historians may be attributable to the following reasons: first, Muslim sources are not in agreement with each other on the duration of Mongol plunder;¹¹⁸ second, Muslim chauvinism inspired Muslim authors to

¹¹⁴Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 329.

¹¹⁵Ibid.

¹¹⁶Barthold, Turkestan, pp. 382ff.

¹¹⁷Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 33.

¹¹⁸Some historians indicated that it lasted for forty days. See al-Şuyūtī, p. 497; al-Maqrizī, I, 410; and Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 429. Some said thirty-four days, i. e., al-Dhaḥḥabī, p. 123, and Nicholson, p. 449. D'Ohsson stated it was a week, IV, 240.

suggest a figure far remote from the fact; and third, the good old days of Hārūn al-Rashīd were remembered and the conditions of the later Abbāsids were by and large neglected.

The Mongols were further denounced as destroying the whole city of Baghdad. They were said to have "destroyed the Mosque of the Caliph, the shrine of Mūsā-al-Kāzim, and the tombs of the Caliphs at Rusāfah, besides most of the streets and private houses. . . ." ¹¹⁹ This statement is equally subject to exaggeration. Long before the rise of the Mongols in the 7th/13th century, the northern quarters of East Baghdad had already fallen totally into ruin, except the out-lying suburb round the Shrine of Abū Hanīfah and the Great Mosque at al-Rusafāh. The only populous quarters in the middle of the 6th/12th century were those lying immediately outside and surrounding the Palaces of the Caliphs. ¹²⁰ Yet, when Ibn Battūtah visited Baghdad in 727/1327, the Rusāfah Mosque and the tomb of Abū Hanīfah along with Jāmi' al-Sultān were still standing. ¹²¹ Likewise, three-quarters of a century after the Mongol siege of the city, the famous al-Nizāmiyah College and al-Mustansiriyyah College were in existence and their magnificence was cited by the traveler, Ibn Battūtah. ¹²² Even those

¹¹⁹ Le Strange, Baghdad, p. 343.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 280. Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, The History of the Assassins, derived from the Oriental sources, tr. from the German by Oswald Charles Wood (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968), p. 199.

¹²¹ Hammer-Purgstall, p. 241.

¹²² Ibid., pp. 299, 268-269. Many other schools were there too. See also Ibn al-Fuwatī, pp. 322ff.

areas that had been partially destroyed were rebuilt. Thus, before leaving the city, Hūlāgū ordered that the great Mosque of the Caliph and the Shrine of Mūsā be rebuilt. Dār al-Khilāfah, and Dār al-Dawitdār were also standing in the early 8th/14th century.¹²³

On the whole, the damage deliberately wrought by the Mongols was not as great as is generally implied by Muslim authors. Many important quarters within the walled city were still there as reported by Ibn ^CAbd al-Haqq (d. 739/1331). In contrast to Le Strange's statements on the walled city, almost all these quarters were extant in Ibn ^CAbd al-Haqq's time.¹²⁴ They were the quarters of Bāb al-Azaj, al-Basaliyyah, Sūq al-Thulāthā', al-Ja^Cfariyyah, al-Halbah, Dār al-Rayhānī, Dār Sūq al-Tamr, Nahr al-Mu^Callā, Qurāh al-Qādī, Qurāh al-Quraybāt, Qurāh Ibn Razīn, Qurāh Zafar, Qasr Maydān Khālīs, Qatī^Cah al-^CAjam, al-Ma'mūniyyah, al-Muqtadiyyah, al-Zafariyyah, and Qurāh Abi al-Shahm.¹²⁵ (See Map III)

Nevertheless, the most atrocious, irreparable, and irretrievable destruction wrought by the Mongols, according to a modern writer, namely, Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, was "the annihilation of the libraries, and the loss of many hundred thousand volumes, which fell

¹²³Ibn al-Fuwatī, pp. 330, 333, 371, 376, 390, 424, and 426.

¹²⁴See Le Strange, Baghdad, Chapters XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI.

¹²⁵See Ibn ^CAbd al-Haqq, I, 65, 202, 298, 336, 417; II, 506; III, 1406, 1056, 1071, 1101, 1110, 1222, 1239, 1406, 1066. For locations of all these quarters, see Map III, which is a production of the marvelous map of Le Strange.

a prey to the flames."¹²⁶ According to Ibn Khaldūn,¹²⁷ the fourteenth century Tunisian socio-philosopher, the books were thrown into the Tigris in such incalculable quantities that "a solid bridge was formed over which both pedestrian and horseman . . . could safely cross from one bank to another."¹²⁸ The destruction might have been altered, had Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī and the historian, 'Alā' al-Dīn al-Juwaynī, interfered.¹²⁹ Yet, the loss was again exaggerated, for the astronomer Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī came back to Baghdad in 657/1259¹³⁰ and 662/1264-65¹³¹ to collect many books for his observatory in Marāgha. In addition to his observatory, he also operated a Dār al-Hikmah, (House of Wisdom), Dār al-Tibb, (Academy of Medicine), a school for theologians, and a Dār al-Hadīth for scholars of the science or study of Prophetic tradition.¹³² Professor Aziz S. Atiya rightly commented, "Even with so much ruination and vandalism, and if we allow for considerable exaggeration, much has actually survived. . . ."¹³³ Even though the Mongols were savages, they later had a

¹²⁶ Hammer-Purgstall, p. 198.

¹²⁷ Ibn Khaldūn, p. 1150.

¹²⁸ Aziz S. Atiya, Crusade, Commerce, and Culture, p. 250.

¹²⁹ Hammer-Purgstall, p. 199. We have the example during the fall of Alamut, the stronghold of the Assassins that the destruction of its library was conceded by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī. See also Juvaini, 719.

¹³⁰ Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 351; also Atiya, Crusade, p. 250.

¹³¹ Ibn Kathīr, XIII, 215.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Atiya, Crusade, Commerce, and Culture, p. 250.

great regard for the sciences.¹³⁴ By the times of Hamd Allāh Mustawfī al-Qazwīnī and Ibn Battūtah (d. 779/1377), they found the two most important of the schools in excellent condition and apparently in normal working order.¹³⁵

¹³⁴Browne, III, 36.

¹³⁵Hamd Aliah Mustawfī, The Geographical Part of the Nuzhat-al-Qulūb, translated by G. Le Strange. (Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1919), p. 42. Ibn Battuta, The Travels, translated with revisions and notes from the Arabic text edited by C. Defremery and B. R. Sanguinetti, by H. A. R. Gibb. (Cambridge: The University Press, 1958-71), II, 332-333. Also Le Strange, Baghdad, pp. 346-347.

CHAPTER III

THE ILKHANITE EMPIRE: A POLITICAL SURVEY

The establishment of the Mongol Ilkhanate in Persia and al-^cIrāq gave rise to a Mongol Empire without peer in Oriental history. Not only did it cover a large area stretching from Asia to Europe, but it ushered in a new era in which direct communication between Asia and Europe was made possible. For the first time in history Europeans crossed Central Asia into the East via the silk route, or passed through Persia and the Persian Gulf on the way to India and China. "The Italian merchants chaffered and Italian friars said Mass in the ports and cities on India and China, moved unhampered with their caravans on the great silk route across Central Asia, or passed through Persia to take ship on the long sea road."¹

Although political and administrative divisions existed as each khan of the four Khanates fought for supremacy, peace and security for travel were always restored once the usually brief local outbreaks of war had ceased. Merchants continually brought

¹Eileen Power, "The Opening of the Land Routes to Cathay," Travel and Travellers of the Middle Ages, ed. by Arthur Percival Newton. (London: Kegan Paul, Treanach, Trubner, 1926), p. 125.

home news that the routes of the steppes were perfectly safe. The testimony of Pegolotti and other travelers amply illustrates that it was indeed an era of perfect peace under Mongol rule, often cited as "Pax Mongolica."²

The Ilkhanate solely was in a position to control one of these two trade routes--the sea road from Tabriz to the Indian Ocean by way of Hurmuz. From Tabriz one could reach Hurmuz by following either the caravan route via Yazd and Kerman, or by sailing down the Tigris, passing by Baghdad to the Persian Gulf. As long as the Ilkhanate was able to maintain its own stability and security, trade continued to flow freely throughout the Empire. Maintenance of security along trade routes, however, was not easy, on account of the political repercussions surrounding the very existence of the Ilkhanate. But as long as the Ilkhans were secure themselves, the safety of trades was also assured.

End of the Mongol Advance

The defeat of Kit Buqa at the Battle of ^cAyn Jālūt was a severe, but not fatal, blow to the once invincible Mongols. Immediately afterwards, Hūlāgū sent a second expedition into Syria to avenge that defeat. At first the Mongol army penetrated Syria and pillaged Aleppo for the second time, but in Muharram 658/ December 1260, it was driven back across the Euphrates. This failure put a permanent stop to the Mongol advance into Syria, and the

²Cf. Yule, Cathay, III, 150, 155, and passim.

Euphrates became a permanent demarcation line between the Persian Mongols and the Egyptian Mamluks.

The Mongol defeats did not indicate that the Mamluk army was particularly strong or overwhelming; it was only precipitated by the growing disunity among the Mongol Khans themselves. As Rashīd al-Dīn pointed out, the situation at that time was not propitious for a second expedition into Syria because Mongke Khan had just died a year before that untoward event in August 1259, and because a dispute had erupted between Hūlāgū and his kinsman, the Khan of the Golden Horde.³

Having received news of the death of the Great Khan while in Syria campaigning against the Ayyubids of Egypt, Hūlāgū immediately returned to Persia, leaving behind him an army considerably reduced in numbers and without strong leadership. He then journeyed eastward and, on 24 Jumadā al-Ākhirah 658/June 1260, reached Akhlāt, where he was probably informed of Kubilai being proclaimed Great Khan on June 4, 1260 at Shangtu (Peking).⁴ He approved the election warmly, and returned to Tabriz.

The reason for Hūlāgū's immediate departure from the battlefield is hard to determine, for our sources are mute about it. Rashīd al-Dīn simply stated that Hūlāgū left Syria because he was annoyed and grieved by the death of his brother, Mongke Khan.⁵ Hayton's suggestion that he traveled to the Orient for

³Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I, 317.

⁴Grouseet, The Empire of the Steppes, p. 285.

⁵Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I, 285.

"busoignes de l'empire" is probably right.⁶ However, he may have felt apprehensive of encroachments in the Caucasus area by Berke, the Khan of the Golden Horde.⁷ If so, then the second expedition was doomed to failure, for Hūlāgū could not launch an all-out offensive against the nascent power of the Mamluks while confronting an imminent threat from the Caucasus.

Despite the defeats, Hūlāgū started to consolidate his Empire. His tacit support of Kubilai as Great Khan resulted in Hūlāgū's appointment as Ilkhan (so-called because of his subordination to the Great Khan), with an area extending east to west from the Amu Darya (the Oxus River) to the border of Egypt and north to south from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf.⁸ Despite its well-marked frontiers, the demarcation lines gave rise to much trouble with the Golden Horde in the west and the Chagatai Khanate in the east--difficulties which will be discussed later.

In Asia Minor, the Saljuqs of Rūm remained a tributary state.⁹ Michael Palaeologus VIII of Byzantium, whose father had

⁶Hayton, "La Flor des Estoires de la Terre d'Orient," in Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Documents arméniens, Vol. II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1906), p. 173.

⁷E. D. Phillips, The Mongols (London: Thames and Hudson, 1969), p. 115; and Boyle, "History of the Il-Khans," p. 351.

⁸Boyle called him Ilkhan as soon as he conquered Baghdad, which is evidently improper. On his coins struck during the reign of Mongke he styles himself Khan. But after the accession of Kubilai, he called himself Ilkhan. Cf. Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I,

⁹Cf. Cl. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History, c. 1071-1330. Translated from the French by J. Jones-Williams (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co.), pp. 269-279.

become in some degree a vassal of Mongke Khan,¹⁰ concluded a secret treaty with Hūlāgū in 1261 and gave his daughter, Maria, in marriage to him.¹¹ The Mongols of Persia ruled directly only in Khurāsān and elsewhere in northern Iran, except Gilan where mountainous terrain made it inaccessible to the Mongols. A campaign against Gilan failed to subjugate that territory. The forces of the Mongols were no more successful than those of the Abbasids in previous centuries when fighting in the hot and humid climate of the southern coast of the Caspian Sea.¹² Some of the principalities in the south of Persia, which were almost equally inaccessible to the Mongols because of the adverse climate, were able to retain their autonomy within the imperial Mongol framework. The most important of these principalities were Fārs, with Shirāz as its capital;¹³ Kerman, with a dynasty (619-703/1222-1303) of Qutlugh Khans, descendant of Burak Hājib (619-632/1222-1234);¹⁴ and, finally, the islands of the Persian Gulf centered around Hurmuz.¹⁵ The states of Luristan, Georgia, and Great and Lesser Armenia owed allegiance to the Mongols. Herāt, ruled by

¹⁰Phillips, p. 117.

¹¹A. A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, 324-1453 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press), II, 600-602.

¹²For another campaign in the time of Uljaytu see below.

¹³Lane-Poole, Mohammad Dynasties, p. 172.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 179.

¹⁵Cf. Jean Aubin, "Les Princes d'Ormuz de XIII^e au XV^e Siècle," JA, CXLI (1953), 78-128.

the dynasty of the Kurts (643-791/1245-1389), retained its independence, owing to its geographical proximity to the Chagataites of Transoxiana, with whom it could ally itself against the Ilkhans and thus was able to repulse Mongol inroads. Several long and difficult campaigns were waged against it and usurpers were employed in order to bring this turbulent region once again into subjection but with no avail.¹⁶

Disputes among Mongol Khans

Wars drained the strength of the Ilkhans, particularly the internecine struggles among the Khans of the Golden Horde, and the Chagatai Khanate. The death of Mongke Khan signalled the outbreak of a series of disputes which soon gave rise to a war of succession between Mongke's two brothers, Kubilai and Ariq Buqa, both of whom proclaimed themselves Khans in Mongolia. To discuss the struggle between these two brothers would take us too far from our main purpose; suffice to say that the contest ended in favor of Kubilai after Alghu, the Khan of Chagatai appointed by Ariq Buqa,¹⁷ sided with him in 1262. As a result, Ariq Buqa gave himself up two years later and died a captive in 1266.

This succession struggle had its consequences upon the development of the Mongol Empire as a whole and the Ilkhans in particular. It created two rival camps fighting each other. Alghu

¹⁶Spuler, The Mongol Period, p. 33.

¹⁷Chagatai Khanate had been most dependent among other princes on the Central government of the Mongol Empire. See Grousset, Empire of the Steppes, pp. 326-331.

was appointed by Ariq Buqa to occupy a vacant throne in Chagatai in order to guard the Amu Darya frontier and prevent Hūlāgū from sending reinforcements to Kubilai. However, as soon as he replaced Urghana Khatun (the widow of Chagatai's grandson, and a woman of great ability) as Khan of Chagatai in 1261, he coveted the rich revenue of his Khanate and declared his independence of his benefactor. An army sent by Ariq Buqa to punish Alghu for his insubordination put him to flight. Yet Alghu came back as soon as Ariq Buqa's army left. He finally declared his allegiance for Kubilai.¹⁸

Hūlāgū's support of Kubilai resulted in Berke's cooperation with Ariq Buqa. Consequently, Berke broke away from the universal Mongol Empire. However, the worsened relations between Hūlāgū and Berke began at the time of the Baghdad conquest in 656/1258. Berke, who succeeded Batu after the brief intervening reigns of Ulagchi and Sartaq in 1257, was the first Mongol to be converted to Islam. As such, he did not agree with the sacking of many Muslim cities and particularly the elimination of the ^cAbbāsīd Caliph al-Mu^ctaṣīm. He is said to have attempted to oppose the campaign against the caliphate, but without avail.¹⁹ The outcome of Hūlāgū's campaign so enraged him that he once said:

He [Hūlāgū] has demolished all the Muslim cities, and condemned indiscriminately all the Muslim royal houses, whether they were friends or enemies, and without consulting the eminent members of the House [of Chingiz] had terminated the caliphate. With the help of Allah I

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 331-332.

¹⁹Spuler, The Mongol Period, p. 21.

will call him to account for so much innocent blood.²⁰

The core of the problem, however, was a quarrel over authority and territory. After Hūlāgū had gained control over most of Persia and began to consolidate his Empire, he found in Berke's power a displeasing competitor. Indeed Berke asserted his prestige and influence as a reward for the assistance which his brother Batu had rendered to Mongke Khan to secure the throne for him, over the Qara Qorum.²¹ Berke, in fact, took advantage of every opportunity to mortify his cousin's haughty attitude. Impatient with Berke's insolent pretensions, Hūlāgū at last openly denounced him and withdrew his submission to him. He also declared that thereafter all ties of friendship between them were dissolved.²² Berke, on the other hand, was insulted by the Great Khan's assignment to Hūlāgū of Arran, Ādharbayjān, and Rūm--territories hitherto either possessions or dependencies of the Golden Horde.²³ Berke may even have feared the reduction of his Khanate to vassel status if Hūlāgū subdued both Syria and Egypt.²⁴

Hūlāgū's precautions against encroachment by Berke resulted

²⁰Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I, 332.

²¹See Chapter II, p. 68 above.

²²Price, II, 569-570.

²³Boyle, "History of the Īl-Khāns," p. 352; Grousset, *Empire of the Steppes*, p. 398; Spuler, *The Mongol Period*, p. 22; and Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, p. 275.

²⁴J. J. Saunders, *The History of the Mongol Conquests* (London: Routledge & Paul, 1971), p. 116.

in second Mongol defeat at Hims, while strained relations between the Golden Horde and the Ilkhanate resulted in 1261 in the outbreak of hostilities along the Caucasus.²⁵ This was the beginning of an inconclusive war that exploded into fierce fighting in 660/1262. An army consisting of thirty thousand horse under Nuqay²⁶ descended across Darband to Shirwān, and on 2 Shawwāl 660/August 1262 Hūlāgū set out from Alātagh to meet Nuqay. In the neighborhood of Shamākhi, Hūlāgū's army suffered a defeat by surprise and many of his men were killed.²⁷ However, Hūlāgū won the next encounter, and Darband was taken by storm on 6 Muharram 661/8 December 1262. But whilst in pursuit of the fleeing enemy, the Ilkhan's army was overwhelmed in Rabi' al-Awwal 662/January 1263 by a great army led in person by Berke along the banks of the Terek River.²⁸ Nevertheless, Berke was not successful in dislodging Hūlāgū from the Caucasus. On 10 Jumadā al-Ākhirah 662/23 March 1263, Hūlāgū returned to Tabriz. He died in the course of next year while making elaborate preparation for a new campaign against the Gold Horde.

The threat from the Golden Horde would not itself have presented any great danger to the Ilkhans had not Berke allied himself with the Mamluks, the traditional enemies of the Mongols. Berke's

²⁵Spuler, The Mongol Period, p. 22.

²⁶In Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I, 332, this name is written as Buqay and Khwandmir in Habīb al-Siyār called Tugay. Price, II, 570.

²⁷Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I, 333; Price, II, 570; and Boyle, "History of the Īl-Khāns," p. 353.

²⁸Ibid.

move towards an alliance with Egypt seems to have started shortly after the sack of Baghdad, when he ordered his troops fighting in Hulagu's army to withdraw and proceed to Cairo.²⁹ Formal diplomatic exchanges began in 659/1261 and continued until 661/1263, when a specific alliance was concluded between the two countries. After the alliance, Berke's name was even mentioned in the Friday prayers in Cairo side by side with that of the Mamluk Sultan. Strangely enough, his name was also cited in the mosques of the holy cities of Jerusalem, Mecca, and Madīnah.³⁰ To seal their alliance, Berke's daughter was given in marriage to Sultan Baybars.³¹

The rapprochement with Egypt not only ended Berke's isolation within the Mongol Empire, but brought him into contact with other states. After Baybars came to power after the battle of ^cAyn Jālūt, Egypt entered into various pacts with other potentates such as Michael Palaeologus of Byzantium, Manfred of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, James of Aragon, Alfonso of Seville, Charles of Anjou, and even Kay Khusru of Asia Minor who was the vassal of the Ilkhans.³² As a result, the Ilkhans were threatened by a vast encircling movement which extended from the Nile Valley through the Black Sea to

²⁹Spuler, The Mongol Period, p. 22.

³⁰Sadeque, p. 191; Maqrizī, I, 498.

³¹Baybars' eldest son by Berke's daughter, al-Malik al-Sa^cid Naṣīr al-Dīn Baraka Khan, was raised to the throne after him in 1277. But he was forced to abdicate in 1279 for his inability to govern. See Stanley Lane-Poole, A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages (Reprint ed. New York: Haskell House Publishers, 1969), pp. 266 and 277.

³²Ibid.

the Volga Basin, and later to Transoxiana.

During the reign of Mongu Timur (1267-1280), the Chagatai Khanate allied itself with the Golden Horde. As we have seen above, while Hūlāgū declared his support for Kubilai in the civil war between the two brothers, Berke rallied to Ariq Buqa because of his hostility towards the Ilkhans. When Kubilai gained the upper hand after Alghu deserted Ariq Buqa, Berke was isolated. However, this situation continued only in the reign of Alghu. After his death, Qaidu of the House of Ogodai, and Baraq of the House of Chagatai were contesting for the domination of Transoxiana. In his struggle with Baraq, Qaidu was successful in obtaining the support of Mongu Timur of the Mongol Yuan, and thus won his supremacy over Baraq who became his vassal. An alliance is said to have been concluded between the Mongols of the Volga Basin as well as Transoxiana, which was stood against the Ilkhans, but failed to overthrow them as the alliance came too late.³³ After the death of Berke during a campaign against the Ilkhans, this venture collapsed.

Although the Ilkhans were encircled, they were not without sympathizers along the Syrian coast. During their first invasion of Syria, the Mongols were joined by allies of King Hayton of Armenia and his crusading son-in-law, Bohemond VI of Antioch. Other Franks in northern Syria began to lean towards the Mongols when they sensed that they were disposed to favor Christianity. It was through

³³Spuler, The Mongol Period, p. 49.

their communication with them that a series of missions were exchanged between the Ilkhans and the European Christians about which a discussion will be presented later.³⁴

No sooner was Abaqa (663-680/1265-1281) enthroned,³⁵ than he was alarmed by a fresh invasion from the Caucasus. Nuqay again descended from Darband to invade Ādharbayjān; and Hūlāgū's brother Yashmut was enjoined to repel this new invasion on 2 Shawwāl 663/19 July 1265. In a battle fought on the Aq-Su River, the invaders were defeated and Nuqay was put to flight with a wound in his eye. Then Abaqa crossed the river Kur, but was met by 300,000 horsemen under the personal command of Berke. He recrossed the river and for two weeks the two armies exchanged volleys of arrows, for Abaqa had erected palisades along the left bank of the river through which Berke was not able to cross. Berke then proceeded upstream towards Tiflis to search for a crossing, but he died on the way and the whole project was abandoned.³⁶

Immediately afterwards, we find Abaqa Khan engaged in another war--this time with the Chagataites in Khurāsān during 667-668/1268-1269. Berke's invasion was repelled and in Dhu al-Hijja 668/August 1270 the invaders were routed at a battle near Herāt and compelled to retire into their own dominion.³⁷ Soon Baraq

³⁴See Chapter VI below.

³⁵The date of enthronement was 3 Ramaḍān/19 June. See Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, II, 11.

³⁶Ibid., II, 13-14; and Prince, II, 577-578.

³⁷Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, II, 48-61.

died, and Abaqa sent an expedition into Chagatai during 1272-1273 in which Bukhārā was sacked and burnt.³⁸

Fortunately for the Ilkhans, no border trouble took place during the reign of Ahmad Khan (680-683/1282-1284). In those years, the Ilkhanate was engaged in a contest for the throne between Ahmad and Arghun his nephew. Arghun's reign (683-690/1284-1291) witnessed an insurrection of Nawruz, son of Arghun Agha of Khurasan, which lasted from 788/1289 to 793/1294, while minor warfare continued against the Golden Horde. That war, however, was limited to a couple of battles in the nature of raids during the spring of 687/1288 and 689/1290.³⁹

In the course of Gaykhatu's reign (690-694/1291-1295), a detente was concluded with Toqta (690-711/1291-1312). In the spring of 693/1294, Toqta sent a peace mission to the court of Ilkhan, and was honorably received by Gaykhatu at Dalan Na'ur. Peace was promoted between them, and this was to last until the reign of Abū Sa'īd (715-734/1316-1335).⁴⁰

However, on the other frontier in Transoxiana, it was relatively quiet during the reigns of Ahmad, Arghun, and Gaykhatu, for the Chagatai Khanate was torn by internal troubles between Qaidu and Duwa Khan of Chagatai (672-706/1274-1306)--both of which were

³⁸Ibid., II, 149.

³⁹Boyle, "History of the Īl-Khāns," p. 370.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 374.

struggling for supremacy in that area. Nevertheless, the Chagataites taking advantage of the defenceless state of Khurasan (whose governor, Ghazan, was in the west fighting with Baidu), invaded that province with a powerful army; but they were compelled to retreat owing to the presence of Nawruz, the Abū Muslim of Ghazan.⁴¹

The Chagataites continued the invasion of Khurāsān during the reign of Uljaytu (703-716/1304-1316). In 713/1313, a Chagatai army led by Kabak, the brother of Esen Buqa Khan (709-718/1309-1318), Dā'ūd Khwaja, and Prince Yasa'ur, crossed the Amu Darya and inflicted a heavy defeat on the Ilkhans in Khurasan near the banks of the Murghab. Then they pursued their fugitive opponents to the gates of Herat. But when Uljaytu was informed of the defeat, he immediately set out from his capital, Sultaniyyah. Consequently, the pursuers found it necessary to withdraw and Uljaytu approached.⁴² The most serious attack by the Chagataites, however, was launched during the reign of Abū Sa'īd, the last Ilkhan. Prince Yasa'ur, who had been given the pasture land in Bādghīs after his quarrel with Kabak in 1313, rose in open revolt against Abū Sa'īd early in 719/1319. Simultaneously there was another threat on the western frontier by the ruler of the Golden Horde, Uz Beg (712-741/1313-1340), who approached Darband at the head of a great army. Yasa'ur's revolt was soon suppressed by Amir Husay--Hasan-i Buzurg's father (736-757/

⁴¹Price, II, 612; d'Ohsson, VI, 155-156; Howorth, III, 399. Wassāf called Nawruz the second Abu Muslim, because he was the architect of Ghazan's success just like Abū Muslim had been of al-Mansūr of the Abbāsids.

⁴²Miles, p. 290; Howorth, III, 568; and Boyle, "History of the Il-Khāns," p. 405.

1336-1356) who had founded Jalayir Dynasty (736-814/1336-1411)--and Uz Beg retreated, suffering heavy losses.⁴³

Although these internecine struggles presented no great threat to the Ilkhans, they resulted in a weakening of the efforts to subjugate Syria in spite of the Ilkhan's perpetual concern for a triumph in that field.

Syria: A Thorn in the Ilkhan's Side

The Ilkhanite Mongols inherited together with the ancient Persian homeland its old problems as well. Geographically, the area was protected by its formidable mountains--the Caucasus in the northwest, the Zagros in the west and southwest, and the Pamir plateau and the Hindu Kush in the east. Nevertheless, the frontiers of Transoxiana and Mesopotamia were not invulnerable to attacks from outside. We have seen that several raids were made into the Khurāsān area by the Chagataites, but the Syrian frontier remained the most perilous. The Chagataites had their internal troubles and had to contend with invasions by the Great Khans on their eastern frontier,⁴⁴ while the energetic Mamluk Sultan Baybars I, who occupied Southern Syria and championed the Islamic cause, would hardly slip

⁴³Boyle, "History of the Īl-Khāns," p. 403.

⁴⁴The Chagatai Khanate up to Baraq Khan was a dependency of the Great Khan. After Baraq tried to gain its independence of the Mongol Empire in China, his successors strove to maintain that status. But they were always interrupted by the Great Khan.

any favorable opportunity to harass the Mongols.⁴⁵

Since ancient times, Syria had been a bone of contention between the rulers of Persia and the rulers of Egypt. The possession of Syria not only secured the frontier bordering al-^CIrāq, but also gave the Persians access to the Mediterranean. Strategically, the importance of Syria to Mesopotamia is just like "the lips to the teeth", to use the Chinese expression. When the lips are gone, the teeth become vulnerable. If Syria were lost to an enemy, Mesopotamia would be open to serious inroads. For this reason the Egyptians, even after Hūlāgū had failed to dislodge them from that area continued to make raids on Syria.⁴⁶ At any rate, all these attacks proved for the time being to be no more than ephemeral skirmishes, during Baybars' reign its Mongol occupation just remained in the balance. However, the strategy wisely employed by Baybars to ward off any dangerous attack was to lay waste all its fertile valleys so that any occupying forces would find no food for themselves and no fodder for their animals.⁴⁷

By the time the Mongols launched their next vehement attack

⁴⁵ Baybars--or al-Sultan al-Malik al-Zāhir Rukn al-Dunyā wa-Dīn Baybars al-Bunduqdārī, to give his name in full--was a one-eyed slave bought at a low price, who distinguished himself at the battle of Mansūrah. "In many respects he was a great ruler," as Stanley Lane-Poole says, "and his qualities must have been remarkable to have raised him from the level of a one-eyed slave to be the consolidator of an empire that lasted for 250 years." Lane-Poole, A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages (New York: Haskell House Publishers, 1969), p. 264.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 266.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

upon Syria, Baybars had already consolidated his control over the interior though not its coastal cities still in the hands of the crusaders. Since 663/1265, Baybars had begun a series of sorties in several directions within Syria and succeeded in wresting a number of cities from the crusaders and razed them to the ground lest they should again become strongholds to the infidels. Twice, in 665/1267 and 673/1275, he overran the kingdom of Little Armenia as far as Tarsus. On the first occasion, king Hayton had to purchase peace by surrendering Barbasak and the country east of the Jayhan river.⁴⁸

After Abaqa Khan had settled his disputes with his kinsmen, he was able to give his full attention to Syria. Not only had he been in correspondence with the pope since 665/1267, and with some of the kings of the European states since 671/1273, but he had also sought a peace settlement with Egypt. Having received no positive reply to his appeals for an alliance with Europe, and being unable to reach an amicable settlement with Egypt, Abaqa determined to act alone.⁴⁹ In the fall of 679/1281, a Mongol army of 40,000 men under the general of Mangu Timur, Abaqa's own brother, penetrated Syria. The Mongol army met the Egyptian army near Hims, and a decisive battle was fought on 30 October 1281. The right wing of the Mongol army put the enemy to flight, but in the center Mangu Timur was

⁴⁸Jayhan also is known to the Europeans the Pyramus. Cf. Le Strange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, pp. 130-131.

⁴⁹Sayedah Fatima Sadeque, Baybars I of Egypt, p. 63; and Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, p. 285.

wounded and had to retire from the field. His withdrawal demoralized his men and the Mongols were disastrously defeated. The fate of Hulāgū was repeated when, in the following spring, Abaqa died.⁵⁰

The result was an armed truce of seventeen years. A plan for reconciliation with the Mamluk Sultan, Qalāun (678-689/1279-1290), was sought by Ahmad, the new Ilkhan and a Muslim. However, the project was not realized due to the death of the Ilkhan.

The war between the Ilkhanate and Mamluk Egypt was consequently resumed with a Syrian incursion into Upper Mesopotamia in 699/1299. An army of four thousand led by al-Nāṣir Muhammad, Sultan of Egypt, suddenly broke into the territory of Mārdīn and Ra's al-^CAyn, both tributaries of the Ilkhans. They desecrated the mosques and carried off vast numbers of innocent prisoners, including women and children. As a result, Ghazan Khan decided to move against Syria with ninety thousand horse and six months' provisions on 19 Ṣafar 699/14 November 1299. By way of Mawsil and Nisībīn, the Mongol army crossed the Euphrates at Qal^Cat Ja^Cbar and then proceeded without obstacle to Aleppo. Toward the end of the following month, Ghazan met his enemy near Hims, where the Mongols had been twice defeated by the Egyptians in 663/1265 and 680/1281. This time aware of its strategic position, Ghazan outmaneuvered his enemy by avoiding a frontal attack and taking them from the rear. The battle ended in a total discomfiture of the Mamluks by midnight. After a two-day's

⁵⁰ Rashīd al-Dīn cited this battle very briefly, but it is described in great detail by Egyptian historians, such as Abu al-Fidā' and Maqrizī.

respite, Ghazan moved forward to Damascus. Following up their victory, the Mongols chased the Egyptians out of Syria. Ghazan Khan, however, could not hold on to his prey, for danger arose on the southeastern frontier with the uprising of the Nigudaris (or Qarau-nas, as they called themselves and as they were called by Marco Polo).⁵¹ In the face of the new menace, the Mongols were forced to evacuate Syria as quickly as they had occupied it, and gradually the Mamluks reoccupied the lost territory.

Ghazan Khan did not take up arms again to subjugate Syria in spite of the fact that "the design of completing the subjugation of Damascus, and the Syrian territory is said, sleeping and waking, to have been the inseparable companion of his thoughts."⁵² However, again in Muharram 701/September 1301, he made another vain attempt by crossing the Euphrates into Syria, but heavy rain and snow dispersed his Mongol soldiers and he decided to turn back. It was not long afterwards that negotiations for a peace with Egypt were initiated by him. An embassy was sent to the Mamluk court, but without concrete results.⁵³

⁵¹Marco Polo, I, 97-101. They first were mentioned as a Mongol tribe forming a division of 10,000 in the Mongol army. Later they became the daring and savage freebooters scouring the Persian provinces, and having their headquarters on the eastern frontiers of Persia. They were described as having had their original seats on the mountains north of the Chinese wall near Karaün Jidun.

⁵²Price, II, 624.

⁵³The embassy consisted of qādī Nāṣir al-Dīn of Tabriz and qādī Kutb al-Dīn of Mawṣil. According to Khwandmir, the object of their mission was, in substance, to explain that if the name of their Khan was exhibited on the coinage, and pronounced in the public prayers, and the Egyptians consented to the payment of a stipulated

The failure of negotiation led to another Mongol expedition into Syria. For this last expedition Ghazan Khan made careful preparations. In addition to the recruitment of a formidable army, Ghazan wrote to Pope Boniface VIII in April 1302 proposing an elaborate plan of a joint campaign against the Mamluks. In his letter he urged the Pope and the European states to keep the rendezvous. "Heaven willing," Ghazan's letter continued, "we shall make the great work our sole aim."⁵⁴ But his eloquent letter remained unanswered.

Finally, he decided to move alone and started the march on Syria at a rather leisurely pace in the middle of 702/early 1303. On 2 Ramadān/19 April, a Mongol army 100,000 strong under Qutlugh Shah's command reached Damascus, where the inhabitants began to flee in panic. Many were trampled to death in the crowds that thronged out of the gates. High prices were paid for horses and asses to carry out the terror-stricken people. On the following

tribute, his country would be redeemed from the ravages of his irresistible army; if not, then his people would be visited by the same fearful train of calamities. The mission of Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad arrived at the court of Ghazan who was then in al-Ḥillah, with a letter from their sovereign. The letter stated that with regard to the coinage, the Sultan conceived it was a point that could be adjusted without great difficulty by inserting the name of the Mongol Khan on the one side and retaining on the other--after, or under the creed of their common religion--the name of the Sultan of Egypt. But, with respect to the other demand it was sufficient to observe that the continual wars in which the Sultan was engaged in defence of the faith, and in defence of the legitimate possessions of the disciples of the Qur'ān, left little to supply the arrogant, and insatiable exactions of foreign tribute. In short, the revenues of his country were entirely absorbed by the exigencies of the state. See Price, II, 625.

⁵⁴A. Mostaert and F. W. Cleaves, "Trois documents mongols des Archives secrètes vaticanes," HJAS, XV:3-4 (1952), p. 471.

day, the Mongols met the army of Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad on the plain of Marj al-Suffar.⁵⁵ A battle ensued where fierce fighting yielded the triumph of Egypt and a miserable defeat for the Mongols. Only a small remnant followed Qutlugh Shah in his flight back to Mesopotamia. The frustrated Ghazan died soon afterwards, following in the footsteps of his ancestors, Hūlāgū and Abaqa.

Despite the fact that the Mongols had by now suffered four disastrous defeats, Ghazan's brother and successor, Uljaytu, was equally desirous to subjugate Syria and Egypt. However, the recent defeat of his predecessor led him to take caution against further error. He first sent letters to Philippe le Bel and other European potentates expressing his desire to maintain traditional ties of friendship with them. After stressing mutual friendly relations between the Mongol Khans and the kings of Europe as well as the security of trade routes in Mongol Empire, the letter concluded by proposing possible concerted action against the Mamluks.⁵⁶

The response of Europe was unfavorable. After receiving the Ilkhan's letter, Edward I of England replied that he wished Uljaytu well in his enterprise, but regreted that the distance and other difficulties prevented his cooperation in the plan.⁵⁷ Pope

⁵⁵Price, II, 626-632; Boyle, "History of the Il-Khans," pp. 394-396.

⁵⁶A. Mostaert and F. W. Cleaves, Les Lettres de 1289 et 1305 des Ilkhan aryun et Oljeitu à Philippe le Bel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 56-57.

⁵⁷Howorth, III, 576.

Clement V expressed his appreciation of the Mongol offer of a joint expedition, but made only a vague reference to future collaboration.⁵⁸

Nevertheless, Uljaytu proceeded to consolidate his kingdom as a preliminary step towards the execution of his enterprise. During the period under consideration, the Mongol Empire appears to have been under the separate rule of several independent local chiefs. In 705/1036, the Ilkhans dispatched an army against Fakhr al-Din Kart of Herat. This expedition was not a success, although the Mongols were able to negotiate terms of surrender with the city, for the commander, Danishmānd Bahdur, was killed in a conspiracy organized by one of his officers, namely, Jamāl al-Dīn Muhammad Sām.⁵⁹

In the following year, the Ilkhan set out on a campaign against the province of Gilan, which was at the threshold of his capital. Owing to its dense forests, impenetrable jungles, and humid, unhealthy climate, the province had resisted submission to the Mongols for fifty years. The Ilkhans' inability to conquer the area is said to have become the subject of ridicule at the court of the Chagatai Khanate. Stimulated by this ridicule, Uljaytu determined to subdue the province. The Mongol army was at first successful in subjugating some of its outlying districts, but was finally defeated and had to withdraw. The campaign "carried incal-

⁵⁸ Ibid., III, 576-577.

⁵⁹ Boyle, "History of the Īl-Khāns," p. 401; and ibid., pp. 544-545.

culable consequences for the future of the Īl-Khānate," for the commander-in-chief, Qutlugh Shah, was killed in the battle. "Had he survived, the Amir Choban, who now succeeded him as commander-in-chief, might well not have achieved the all-powerful position which he occupied in the following reign."⁶⁰ Reinforcements sent to avenge the disaster almost met with the same fate.

In view of his internal situation and external defeats, Uljaytu would not have invaded Syria had he not been encouraged by a group of dissident Syrian amirs led by Qara Sonqur, the governor of Damascus, and Aq Qush al-Afram, the governor of Tripoli. This took place in 712/1312, when those two amirs accompanied by five hundred horsemen presented themselves to the Ilkhan in the neighborhood of Sultaniyyah. The defection "revived in the bosom of the Persian monarch, those plans of subjugation in Syria, which had only lain dormant for disclosure at a proper opportunity."⁶¹

After extensive preparations, the Mongol army marched from Mawṣil, and on 6 Ramaḍān/23 December arrived at the walls of Raḥbat al-Shām. The Mongols began immediately to lay siege to the city, which the inhabitants defended fiercely. However, the judge of the city finally came out to negotiate with the Mongols. Uljaytu, having ridden round the town, deemed it hopeless to capture the place. Fearing also the lack of provisions, he agreed to raise the siege;

⁶⁰Boyle, "History of the Īl-Khāns," p. 401.

⁶¹Price, II, 639.

and on Ramadān 24/January 26, 1313, the Mongols departed.⁶²

With their retreat, the Mongol offensive against Syria came to an end forever. During the reign of Abū Sa^cīd, the last Ilkhan, the relations between the Ilkhanites and the Mamluks became friendly, and in 723/1323 Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad concluded a treaty of peace and amity with the Ilkhan Abū Sa^cīd.⁶³

Bedouins and the Mamluk-Ilkhanite Confrontations

The defection of the governors of Damascus and Tripoli from the Mamluk Sultan was not the only incident that helped the Mongols to launch their last expedition against the Mamluks. The Arab tribes, commonly known as Bedouins, in the Syria deserts had long taken the opportunity of the hostile situation between the two powers to enrich themselves. Like their ancestors who during the time of the crusades had been at times an ally of the Franks and at times an ally of the Sultans of Egypt,⁶⁴ Āl Fadl, the leader of the Arab tribes, played a similar role in the Mamluk-Ilkhanite confrontation to lean on one side at one time and on the other at another time.

For centuries, these Bedouins lived on plundering the civilized centers and raiding the pilgrims. Whenever opportunity

⁶² Ibid., also Boyle, "History of the Īl-Khāns," p. 403.

⁶³ Lane-Poole, A History of Egypt, p. 307. Also D. Ayalon, "The Great Yāsa of Chingiz Khan: a Re-examination," Studia Islamica, XXXVI (1972), 140.

⁶⁴ Ibn Khaldūn, Kitāb al-^cIbar (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab, 1959), VI, 15.

was presented, they never failed to take full use of it to their own advantage. As a result of their practice, the confrontation between the Ilkhanites and the Mamluks was complicated by their shiftings of allegiance.

During the early Mongol raids into Mesopotamia, the Bedouins helped the ^CAbbāsīd Empire to repulse the invaders. In the days of al-Mustansir (622-640/1220-1242) and al-Musta^Csim (640-656/1242-1258), they participated in battles against the Mongols. In 633/1235 when the Mongols attacked Irbil the Caliph ordered them to furnish an army. In 642/1244, the Caliph again sought help from them as the Mongols appeared from Hamadān. After the fall of the caliphate in Baghdad, the Bedouins continued to pay allegiance to the Mamluks and helped them to defeat the Mongols at ^CAyn Jālūt in 658/1260.⁶⁵ In return for their service the town of Salamiyyah taken from the ruler of Hamah was given to their leader, Sharaf al-Dīn ^CIsā ibn Muhannā ibn Māni^C of Āl Fadl. He kept it until his death in 684/1284. Later, he traveled to Damascus to join the expedition of the ^CAbbāsīd Caliph al-Mustansir in Cairo to Baghdad in an attempt to recover his lost throne. However, he disappeared into the desert after the Caliph was defeated. For a short while the activities of these Bedouins subsided. In 678/1279, ^CIsā and his tribe appeared again in Egypt and formed part of the Egyptian army which defeated Abaqa's invasion in 679/1281.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Cf. p. 123.

Not long afterwards, ^CIsā joined the rebel of Sunqur al-Ashqar, the governor of Damascus, and corresponded with the Mongols. Eventually, they were defeated by the Mamluk Sultan and ^CIsā fled to Rahbat where he stay for about a year. Then we met him again in Cairo and the next year he was commander of the right wing of the Egyptian army at Hims, leading Fadl, Mirā and other tribes.⁶⁷

Muhannā Husām al-Dīn, son of ^CIsā, succeeded his father as the leader of the Bedouins and continued to maintain cordial relations with Egypt. When the Mamluk army was defeated at Hims by Ghazan in 699/1299, Muhannā was in command of the right wing. His service with the Sultan lasted until 711/1311 when he rebelled against him and was forced to flee the country. With Qara Sunqur and Aq Qush al-Afram, Muhannā took refuge with Uljaytu, the Ilkhan. Qara Sunqur died in Maraghah on 27th Shawwāl 728/14th September 1328 as a septuagenarian,⁶⁸ while Muhannā returned to Egypt two years later, when he was finally summoned to return to his allegiance

⁶⁷See p. 124.

⁶⁸Qara Sunqur al-Jarkasi al-Mansuri, bought by Qalāūn before the later became Sultan of Egypt, was first made a page and a polo-master, then governor of Hamah. In 681/1281, he was appointed Governor of Aleppo and then recalled to Egypt as amir jandar. Under Sultan Lajin, he was viceroy of Egypt till replaced by Mankutimur in 696/1297. He became governor of Subaybah under Muhammad b. Qalāūn and in 698/1298 appointed governor of Hamah and a year later was transferred to Aleppo as governor. On Qalāūn's thrid accession to the throne, he was appointed viceroy of Syria and entered Damascus in 709/1910 and remained in office till 711 when he fled to the Mongol court. See L. A. Mayer, Saracenic Heraldry; A Survey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), p. 157.

in 713/1313. He was restored to his rank as chief of the Bedouins and his fiefs increased to 200,000 dirhams.⁶⁹ However, he again fled to the Mongol court in 717/1317 with a present of Arab horses and falcons. In return, he was given a fief in al-Basrah. The Bedouins of al-Ahsā' and Qatīf drove him from al-Basrah and captured many camels belonging to him.⁷⁰ However, he then paid a visit to Egypt and died in Salamiyyah in 734/1335.

Other less known tribes, such as the Kalb tribe, rebelled against the Sultan and finally joined the Mongols in 704/1304.⁷¹ All the activities of these tribes created the instability of the area and contributed many outbreaks of wars.

Baghdad and the Rise of Hurmuz

The contest between the Mamluks and the Ilkhanites over Syria also extended to the sea. The original cause of confrontation on the sea was commerce, which precipitated prolonged fighting between the two parties. In 689/1290, the Ilkhan Arghun sent for two hundred Genoese to come to Baghdad by sailing down the Tigris. At the same time, seven hundred Franks, who traveled by land, wintered at Baghdad, where they built two galleys. The Ilkhan intended to send the galleys into the Persian Gulf to intercept

⁶⁹A. S. Tritton, "The Tribes of Syria in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies, XII (1947-48), p. 569.

⁷⁰Abū al-Fidā', al-Mukhtasar fi Akhbar al-Basar (Egypt: al-Matba'at al-Husayniyyah, 1968), IV, 78.

⁷¹Tritton, "The Tribes," p. 568.

commercial traffic between India and Egypt. However, the Genoese, after leaving al-Basrah, divided into Guelfs and Ghibellines (two traditional rival factions in Italy) and their quarrels put a stop to the expedition.⁷²

The move of the Ilkhan was probably a counter-measure against a recent policy of Mamluk Egypt which had just been inaugurated two years before. In Rabi^c II 687/May 1288, Sultan Qala^un sent a circular to the merchants of the countries of Sind, India, China and Yemen promising them safe-conduct to Egypt and Syria.⁷³ The Sultan's purpose was to encourage merchants to import slaves and young slave girls by according them protection, safety of capital, and higher prices. He stressed the need for slaves to ensure the victory of Islam in its combat with the Mongols of Persia.

Already in 682/1283, Sultan Qala^un had been in contact with the Prince of Ceylon in an attempt to revive the Red Sea trade which had been interrupted by Hurmuz, a seaport at the entrance of the Persian Gulf.⁷⁴ We have seen in the foregoing pages⁷⁵ that in

⁷²Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography of Gregory Abū'l Faraj (London: Oxford University Press, 1932), p. 486; W. Heyd, Histoire du Commerce du Levant au Moyen-Age (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1959), II, 111; and J. Richard, "An Account of the Battle of Hattin," Speculum, XXVII (1952), 174.

⁷³Al-Maqrīzī, Kitāb al-Sulūk li-Ma^crifat Duwal al-Mulūk, ed. by M. Mustafa Ziyada. (Cairo: Dar Kitab, 1968), I, 742. Gaston Wiet, "Les Marchands d'Épices sous les Sultan Mamlouks," Cahiers d'Histoire égyptienne, VII (1955), p. 90. Labib, "Egyptian Commercial Policy in the Middle Ages," Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 69.

⁷⁴Maqrīzī, I, 742; Wiet, "Les Marchands," p. 91.

⁷⁵Cf. p. 63.

the fifth/eleventh century, Aden had become the center of transit trade from India and China to Egypt. However, since the Mongol conquest of al-^cIraq, the Ilkhans had planned to put an end to this flourishing trade by blocking Aden--a plan which had not proved successful.⁷⁶

Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the embassy sent by the Prince of Ceylon to Egypt disembarked at Hurmuz and then took the caravan route to al-Basrah and Baghdad.⁷⁷ This statement not only indicates the importance of these cities, but also clarifies some doubt concerning the use of this route; for Marco Polo, Odoric of Pordenone, and John of Monte Corvino--all of whom were travelers during the Mongol period--left us no explicit account about their journeys from Tabriz to Hurmuz. Some scholars suggested that Marco Polo, and Monte Corvino might have followed the same route, passing through Baghdad and al-Basrah down to Hurmuz.⁷⁸ Others argued that they did not go through these two cities and that, instead, they passed through Yazd and Kerman.⁷⁹ Those who took the latter position argued that Baghdad, since its

⁷⁶Wiet, "Les Marchands," p. 91; Labib, "Egyptian Commercial policy," p. 69.

⁷⁷Wiet, "Les Marchands," p. 91.

⁷⁸Marco Polo, The Book of Marco Polo (3rd ed., rev. New York: C. Scribner's, 1903), I, 19-20. E. Power, "The Opening of the Land Routes to Cathay," Travel and Travellers of the Middle Ages, ed. Arthur Percival Newton. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1926), p. 137.

⁷⁹P. Sykes, A History of Persia (3rd ed. London: Macmillan & Co., 1958), I, 262-263; and C. R. Beazley, The Dawn of Modern Geography (London: Longman, Green and Co., 1906), III, 50-56.

fall, was rather off the main caravan route.⁸⁰ In refuting this theory, Henri Cordier, stated that Baghdad was not off the main caravan route. The fall of Baghdad was not immediately followed by its decay.⁸¹ During the early Mongol rule, the same author contends that:

Tauris [Tabriz] had not yet the importance it had reached when the Polos visited it on their return journey. . . . It was only under Arghun Khan (1284-1291) that Tauris became the great market for foreign, especially Genoese merchants, as Marco Polo remarks on his return journey; with Ghazan and the new city built by that prince, Tauris reached a very high degree of prosperity, and was then really the chief emporium on the route from Europe to Persia and far East.⁸²

Traffic from southern to northern Persia, i. e., from the Persian Gulf to Tabriz, continued to pass through Baghdad inasmuch as Baghdad was still a center of trade.⁸³ This is confirmed by Marco Polo who said that many different kinds of silk stuffs and gold brocades, and many other beautiful tissues richly wrought with figures of beasts and birds were made in Baghdad. Polo concluded that it was "the noblest and greatest city in all those regions."⁸⁴ More important as evidence is the large number of merchants seen

⁸⁰Sykes, I, 263.

⁸¹Marco Polo, I, 20.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Beazley, II, 443.

⁸⁴Marco Polo, I, 63.

there.⁸⁵ Even in the fourteenth century, wares from China, Yemen, India, and the Zanzibar coast are said to have appeared in the markets of Baghdad once more.⁸⁶

We also have several examples of Baghdadi merchants who were active in international trade business. Ahmad ibn Yūsuf ibn Abī al-Badr al-Baghdādī was a merchant who went to India and China several times for twenty years.⁸⁷ Another, Jamāl al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. Muhammad ibn al-Sawāmī, chief merchant (ra'īs al-Tujjar al-Ṣadr), also went to China by sea and was responsible for the collecting of taxes in al-^cIraq.⁸⁸

Additional evidence showing that Baghdad did not cease to be a center of Islamic faith and learning is presented by Ricold of Monte Croce, who sojourned in that city probably from 1295 to 1300. Ricold was born at Monte Croce near Florence, in 1242. In 1288 or 1289, he started preaching in the Levant until his arrival in Baghdad, where he remained several years studying, with fervid passion, the chief theological writings of Islam. Afterwards he again was met in Lajazzo and then started on the high-road to Tabriz through Little Armenia and the Taurus. He observed that Siwas was a principal station on the Lajazzo-Tabriz high road. In Tabriz, Ricold preached in Arabic for several months, but his work did not

⁸⁵ Heyd, II, 77; and Beazley, III, 57.

⁸⁶ Beazley, II, 444, note 2.

⁸⁷ Ahmad ibn ^cAlī Ibn Hajjar al-^cAsqalānī, al-Durar al-Kāminah fī A^cyān al-Mi'ah al-Thāminah, haqqaqhu wa-qaddam lahu wa-waḍa^c faharisahu Muhammad Sayyid Jād al-Haqq. (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Hadīthah, 1966-68), I, 360.

⁸⁸ Ibid., I, 169.

satisfy him. So he set out for Baghdad, by way of Nineveh (now Mawṣil) and Takrīt. In Baghdad he was informed by reliable sources that there was yet a large number of Muslims--more than 200,000!⁸⁹

The continuation of business activities in Baghdad must be ascribed to its special position on the trade route between Persian Gulf and Tabriz, the Ilkhanite capital, and due to the rise of Hurmuz as a trading center at the entrance of the Gulf. The first writer who mentions the brisk trade of Hurmuz seems to be Ibn al-Athīr who said that the magnificent port of Hurmuz was an anchorage of ships coming from India, China and Yemen. The prince of Hurmuz was in competition with that of Kish (or Qays), who did his best to invite ships' commanders to come to his city as their port of call."⁹⁰

Just as Qays had supplanted Sīrāf in the sixth/twelfth century as center of eastern trade, so, in turn, it was replaced by Hurmuz early in eight/fourteenth century. The rise of Hurmuz was associated with the establishment of a new dynasty from about sixth/twelfth century. This dynasty was originally founded on the coast of Kerman by one Shāh Muḥammad of Muḡhīstān, and became, probably, tributary to the Ghuzz of Kerman.⁹¹

⁸⁹Beazley, III, 191-201.

⁹⁰Wiet, "Les Marchands," p. 89.

⁹¹Cf. Pedro Teixeira, The Travels. Translated and annotated by W. F. Sinclair, with further notes and an introduction by D. Ferguson. (London: Hakluyt Society, 1902), pp. 153-196; and J. Aubin, "Les Princes d'Ormuz du XIII^e au XV^e siècle," Journal Asiatique, CXLI (1950), pp. 78-128.

By the time of Mongol invasions, the prince of Hurmuz, Sayf al-Dīn, was in a position to challenge the supremacy of Qays in the first instance and afterwards extend his endeavour against the rulers of Kerman. From this time onward, Hurmuz rose to a place of importance in world trade and captured most of the commerce of the Persian Gulf. Shortly after Marco Polo's second visit in 1293, a "New Hurmuz" was founded on the opposite island of Jirun, and added another haven to merchant sea-craft. Indeed, from this new position, "New Hurmuz" was even better equipped to dominate the trade and navigation of the Persian Gulf and the marketing operations of of the whole area.

Egypt's trade activity had already been threatened ever since the Mongol conquest of al-^CIrāq. For the Europeans, who had been previously sustained excessive price for Eastern merchandise in the markets of Egypt and Syria, new trade routes under the control of the Mongols were more acceptable on account of lower prices and direct communication with India and China. The route of Hurmuz was also preferred by the eastern traders, who were much oppressed by the imposition of high taxes and custom duties by the Mamluks and their agents.⁹²

After the fall of Acre in 1291, Egyptian trade with the West suffered even further owing to the blockade of its coasts imposed by the Pope. During the Egyptian Sultan's offensive against the last remnants of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem from 1289 to

⁹²Heyd, II, 448-451.

1291, the Pope had prohibited more strictly than ever Europeans to trade with Egypt. After the final collapse of Acre and in view of the impossibility of gathering sufficient forces for an immediate reconquest of the Holy Land, the effective enforcement of an embargo was the only reprisal possible.⁹³ It is true that that embargo was never fully carried out, for the Genoese still maintained some kind of clandestine relations with Egypt. Nevertheless, it "certainly contributed to channeling most of China and India traffic away from the southern-most route i.e., through Egypt."⁹⁴

Situated on one of the main routes from the Persian Gulf, Baghdad must have benefited from these changing circumstances in the Near East and the Mongol conquest did not hamper, but rather enhanced, its position in the world of commerce.

⁹³Robert Sabatino Lopez, "European Merchants in the Medieval Indies: the Evidence of Commercial Documents," Journal of Economic History, III (1943), 169-170.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 170.

CHAPTER IV

ILKHANITE ADMINISTRATION IN IRAQ

The Mongol conquerors divided their conquered lands into two categories according to the conditions under which the countries were subdued. The yasag of Chingiz Khan requires that a country should be persuaded to submit to Mongol rule before waging war against it. If the ruler bowed to their demands without armed resistance, he was granted the right to administer his internal affairs with very little interference. As we have seen, several dynasties in southern Persia, and a number of petty principalities in the Zagros mountains and Mazandarān, together with Little Armenia and the Georgian principalities--all of which had submitted to the Mongols voluntarily--were consequently granted local independence within the framework of the Mongol commonwealth. They could even resolve their own mutual conflicts without Mongol interference. In return, they had to comply with the conditions set down by the conquerors at the time of surrender. The basic responsibilities were payment of a tribute to the Mongols in money and in kind, and the supply of soldiers for fighting with the Mongol contingents in times of war.¹

¹ B. Spuler, The Mongol Period, translated from the German by F. R. C. Bagley, (Leiden: Brill, 1960), pp. 30-33.

However, if a country had been conquered by force, it would first be destroyed, in accordance with the yasag laid down by Chiniz Khan. Then the administration of this country would be relegated to the conquerors at the expense of the inhabitants. According to al-Juwaynī, the yasag states:

. . . and whoever presumed to oppose and resist him [Chingiz Khan], that man, in enforcement of the yasas and ordinances which he imposed, he utterly destroyed, together with all his followers, children, partisans, armies, lands and territories.²

It is interesting to note that the Muslims, like the Mongols, also divided conquered lands into two categories: sulhan, peaceful acquisition of land by capitulation, and anwatan, by force. The inhabitants of the territory which capitulated (dār al-sulh) were spared and allowed to retain their property provided that they paid tribute. The terms of peace were agreed upon between the conquerors and the conquered at the time of submission. However, the inhabitants of a territory conquered by force were deprived of all civil rights and their lands were given to the actual tillers of the soil.³

Provinces of the Ilkhanate

Hūlagū's domain was supposed to include all the territories extending from the Amu Darya in Transoxiana to the Eastern

²Alā al-Dīn Juvaini, The History of the World Conqueror, tr. from the text of Mirza Muhammad Qazvini by John A. Boyle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 24.

³P. K. Hitti, The History of the Arabs (7th ed. London: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 170-171.

Mediterranean including Egypt. Owing to defeats by the Mamluks in Syria, however, his empire was pushed back beyond the Euphrates. Even though Hūlāgū was deprived of Syria and Egypt, he ruled over a territory too vast for him to control closely. The number of the Mongol troops that accompanied him to Persia could not have been large, and, in addition, many fell in battle.⁴ It was not possible for them to garrison all the various territories he conquered and rule them as colonies. Mongol rule was indirect in most areas, except in Khrāsān and elsewhere in northern Persia excluding Gilan.

With little exception, administrative units under Mongol rule had not been altered. The Ilkhanite Empire was, according to previous tradition, divided into provinces (wilāyat). The most notable change in the political map of Persia was the formation of the new province of Kurdistan which was taken from the western half of the Arab province of Jibāl, while the remaining, or eastern, portion of the older Jibāl province became more generally known as al-^cIrāq al-Ajamī (i.e., Persian ^cIrāq). All the Yazd district, which had formerly belonged to Fārs, was now annexed to al-^cIrāq al-Ajamī, in compensation for its loss to Kurdistan. Furthermore, on the Persian Gulf, the Mongols separated Shabānkārah from the south-eastern part of Fars, thus making Shabānkārah an independent province.⁵

⁴ According to Minorsky, the number would not exceed 100,000. V. Minorsky, Iranica, Twenty Articles (Tehran: University of Tehran, 1964), p. 249.

⁵ G. LeStrange, Mesopotamia and Persia under the Mongols in the Fourteenth Century A. D. from the Nuzhat al-Kulūb of Hamd Allah Mustawfi (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1903), pp. 5, 55-6, 62-3, 74.

The new Mongol provinces were: (1) al-^cIrāq al-^cArabī (or al-^cIrāq); (2) al-^cIrāq al-^cAjamī (commonly called Bilād al-Jibāl); (3) Ādharbayjān; (4) Mūghān (or Muqān); (5) Arran; (6) Asia Minor (or Rūm); (7) Shirvān; (8) al-Jazīrah (or Upper Mesopotamia); (9) Kurdistān; (10) Khuzistān; (11) Fārs; (12) Shabānkārah; (13) Kirmān; (14) Makran; (15) Sistān (or Sijistān and Sajistān); (16) Quhistān; (17) Khurāsān; (18) Māzandarān (or Tabaristān); (19) Qumis; (20) Armenia; (21) Guristān (or Georgia).⁶

After the conquest of Baghdad, Hūlāgū left for Ādharbayjān, where he took up residence in Marāghah. Soon he moved his capital to the far better known city of Tabriz. It would have been unwise to stay in an area hostile to him, where feelings remained high following the elimination of the caliphate. That Hūlāgū chose Ādharbayjān was due to the following reasons: first, the pastures in the Arran area were the best in Iran; secondly, the main danger was restricted to the Caucasus frontier; and finally, Ādharbayjān was bordered by the friendly Christian kingdoms of Georgia and Armenia.

Since the early period of their conquest, the Mongols had subjugated the kingdom of Georgia in the Caucasus. Georgian soldiers fought under the Mongols against the Assassins, and took an active part in the capture of Baghdad, where they seized the opportunity to repay their Muslim enemies for the terrible sufferings they

⁶Ibid., and Ḥamd Allāh Muṣṭawfī al-Qazwīnī, Geographical Part, en passim.

had long borne at their hands.⁷ The kingdom of Little Armenia also became a loyal ally to the Mongols as 1245.

As a result of Hūlāgū's and his successors' choice of Tabriz, and later Sultaniyyah, as the Mongol capital, al-^cIrāq--once the center of the Islamic Empire--became a secondary province under the Mongol Ilkhanite Empire. Baghdad, of course, remained as capital of that province. Nevertheless, its importance could not be minimized on account of its place in the protracted struggle with both the Golden Horde and Mamluk Egypt on the western frontier.

Administrative Divisions in Iraq

Hūlāgū left Baghdad without altering the administrative system in al-^cIrāq. Every single unit continued to operate without much hindrance. As it had been in the time of the ^cAbbāsids, al-^cIrāq under the Mongols was the southern part of the whole Mesopotamian plain. In ^cAbbāsīd times, the dividing line between the two provinces of al-Jazīrah and al-^cIrāq, was generally given as running up from Anbār on the Euphrates to Takrīt on the Tigris, both towns being included in the lower part.⁸ Under the Mongols, geographers differed about these dividing lines. Abū Fidā' considered that Anbār belonged to al-^cIrāq, and Takrīt to al-Jazīrah.⁹

⁷Howorth, III, 126; and Grigor of Akanc^c, p. 333.

⁸Ibn al-Hawqal, Kitāb al-Masālik wa al-Mamālik, edited by M. J. de Goeje. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1873), pp. 137-138.

⁹Abū al-Fidā', Kitāb Taqwīn al-Buldān (Baghdād: Maktab al-Mathnā, 1963), p. 80.

Hamd Allāh Mustawfī al-Qazwīnī even placed in al-^CIrāq many towns on the Eurphrates lying to the north of Anbār, up to or beyond Ānah.¹⁰ That variance was perhaps due to the shifts in the administrative divisions of later times.

At the beginning of Mongol rule, there were five districts (a^Cmāl) in al-^CIrāq. They were: A^Cmāl al-Shariyyah¹¹ which consisted of al-Khālis,¹² Tariq al-Khurāsān (the Khurāsān Road),¹³ and al-Bandanījīn¹⁴ regions; A^Cmāl al-Furātiyyah;¹⁵ A^Cmāl al-Wāsitiyyah wa-al-Basriyyah;¹⁶ A^Cmāl al-Hilliyyah wa-al-Kūfiyyah;¹⁷ and ^CAmāl Dujayl wa-al-Mustansiri.¹⁸ To these districts, Abaqā Khan later in 672/1273 ordered Tustar and its dependencies which had been a part of Jibāl province to be added to al-^CIrāq province.¹⁹ Later

¹⁰Le Strange, Mesopotamia and Persia, p. 18.

¹¹Ibn Abū al-Haqq, II, 792.

¹²Ibid., I, 446.

¹³Mustawfī al-Qazwīnī, p. 49; and ibid., I, 255.

¹⁴Le Strange, Mesopotamia and Persia, p. 21. Bandanījīn, generally called Bandagan in the Lihf District, has left no trace on the map. It was an important town when Yaqut wrote his Dictionary lying near the foothills of the Khuzistan frontier. Yāqūt, I, 745, and IV, 353.

¹⁵It is not possible to identify this district.

¹⁶An area between Wāsīt and Basrah.

¹⁷An area between Kūfah and Hillah

¹⁸Al-Dujayl was a branch canal from the Tigris, and al-Mustansiri was an area around the ^CIsā canal.

¹⁹Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, p. 376.

A^Cmāl al-Anbār and A^Cmāl Dāquqā were also added to al-^CIrāq.²⁰ Of course Baghdad became the capital of the province, and the residence of sāhib al-dīwān,²¹ and shahnah,²² the representative of the Mongol court.

These divisions by the Mongols were the same as those of the ^CAbbāsids. During ^CAbbāsīd times, the term "a^Cmal" had already been used loosely by the central government to designate administrative units, although kūrahs had been used throughout the entire period in the same sense. Thus al-^CIrāq had been divided into twelve kuwar (plural of kūrah), each with its subdivisions called tasāsīj (plural of tassūj).²³ All together there were sixty tasāsīj in al-^CIrāq.²⁴ The extent of each kurah was determined by its geographical position and the density of the population, and the same applied to the tassuj. Another equivalent term for kūrah or a ^Cmāl was astān. Astān (probably a word of Persian origin) was also used to designate an administrative unit of the area. It was said that kūrah had been part of the larger unit of astān in Persian times.²⁵ If this is to be believed, then the ^CAbbāsīd definition

²⁰^CAzzāwī, I, 204.

²¹This term indicates the office of financial affairs. However, it developed into some kind of governorship.

²²This Arabo-Persian word shahnah, meaning police, was used as a synonym of the Turkish basquq and the Mongol darughu, i.e., the representative of the conqueror in conquered land responsible in particular for the collection of tribute. Boyle, "The Death," p. 160, n. 6.

²³al-Muqadassi, p. 133; and Ibn Khurdadhbih, p. 19.

²⁴Le Strange, Mesopotamia, p. 21; al-Mas^Cūdī, al-Tanbih, p. 40.

²⁵Yāqūt, I, 39.

of the term, kūrah, may have resulted from the fact that the country of al-^CIrāq had been on the decline. In fact, the decline of the country around the Tigris and the Euphrates was accelerated under the later ^CAbbāsids. After the middle of the 4th/10th century, the turbulent political situation and the recurrence of natural calamities in al-^CIrāq further precipitated the decay of the country and the decrease of rural population. Consequently, the number of districts and subdistricts was reduced to 10 kuwar and 47 tasāsīj.²⁶ Towards the end of the ^CAbbāsīd Empire, widespread devastations throughout the country caused a further decline, and at the beginning of the Mongol rule it was natural that the country should have been reduced to only five districts for administrative purposes.

The Mongol Administrative Affairs

As soon as Hūlāgū decided to leave Baghdad, he began appointing officials to undertake the rebuilding of Baghdad and the administration of the province. First he appointed Asutu²⁷ Bahadur as his representative in the old capital and at the same time made him Shahnah, according to Ibn al-Fuwatī.²⁸ Then he granted the vizierate to the former vizier of the ^CAbbāsīd time, Mu'ayyad al-Dīn Ibn al-^CAlqamī. The former sāhib al-dīwān, Fakhr

²⁶ al-Mas^Cūdī, al-Tanbih, pp. 40-41.

²⁷ In all Muslim sources, he was referred to as ^CAlī Bahadur. Cf. Boyle, "The Death," p. 160.

²⁸ Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 331.

al-Dīn Ibn al-Dāmaghānī, was retained in the same capacity. He also appointed Najm al-Dīn Ibn ^CUmrān (who had been an official of the ^CAbbāsīd time and was now a favorite of the Mongols) to the A^Cmal al-Sharqiyyah. Assisting the vizier and the Sāhib al-Dīwān in governing the province were also Najm al-Dīn ^CAbd al-Ghanī Ibn al-Darnūs²⁹ and Sharaf al-Dīn al-^CAlawī, known as al-Tawīl. Tāj al-Dīn ^CAli Ibn al-Dawami, who had been Hājib al-Bāb³⁰ of the ^CAbbāsīds, was nominated sadr (Head) of A^Cmal al-Furātiyyah. However, he died very soon afterwards and was succeeded by his son Majd al-Dīn Husayn. Hūlāgū also entrusted the position of chief gādī (Aqdā al-Qudāt) to Nizām al-Dīn ^CAbd al-Mun^Cim who had formerly occupied the same function.³¹ These appointees formed the core of the Mongol administration in al-^CIrāq.

After these appointments the vizier and all others returned to Baghdad where they made their decision as to the situation of the country, instituted regulations, and appointed many other sudur (pl. of sadr), administrators, and deputies. Thus, Sirāj al-Dīn Ibn al-Bahilī was named sadr of al-Wāsitiyyah wa-al-Basriyyah; Najm al-Dīn Ibn al-Mu^Cīn, sadr of al-Hilliyyah wa-al-Kūfiyyah; and Fakhr al-Dīn Mubārak Ibn al-Mukharrimī, sadr of

²⁹According to Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī, Ibn al-Darnūs was appointed as chief of uzan, which means "artisans." Boyle, "The Death," p. 160.

³⁰It means gatekeeper, or chamberlain.

³¹Ibn al-Fuwatī, pp. 331-332.

Dujayl wa-al-Mustansiri. ^CIzz al-Dīn ibn Abī al-Hadīd became Kātib al-Sallah³² but died shortly thereafter and Ibn al-Jamāl al-Nasrānī was appointed to replace him. ^CIzz al-Dīn ibn al-Musāwī al-Alawī was na'ib al-Shurtah (deputy of police). Shaykh ^CAbd al-Samad ibn Abī al-Jaysh became the Imām of Qamariyyah and khazān al-dīwan (Treasurer of the dīwān) Shihāb al-Dīn ibn ^CAbd Allāh was nominated as head (ṣadr) of al-wūqūf (religious endowment), and given a residence in Jami^C al-Khalīfah (the Mosque of the Caliphs). Furthermore, all sudur were assisted by their deputies.³³

However, the vizier Mu'ayyad al-Dīn died shortly afterwards and his son ^CIzz al-Dīn Abū al-Fadl succeeded him.³⁴

After all these appointments were made, schools and markets were opened and religious life resumed.

It is clear from these appointments (with the exception of the shahnah, who was in charge of military affairs) that the administration in al-^CIrāq was deliberately entrusted to the experienced hands of former officials. This policy in fact constitutes a deviation from the Mongol rule in which a conquered country was put under the control of the conquerors instead of natives.

In contrast, the Mongol ruler in China put all authority into the hands of the Mongols as well as the Muslims and Christians--

³²The meaning of sallah is basket which may be connected with a kind of measurement. Thus, Kātib al-Sallah was the secretary to supervise taxes paid in kind. To this I am indebted to Prof. Subhi Y. Labib.

³³Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, pp. 332-333.

³⁴Ibid., p. 333.

all of whom were foreigners in the area. According to Marco Polo, the Chinese "detested the Grand Kaan's rule because he set over them governors who were Tartars, or still more frequently Saracens, and these they could not endure, for they were treated by them just like slaves."³⁵

Administrative Organization

Having been reduced in status since the time of the Caliphs to a province in a vast Empire, al-^CIrāq was correspondingly diminished in the size of its administration. Almost all administrative departments of state (dawāwīn in Arabic) but one under the ^CAbbāsids were abolished, according to Ja^Cfar Husayn Khisbak. This was dīwān al-Zimām, which replaced all other dawāwīn (pl. of dīwān). This lone dīwān was an equivalent of dīwān al-dawāwīn in the time of the later ^CAbbāsids.³⁶ A detailed explanation of its status under the ^CAbbāsids may help in clarifying the function of this dīwān and the similarity between dīwān al-zimām and dīwān al-dawāwīn.

The ^CAbbāsīd administrative system was not merely a legacy of the Umayyads, but also an extension and elaboration thereof. In addition to the five dawāwīn, i.e., dīwān al-jund, dīwān al-kharāj, dīwān al-rasā'il, dīwān al-khātām, and dīwān al-barīd, a new dīwān al-zimām was said to have been created by Caliph al-Mahdi in 162/778

³⁵Marco Polo, I, 418.

³⁶Khisbak, p. 67.

in each of these dawāwīn that had already existed in the capital. In fact, there were two sections that constituted this dīwān. One section, which was called dīwān al-asl, which was the main office principally concerned with administrative management. The other, called diwan al-zimam, was a bureau of surveillance concerned with audit and accounts.³⁷ In 168/784 all these dawāwīn were incorporated into one central dīwān, called dīwān zimām al-azimma.³⁸

By the middle of the 3rd/9th century, moreover, each province in the Empire was requested to send its representatives to the capital to manage its own affairs; thus provincial dawāwīn were created in the capital. Each of them had also two sub-sections. Later, Caliph al-Mu^ctadid (279-289/892-902) incorporated all the provincial dawāwīn into one single dīwān called dīwān al-dār.³⁹ However, under his successor, al-Muktafi, the provincial dawāwīn were reorganized into three branches: dīwān al-mashriq (dīwān of the eastern provinces); dīwān al-maghrib (dīwān of the western provinces); and dīwān al-sawād (dīwān of al-^cIrāq). But the next Caliph, al-Mustakfi (332-334/944-946), again set up a central office, the dīwān al-dār, under the control of the vizier or one secretary next to him. While there was a central dīwān al-dār, all the zimām dawāwīn of provinces were controlled by one central

³⁷ Alongside of this arrangement, there was a central government for the province located in the metropolis. Løkkegaard, pp. 148-149.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Mez, p. 76.

office.⁴⁰ From the middle of 4th/10th century we hear only of the dīwān al-sawād. It is easy to see that the disappearance of the dīwāns of al-mashriq and al-maghrib resulted from the weakened caliphate and the sporadic rise of local independent states. It was also from this time that the central dīwān for financial affairs, dīwān al-azimmah, was called just simply al-Dīwān. Hence, its head, the vizier or a secretary next to him in importance, was called Sāhib al-Dīwān, an office which continued to exist until the end of the ^cAbbāsids.⁴¹

At the beginning of the Mongol rule in al-^cIrāq, the head of the administration was the vizier (represented by Mu'ayyad al-Dīn and his son Abū al-Fadl) whose duty does not seem to be clearly defined as the vizier of al-^cIrāq alone or the vizier of the Ilkhanate as well. After the death of both occupants of that position (Mu'ayyad al-Dīn and his son) al-^cIrāq no longer had a vizier; and the chief of the Iraqi administration was directly appointed by the Ilkhan as Sāhib al-Dīwān.⁴² With the disappearance of the vizierate in Baghdad Arab domination also ceased, for thereafter in the Mongol capital the functions of that office were controlled by Iranians.⁴³

The retention of the vizierate in the first years of the Mongol rule in al-^cIrāq may explain why the Khan considered it as

⁴⁰Løkkegaard, p. 149.

⁴¹Mez, p. 76 and Løkkegaard, pp. 149-150.

⁴²Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 332.

⁴³^cAzzāwī, I, 236.

a site for his capital. Later developments on the frontier of the Caucasus, in addition to other factors⁴⁴ outweighed consideration of the old capital, and the final choice fell upon Tabriz.

This change of policy altered little in the fundamentals laid down by the two viziers, and their successor, 'Atā' al-Malik al-Juwaynī did all he could to improve the conditions of al-^CIrāq. His rule witnessed the revival of prosperity in the area.

With the disappearance of the vizierate, the central administration in al-^CIrāq seemed to have been divided into three branches: the office of shahnah represented by a military leader; the office of Sāhib al-Dīwān, represented by a civil official; and the office of waqf, operated through a sadr. There was no difference between these divisions and those of the ^CAbbāsids. Under the ^CAbbāsids, the provincial authority was headed by a military leader, amīr, a financial official, ^Camil, and a qādī. The amīr and the ^Camil shared the same ceremonial privileges at court functions, and the general orders of the vizier came simultaneously to both.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the military leader was higher in rank than the ^Camil.⁴⁶ He was not only in charge of the harb (warfare) and the amr (imperium), but was also invested with the privilege of leading the

⁴⁴Jahshiyarī, p. 199.

⁴⁵Mez, p. 81.

⁴⁶Ibid., and Løkkgaard, p. 146. See also S. A. Q. Husaini, Arab Administration (Periamment, Madras: A. Abdur Rahman, 1949), p. 168. Husaini says that the chief police officer at Baghdad ranked almost as a governor in the ^CAbbasid period.

people at the salāt (prayer) in connection with the khutbah.⁴⁷ As the power of the caliphate weakened, as we have seen in the Chapter I, one person was usually invested with both offices.⁴⁸ When this happened, the province was virtually independent of the central authority.

In the provincial administration of the Mongol Ilkhanate, the shahnah occupied a more important function at the beginning, for the Mongol Empire was created in the course of military conquest and it was natural that the army should be the backbone of the administration. As a rule, the great Khan's orders reached the population through the army officers from the myriarch (a unit of ten thousand soldiers) down to the decurion (a unit of ten soldiers).⁴⁹ At least twice a year they were informed of the affairs of the Empire by means of direct personal contact with the emperor. It was said that:

The state of those who sit in their yurts⁵⁰ and do not hear these thoughts is like that of a stone that falls into deep water or an arrow shot into the reeds-- they disappear. It is not fit for such men to command.⁵¹

However, the shahnah in al-^CIrāq seemed to be an excep-

⁴⁷Husaini, p. 168.

⁴⁸There were examples before this time. The two famous governors of al-^CIrāq, Ziyad and Hajjāj were at the same time amirs and amils. Balādhurī, p. 223. Also Løkkegaard, p. 146.

⁴⁹In between of myriarch and decurion there is centurion, of unit of one hundred. Vernadsky, Russia, p. 124.

⁵⁰Yurt in Mongolian means fief.

⁵¹Quoted from Vernadsky, Russia, p. 124.

tion to the rule in that his authority and power was overshadowed-- first by the vizier and later by the Sāhib al-Dīwān. In the former case, the authority of the vizier was not clear due to the brevity of its existence. In the latter case, the power of Sāhib al-Dīwān in al-^cIraq, his brother, Shams al-Din, was the imperial Sāhib al-Dīwān (sometimes referred to as vizier). ^cAlā' al-Dīn must have become very powerful. The then shahnah Asutu Bahadur so coveted ^cAlā' al-Din's position so that he once dared to lodge a complaint against him before Hūlāgū and accused him with keeping a great sum of state funds for himself. The accusation was found to be without foundation and the shahnah was ordered to be executed. He appealed to the Khan for mercy and was, however, finally pardoned; but his beard was shaved off.⁵² Next year, in 659/1261, the imperial Sāhib al-Dīwān came down to Baghdad with a yarliq confirming his brother's (Alā' al-Dīn's) innocence and his position of Sāhib al-Dīwān of al-^cIraq. At the same time, Shams al-Dīn took the opportunity to warn the shahnah of wrongdoing and admonished him that "hair if shaved off will grow again, but head if shaved off will not."⁵³ Two years later, Asutu Bahadur was executed,⁵⁴ probably by order of Shams al-Dīn.

Alā' al-Dīn's rule in al-^cIraq was again confirmed by Abaqa Khan who issued another decree after his accession in 663/1265 in

⁵² Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 343; and ^cAzzāwī, I, 252.

⁵³ Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 346.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 349.

his favor. This document stated that he was an absolute ruler and there would be no hands above his.⁵⁵ Thus his authority continued until the end of Abaqa's reign he was deposed through an intrigue of Majd al-Mulk against the two brothers.

The shahnah also differed from the amir of the ^CAbbāsids in one more aspect. This Mongol military leader was a non-Muslim. As such he could not lead the people at ṣalāt, which naturally became the duty of qādī al-quḍāt. The shahnah was left to supervise the security of the province and watch over the Sāhib al-Dīwān for his loyalty to the Ilkhanite Empire and the revenues. He was the eyes of the Ilkhan over the conduct and activities of the top ranking civilian officials.⁵⁶ Since 683/1284, the shahnah's jurisdiction expanded to include the whole area of al-^CIrāq, for he was thereafter called shahhat al-^CIrāq instead of shahnat Baghdad.⁵⁷

The shahnah was assisted by a deputy, called nā'ib al-shurtah, whose duty corresponded to that of the director of the police department in Baghdad. He maintained the security of the city and prevented riots. The shahnah would come to his help if the city or the province was threatened.⁵⁸

There was no precedent in Arab eras for the authority of Sāhib al-Dīwān. He controlled the appointments of high ranking

⁵⁵^CAzzāwī, I, 258.

⁵⁶Khishbak, p. 75.

⁵⁷^CAzzāwī, I, 329.

⁵⁸Khishbak, p. 76.

officials, such as qādīs, chief qādīs, sūdūr of a ḥmāl, professors of madrasahs (religious schools), and others. He also had the right of determining the life or death of officials and the ra^ciyah (the settled people subject to taxation).⁵⁹ Aruq, who became the administrator of the provinces of al-^cIrāq, Diyārbakr (al-Jazīrah or Upper Mesopotamia), and Ādharbayjān in 683/1284, put several civilians and officials to death without securing the consent of the Ilkhan.⁶⁰ He also appropriated the revenues which should have gone into the treasury of the Empire.⁶¹

It was also during the time of Aruq that two new offices were instituted to aid his expanding authority. The first of these offices was that of hājib of Sāhib Dīwān Baghdād; the second was mushrif over the hājib. All these offices were derivations of Arab institutions. Hājib was first introduced in the reign of the Umayyad Caliph, ^cAbd al-Malik (63-84/684-705), to relieve the Caliph from his over-loaded audience. The new official would interview people and see to it that only those who really stood in need of a personal audience with the Caliph were allowed to proceed further. To accommodate those who had no opportunity to see the Caliph, he would hold a weekly meeting in public so that those who had complaints could make them in person. In ^cAbbāsīd times the hājib in-

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 68. For ra^ciyah see Petrushevsky, p. 492.

⁶⁰ Howorth, III, 321-323; and Bar Hebraeus, p. 478. Ibn al-Fuwaṭī said that he ruled over only two provinces, i.e., al-^cIrāq and al-Jazīrah. Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, p. 478.

⁶¹ Howorth, III, 323; Bar Hebraeus, p. 478.

creased his importance in that he not only interviewed people on behalf of the Caliph, but also was invested with the power to settle the grievances of the oppressed so that there was no need for them to see the Caliph.⁶² Mushrif was the supervisor over the hājib.

During Aruq's rule in the three provinces, there were no Sāhib al-Dīwān in al-^CIrāq. The provincial government was administered by a body of officials which consisted of mushrif, kātib al-sallah,⁶³ and musharik.⁶⁴ Two years later, these three officials were accused of amassing money, and were executed by the order of Aruq. In their stead, Nāsir al-Dīn Qutlugh Shāh, the protege of the late ^CAlā' al-Dīn al-Juwaynī, was appointed mushrif, and became the sole ruler of al-^CIrāq. Though he was temporarily removed from office, he was restored in the next year (686/1287) as Sāhib al-Dīwān, but without his previous absolute power. A mushrif was always appointed concurrently with him.⁶⁵

In the absence of Sāhib al-Dīwān, the provincial administration was administered jointly by three high ranking officials. Among them was kātib al-sallah who had formerly been the secretary of Sāhib al-Dīwān. Because of his close personal contact with Sāhib al-Dīwān, the kātib al-sallah was perhaps the next in impor-

⁶²Husaini, p. 259. The duty of the hājib also included introducing accredited envoys and dignitaries of foreign countries to the presence of the Caliph.

⁶³See later discussion.

⁶⁴It literally means partner and the nature of this office is not clear, but was part of the office of Kātib al-Sallah. Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, p. 437, 448, 450.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 450-455.

tance in the civilian administration. The calamities of his chief in most cases became his own. Both were dismissed, removed, and executed at the same time.⁶⁶

The office of kātib al-sallah, called kitābat al-sallah in Arabic, was an ^CAbbasid institution adopted by the Mongols without much change. However, there was a slight difference between the two dynasties. During the ^CAbbāsīd time, the head of kitābat al-sallah probably took charge of the duties of the minister of dīwān al-inshā', or his secretary, for the two offices did not exist concurrently.⁶⁷ They existed at the same time, however, in al-^CIrāq under the Mongols.⁶⁸ Since the office was the continuation of the ^CAbbāsīd institution, its duty was to draw up all out-going letters and circulars.

Among the first officials appointed by Hūlāgū Khan was the qādī al-quḍāt, the chief justice,⁶⁹ who was entrusted with religious affairs. The Muslims were thus in the hands of their own judges. Nothing seemed to have changed in the duties of that chief justice. He appointed judges to various towns and took care of the awqāf (the Muslim religious endowment). During the Arab periods, he was assigned the following duties:

settling disputes, restoration of rights administration of the properties of minors, the insane etc., supervision of endowments, execution of wills (al-wasaya), en-

⁶⁶ Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, pp. 419, 437, 446.

⁶⁷ Khibak, p. 79.

⁶⁸ Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, pp. 341, 398, 480.

⁶⁹ He was Nizām al-Dīn ^CAbd al-Mu^Cin, Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, I, 295, and Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, p. 332.

couragement of and arrangement of the punishments (al-hudūd), removal of public encroachments, control over his subordinates and watching their conduct and protecting the weak against the strong.⁷⁰

The chief justices were allowed to retain their teaching positions in the Muslim colleges of jurisprudence from which they were drafted. It was probably for this reason that the occupant of that dignity was assisted by the sadr al-wuqūf, the chief of the religious endowments.⁷¹

The security of pilgrimage to and from Mecca was not under the control of the religious institution, but was entrusted to Sāhib al-Diwan. There were many instances when the Ilkhanite government encouraged pilgrims and supplied them with the necessary provisions and security.

Strangely enough, all sources are silent about the Mongol post-horse service in al-^cIraq. The Mongol post-horse service, which was described in detail and praised highly by John de Plano Carpini,⁷² Marco Polo,⁷³ and other European travelers,⁷⁴ was one of the most important Mongol institution. In view of its importance in al-^cIraq, there must have been horse relays for carrying messages

⁷⁰ al-Māwardī, al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyyah (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Waṭan, 1298 A. H.), ch. VI. See also Mez, ch. XV, pp. 216-234.

⁷¹ Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, pp. 322ff.

⁷² Marco Polo, I, 433-438.

⁷³ Rockhill, pp. 101, 131, en passim.

⁷⁴ Cf. Yule, Cathay the Way Thither, pp. 131, 374, and 416.

to and from Tabriz and Baghdad. The proper organization of this service, called yam in Mongolian, was essential for communication between administrative centers in an area as vast as the Mongol Empire. The system was instituted by Chingiz Khan and further developed by Ogodai Khan in 1234 throughout the Mongol Empire.⁷⁵

In the early stage, merchants were allowed to use the yam facilities without charge, but later Mongke required them to travel at their own expense.⁷⁶ A department of yam was created for better and faster services.⁷⁷

General Policy of the Ilkhans

By the time Hūlāgū conquered Persia and al-^CIrāq in the middle of the seventh/thirteenth century, the original Mongol plan to raze the conquered cities to the ground, to wipe out the population, and to convert the entire arable land into pasture for their cattles, had already been abandoned completely.⁷⁸ As we have seen, Hūlāgū

⁷⁵Vernadsky, Russia, p. 30; and Rockhill, p. 101, n. 2, and also d'Ohsson, II, 63.

⁷⁶Vernadsky, Russia, p. 127.

⁷⁷Ibid. During the ^CAbbasid time, there was a department for postal service, which was called dīwan al-barīd. We are told that Mu^Cāwīyah was the first Umayyad interested in the postal service. ^CAbd al-Malik extended it throughout the Empire. In the ^CAbbāsīd period, Hārūn al-Rashīd was credited with organizaing it on a new basis. Each provincial capital was provided with an office. Systems of relays to cover all the routes in the Empire were established. Horses, mules and camels were used in the services. In Persia, the relays consisted of mules and horse, while in Syria and Arabia camels were heavily relied upon. Ibn al-Athīr, VIII, 480. See also Hitti, p. 32.

⁷⁸During the time of Chingiz Khan, the idea had been gradually abandoned due to the suggestion made by his minister Yeh-lu Chu-tsai.

ordered the cessation of plundering and killing after the conquest of Baghdad. Very soon afterwards he entrusted the task of rebuilding the devastated city to the old hands of the Baghdadis and also dispatched 3,000 Mongol cavalries under the command of Qara Buqa and Ilka Noyan to see that the good work was done. His sincere commitment to rebuild the City of Peace was attested to by the Armenian historian, Grigor of Aknac^c. According to Grigor, most of the devastation was done by the seven princes of the Mongol khans who were so unruly that Hūlāgū could do nothing to restrain them from plunder and ravage. In order to save the country from further destruction, Hūlāgū asked Mongke Khan to bestow upon him the right to command these unruly princes whose savage acts violated the yasaq of Chingiz Khan. He stated emphatically that if the Mongols continued their ravages in violation of the yasaq and without a commander the country would be wasted and the command of Chingiz Khan would not endure. Chingiz Khan had ordered us "to subdue and hold the country through affection, and to build rather than destroy."⁷⁹ Upon receiving this message, Mongke Khan installed Hūlāgū Khan of Persia and authorized him to punish whosoever did not submit to him.

This same historian also describes the reconstruction program carried out by Hūlāgū. From each inhabited village, the Mongols selected householders--one from the small, and two or three from the large villages--and sent them to all of the destroyed places

⁷⁹Grigor of Aknac^c, p. 337.

to undertake rebuilding. In return, they paid no taxes at all, but had to provide the īlchi (envoy of official traveler on government business) with food.⁸⁰

It has been pointed out that it was a deviation from Mongol rule that Hūlāgū entrusted the administration of al-^cIrāq to the hands of the conquered natives. This may be due to the change of Mongol policy, but more probably it was due to the shortage of personnel in the Mongol army. Obviously, the Mongols with their primitive culture were not able effectively to control the complex organization of the government machinery which demanded a highly trained and educated bureaucracy with expertise in administration. Thus they had to rely on educated non-Mongols. In previous cases, such as in northern China and in Asia Minor, they relied either on those who, in earlier regimes, had been treated as inferiors, or those who were totally unfamiliar with the area which they governed. As such they avoided putting power back into the hands of the old local ruling class. A more recent example was the Mongol rule in China, following the conquest of 1278. The Mongol rulers had no confidence in the natives, as observed by Marco Polo, and thus they placed all authority in the hands of Mongols, Muslims, or Christians.⁸¹ So deep was their distrust of the Chinese natives that even the local offices were often held by these foreigners. Marco Polo, a Venetian

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 345.

⁸¹ Marco Polo, I, 418.

who had no knowledge of the Chinese language and system of government, became a high ranking official in the court and a governor of a city for three years.⁸² Many foreign administrators, such as Mahmud Yalawach, automatically introduced new institutions totally foreign to the Chinese people and Chinese circumstance. The system of tax farming, called p'u-mai by the Chinese, and taxation based upon adults, i.e., the poll-tax, were among others introduced to China with devastating results.⁸³

Rarely were there foreigners ruling in al-^CIrāq, with the exception of Sa^Cd al-Dawlah, a Jew, who for a total of less than three years was a mushrif and then the imperial Sāhib al-Dīwān. Even though he was a Jew, he was a native of Abhar in Khuzistan who knew Arabic and other local languages including Mongolian, and he was familiar with the area. He could therefore hardly be considered a foreigner in the sense that Marco Polo, Yalawach, and many others were in China.

Under Mongol rule, al-^CIrāq witnessed the improvement of social stability which eventually contributed to the return of prosperity.⁸⁴ The bitter strife between the two hostile religious groups, Sunnites and Shi^Cites, subsided. We hear of no more fighting between them. The ayyārs disappeared and the outlaws in al-

⁸² Ibid., I, 29.

⁸³ Hsiao Chi-ching, Hsi-yu jen yu Yuan chu cheng-chi (Taipei: Taiwan Ta-hsueh, 1966), pp. 35, and 101-108.

⁸⁴ Khisbak, p. 94.

batā'ih, the Great Swamp, were crushed by the Mongol army. The irrigation work which had been in very poor condition during the latter period of the ^CAbbāsids was to some extent taken care of under the Mongols.⁸⁵

However, in certain areas the Mongols adhered to their traditions. In matters of religion the Mongols maintained their tolerance towards all denominations.⁸⁶ There were no distinctions between Muslims and ahl al-Dhimmah (i.e., Christian, Jews, and Sabians with whom the Muslims had made a covenant). The Muslims, in fact, viewed themselves as being downgraded, while the people of ahl al-Dhimmah were being elevated to unprecedented heights.⁸⁷ As a result of this policy, the Muslims enjoyed no special privileges of exemption from certain taxes because of their religion.

These policies--particularly the taxation system--had their roots in nomadic customs. As to their religious policy, this will be discussed in a later chapter, while traditional taxation methods are briefly surveyed here before dwelling on the particular problems of the Mongol taxation system in al-^CIrāq and (more generally) in Persia. In a nomadic society there was no ownership, or at least a standard of ownership comparable to that of our own. Nomads had to move seasonally from one pasture to another for fresh grass. No one single pasture could be grazed continuously without moving to another.

⁸⁵See Chapter V below.

⁸⁶See Chapter VI below.

⁸⁷Ibid.

Ownership in nomadic tradition meant not the right to camp and to occupy, but the right to graze and to move. When a tribal society was established, territorial boundaries were also fixed in relation to other tribal societies. Consequently, the title to such territories within the boundaries belonged not to individuals, not even to the chief or prince of a tribe, but to the tribe as a whole. There was, accordingly, no individual ownership of land, though in practice the common tribally-owned land was administered by the prince who had the final decision in allotting the use of pastures to different individuals and families. Therefore, the tribal chief or prince was free to grant noble families direct use of the best pasture, even though he had no outright ownership thereof. On the other hand, common people not only were confined to poor lands, but also were subject to both service and tribute in kind to the prince.⁸⁸

When the Mongols began to settle down in a sedentary society, the concept of ownership changed accordingly. While their pasture (territory) was secured through conquest, the Mongols looked to the conquered people as their herd. The people of the conquered land, like the herd, were the possession of the Mongol lord, culminating in the Great Khan. As the herd was the source of income for the nomads, so the people became the source of income for the Mongol overlords. Consequently, a subject was obliged to furnish his own ruler with whatever goods and services were necessary to enable his lord to carry out his functions as lord. No basic dis-

⁸⁸Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 66-67.

inction was made between payment of goods and rendering of service, for a lord could demand either or both as occasion required. Influenced by the sedentary institutions and their own nomadic practices, the tribute or service may be divided into two categories: the permanent, customary form, and the extraordinary form.⁸⁹

In fact, the concept of the Mongol Empire, even after the established of the four khanates, was built upon tribal family basis. The Empire was just like a family on a much larger scale. There were four elements upon which a family was built: father, mother, children, and slaves. The Empire was also formed by four elements: princes, princesses, noble families, and subjects. Of course, the master of the house must look after the interest of the whole family, but the members of the family, particularly the slaves, must support him in every way possible. Therefore, every member of the Empire was responsible for its existence. Such a concept also existed in the Islamic Empire and among the Arabs.⁹⁰ The Prophet Muhammad, founder of the Islamic faith and the Arab Empires, once remarked: "Every one of you is a shepherd and every one of you will be held accountable for his herd."⁹¹

Once the concept of the Mongol Empire is understood, the obligations which represented the traditional modes of exploitation within Mongol society must be viewed as a common practice among the

⁸⁹Cf. H. F. Schurmann, "Mongolian Tributary Practices of the Thirteenth Century," HJAS, XIX (1956), 309-310.

⁹⁰Cf. Subhi Y. Labib, "Capitalism in Medieval Islam," JEH XXIX:1 (March, 1969), pp. 79-96.

⁹¹Quoted from Labib, ibid., p. 95.

nomads before they were completely transformed to the traditional system of the conquered sedentary society. The transformation took the Mongols in Persia a generation to realize the harms they had done to their subjects.

The Mongol Taxation System

As we have seen above, Mongol policy was based upon nomad tribal practice, and the Empire was viewed as a family. Its economic system was also based upon home economy. Taxes were the responsibility of every individual. However, when exigencies arose, the subjects of the state had to pay extra levies. This system explains why Mongol farmers suffered so many "tributes." The Mongols could justify their action by asserting that "the tax served to protect the farmers against greedy enemies, who, if not restrained by the military power of the strangers, would rob the farmers."⁹²

Taxes were thus indiscriminately imposed on every subject with no distinction of religion or race. The Muslim under Mongol rule had to pay the same taxes as members of ahl al-Dhimmah, including the Mongol version poll-tax, qubchūr. Qubchūr, as Atā' Malik al-Juwaynī explains, was the old herd tribute levied on the nomads.⁹³ The rate given by Bar Hebraeus was: "From every hundred head of cattle one head was to be taken, and from the man who had

⁹²Wolfram Eberhad, Conquerors and Rulers: Social Forces in Medieval China (2nd rev. ed. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), pp. 3-4.

⁹³Juvaini, pp. 30-34.

less than one hundred head nothing was to be taken."⁹⁴ After Mongol expansion into settled areas, the qubchūr was extended to include the levies upon the sedentary populations of Central and Western Asia. As a result, it was interpreted as a kind of poll-tax. Mongke Khan was credited as being the first Mongol to impose it upon the subjects of the Mongol Empire. Nevertheless, the following five classes of people were exempted from it: tarkhān people, whom Chingiz Khan had made tarkhān,⁹⁵ such as Muslim clerics, and Nestorian clerics; the old; those in distress and the sick; the poor; and children.⁹⁶ Later, however, it was applied to various casual imposts levied on the spot chiefly to defray the expenses of messengers and ilchi.⁹⁷ The scope of this qubchūr seems to expand as time goes on and its nature is therefore far from clear.⁹⁸

The Mongol taxation system was complicated by the fact that it was an intensive amalgamation of tribal custom, non-Islamic systems imported by the motley staff of Mongol administration, and Islamic imposts.⁹⁹ Furthermore, the system was complicated by

⁹⁴Bar Hebraeus, p. 418.

⁹⁵Tarkhān: person enjoying certain hereditary privileges, such as exemption from taxes on account of being professionally a member of the priestly community.

⁹⁶Schurmann, p. 375, and also Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 339.

⁹⁷Minorsky, "Nasīr al-Dīn Tūsī," p. 80.

⁹⁸This signifies the home economy of the tribal practice.

⁹⁹Minorsky, "Nasīr al-Dīn Tūsī," p. 77. Minorsky mentions that the Mongol system of tax also incorporated pre-Islamic customs. I would rather say it is the family-tribal tradition which is common among all nomads.

the significance of certain terms used, and the nature of the taxes designated.

In addition to the qubchūr, there were new imposts upon the people of al-^CIrāq who had not experienced them before. Some of these taxes were either discontinued after a short while or eased at a later time. After the Mongol conquest, a kind of inheritance tax was introduced into al-^CIrāq and its neighboring provinces. In 657/1259, when ^CAlā' al-Dīn al-Juwaynī was appointed Sāhib al-Dīwān of Baghdad, and he observed that "the inheritance taxes were in force in all that region" and decided immediately to sweep away that system and abolish the imposts that had been levied in the the countries of Tustar and Bayat.¹⁰⁰ This tax was to transfer property (for which there were no heirs) to the Treasury (bayt al-māl) for the use of the Empire.¹⁰¹

There was another impost, tamghā,¹⁰² introduced to the Muslim land for the first time by the Mongols. For most of the time during the rule of Chingiz Khan nothing was demanded from moneyed people (ahl-i māl) and merchants,¹⁰³ except for a certain amount of money they were told to give to the Khan from the capital itself (aṣl-i māl). At first one dīnār out of 240 dīnārs was col-

¹⁰⁰Juvaini, p. 34.

¹⁰¹Minorsky, "Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī," p. 71.

¹⁰²Dues on merchandise; capital levy; town levies, octrois.

¹⁰³Minorsky, "Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī," p. 71. According to Petrushevsky the tamghā was paid on all forms of trade and urban crafts, even prostitution! Petrushevsky, p. 532.

lected, and later it was raised to one dīnār out of 120.¹⁰⁴ Still later, probably after the conquests of many countries, the rate of tamghā in the Ilkhanate was ten percent of the value of each commercial transaction; and by the time of Ghazan Khan, it was cut by half in some towns, while in others it was abrogated for a period of time.¹⁰⁵ It must have been quite a burden to the people of Baghdad, for in 672/1273 when Abaqa Khan came down to Baghdad, he ordered among other things the reduction of the tamghā taxes in order to curtail the burden of the people.¹⁰⁶ This tax, like the others, was farmed out to a contractor and thus a dāmin was in charge of it.¹⁰⁷

Qubchur, tamghā, and kharāj constituted the major Mongol income. The kharāj was considered the main source for expenditures of the Empire and was fixed, much as it was in the ^CAbbāsīd times, at the rate of one-tenth (ushr, tithe), or one-twentieth (nisf ushr, half-tithe) according to the capability of the tax payer and the quality of his land. Should he be wealthy and if his soil were good, he must give the ushr. Should the man be poor and his soil bad, he would pay a nisf ushr. Special registers (qānūn, pl. qawānīn) were kept in each province for levies. At each province,

¹⁰⁴Minorsky, "Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī," p. 71.

¹⁰⁵Petrushevsky, p. 532.

¹⁰⁶Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, p. 375.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 458.

the qānūn was made to suit the local conditions of the provinces.¹⁰⁸
 The land taxes (kharāj) were paid either in kind or in money, as it had been in the ^CAbbāsids' time. However, the district of Baghdad was subject to payment in cash.¹⁰⁹

Moreover, there were many other minor regular taxes in al-^CIrāq during the Mongol period, but they can be classed under the one group or the other. For example, there was a tax on mills and a tax on markets which could be grouped under the tamghā, while the cattle-tax (marā^Ci) could be included under the qubchūr.¹¹⁰

Under the Mongols the revenues of al-^CIraq were in most cases farmed out to the relatives of the vizier and to the highest bidders. The tax-farmer (dāmin) was an individual who, often for one or more provinces and for a number of years, paid annually to the state a contracted sum. After he paid the contracted sum, the tax-farmer could then levy for himself and thus extortion prevailed.

Tax-farming is an ^CAbbāsīd legacy, and its roots can even be traced to the Sassanid as well as the Roman-Hellenistic times.¹¹¹ The evil effect of tax-farming has been discussed in Chapter I, and it also had the same effect upon the Mongol administration due to the Mongol nomad practice and the corruption of the administrators. Therefore, we witness many extra irregular taxes imposed on the people of al-^CIrāq whenever special circumstances arose and there

¹⁰⁹Lambton, p. 86.

¹¹⁰Minorsky, "Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī," p. 78.

¹¹¹Løkkegaard, Ch. IV, pp. 92-108.

was a need for money. Although al-^CIrāq was fortunate enough to have administrators like ^CAlā' al-Dīn al-Juwaynī and to some extent Sa^Cd al-Dawlah, who were concerned with the lot of the peasantry, the demands had always to be complied with. Even ^CAlā' al-Dīn al-Juwaynī, the most just and powerful governor of al-^CIrāq, who had the complete confidence of the first two Ilkhans, Hūlāgū and Abaqa, and the support of his brother, the vizier Shams al-Dīn, was not immune from demands made by the Khans and princes. In 677/1278, for instance, he was ordered to collect 50,000 dīnārs from Baghdad and its districts in the form of a special levy called musā^Cadah.¹¹² To comply with the order, he had to resort to force and collected two months tax from the landlords in advance.¹¹³ Nevertheless, his administration was highly praised and witnessed the improvement of the lot of the peasantry, for even though he was a tax-farmer, he did not press hard for money. It was said that he had by 669/1270-1271 a deficit of 2,500,000 dīnārs that remained unpaid. When charged by Asutu Bahadur, the shahnah, with amassing money for himself, he convinced the Ilkhan, Abaqa, that the deficit could not be made up without endangering the inhabitants and thus he was allowed to remit it at a later time.¹¹⁴ Demands for money from the

¹¹²This term cannot be identified and I suspect this levy is a kind of loan to the state and can be characterized as a kind of maona (Ma'ūna in Arabic), meaning support and help. The maona was a kind of private bank which loaned out state money. Labib, "Capitalism," p. 94. Cf. R. Dozy, Supplément aux Dictionnaires arabes (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1927),

¹¹³^CAzzāwī, I, 288.

¹¹⁴Howorth, III, 264; and d'Ohsson, III, 514.

royal princes, khatuns, and amīrs, and lavish spending by the sovereign, continued to drain the sources of revenue.¹¹⁵

The tax-farming system would not have been so corrupt had it not been for the sake of unscrupulous tax-farmers after the death of the al-Juwaynīs.¹¹⁶ Aruq, who succeeded Sharaf al-Dīn Hārūn ibn Shams al-Dīn al-Juwaynī, son of the vizier Shams al-Dīn, to rule over al-^CIrāq and other provinces in 683/1284, was notorious for his exaction of revenues, particularly after Qutlugh Shāh was nominated by him as Sāhib al-Dīwān in 686/1287.¹¹⁷ During the first few years of Arghun's reign the financial situation of the Empire sank to a record low, for Aruq and his brother Buqa, the vizier, appropriated the revenues which should have gone into the Treasury. At this juncture a Jew called Sa^Cd al-Dawlah, who had obtained a governmental position as a clerk in al-^CIrāq, appeared before the Ilkahn, Arghun, assuring him that if he had had control over al-^CIrāq he would have doubled the revenue that had been due to the Treasury, whereupon the Jew was appointed mushrif of that country. In a very short time he turned in a revenue amounting to five million dīnārs.¹¹⁸ Although he doubled the previous revenue, his policy did not lead to oppressing the inhabitants of al-^CIrāq. On the contrary, sources indicate

¹¹⁵Howorth, III, 264.

¹¹⁶Alā' al-Dīn died in 681/1282; Shams al-Dīn was executed by Arghun in 683/1284, as was his son Sharaf al-Dīn.

¹¹⁷cAzzāwī, I, 339.

¹¹⁸Fischel, Jews in the Economic and Political Life of Medieval Islam (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1937), p. 99.

that he administered the area with justice and wisdom.¹¹⁹ He even refunded to the people the money extorted from them by compulsory loans, collected the arrears of taxes, balanced the budget, filled the state treasury as well as the private treasury of Arghun.¹²⁰ He further declared that he could have collected still more had not the Mongol amīrs hindered him.¹²¹ Thereupon, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, Arghun ordered that these amirs be executed.¹²² His success culminated in his appointment to the vizierate in the next year in 688/1289. However, his unrelenting policy brought forth strong opposition from the Mongol aristocracy and others, and he was put to death in Safar 690/February 1291.¹²³

In less than two years, Sa^cd al-Dawlah left behind him ten million dīnārs in the state treasury and other treasures for Arghun.¹²⁴ The Empire reached "a pitch of almost unexampled prosperity and splendor."¹²⁵ But Arghun had not the good fortune to enjoy it, and suffered his vizier's fate within a month of his execution. More unfortunately, Arghun's successor, Gaykhatu, spent the fortune

¹¹⁹Cited in Fischel, ibid., p. 102.

¹²⁰Wassāf remarked that the treasure of Arghun piled up like a mountain. Ibid.

¹²¹Ibid.

¹²²Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, II, 151.

¹²³Prince, II, 589-590.

¹²⁴Ibid., and Jahn, "Paper Currency in Iran," p. 109.

¹²⁵Prince, II, 590.

accumulated by Sa^cd al-Dawlah and Arghun with great extravagance,¹²⁶ which found its way into the hands of the seditious amirs.¹²⁷ Under the strain of financial difficulties, Gaykhatu's vizier, Sadr al-Dīn Ahmad b. ^cAbd al-Razzāq al-Khālidi al-Zanjānī, proposed in 693/1294 to issue paper money in Chinese style (ch'ao) to relieve the situation. Reaction to this was very unfavorable, however, for "the merchants could not trade and the roads were cut and the khans were closed and buying and selling ceased."¹²⁸ For two months the paper money reform created great turbulence and the people cried out against him. Finally, the whole project was dropped.

When Ghazan came to the throne in 694/1295, he discovered that financial disorder and corruption had reached their peaks. He began immediately to reform the fiscal system, but pursued it slowly for fear of unfavorable reactions. He abolished the tax farming system in certain areas and continued it elsewhere in a modified form.¹²⁹ He took away from the governors the rights of levying the taxes, and ordered the bitikchis (revenue officials) to go to each province to make a list of private property in all villages. One bitikchi was appointed to each province and was made responsible to the diwān. During his reign, economic conditions were improved. The effect of Ghazan's reforms was still felt during the reign of Uljaytu who continued to rely on Rashīd al-Dīn

¹²⁶Jahn, "Paper Currency in Iran," p. 108. On one occasion, Gaykhatu made presents to his wives of a sum of 300,000 dīnārs.

¹²⁷Ibid.

¹²⁸Boyle, "History of the Īl-Khāns," p. 395.

¹²⁹Lambton, p. 85.

Fadl Allāh, the vizier, to administer the Empire. Nevertheless, old habits of extortion gradually began to set in again. On several occasions, Rashīd al-Dīn's sons, who were governors of various provinces, were constantly admonished for fear of falling in the abuse of their power.¹³⁰ From the beginning of Abū Sa'īd's reign, the influence of the nomadic military aristocracy again prevailed under the amir and his favorite, Choban. However, towards the end of his reign, the nomad power again waned when the vizier Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muhammad Rashīdī, the son of Rashīd al-Dīn, reintroduced his father's policy.

In addition to these permanent regular taxes, there were extraordinary levies. These levies, too numerous to enumerate in full, became a real ordeal to the population.¹³¹ However, they were invariably derived from Mongol practices. Al-Juwaynī, who praises the effectiveness and obedience of the Mongol army, describes its duties after wars in the following terms:

It is an army after the fashion of a peasantry, being liable to all manner of contributions (mu'an) and rendering without complaint whatever is enjoined upon it, whether qupchur, occasional taxes (ḥavarizat), the maintenance (ikhrājāt) of travellers or the upkeep of post stations (yam) with the provision of mounts (ulagh) and food (ḥulūfāt) therefor. . . . Even when they are actually engaged in fighting, there is exacted from them as much of the various taxes as is expedient, while any service which they used to perform when present devolves upon their wives and those of them that remain

¹³⁰Lambton, pp. 93-95.

¹³¹These levies are listed conveniently by Lambton, pp. 102-103.

behind. Thus if work be afoot in which a man has his share of forced labour (bīgār), and if the man himself be absent, his wife goes forth in person and performs that duty in his stead.¹³²

Although the taxes themselves were the burden of the people, the Mongol taxation system was further exacerbated by the extortions and corruption of fiscal agents. Everyone took advantage of it to enrich himself. Even the qādīs, who were supposed to be mediators between the people and their government, ceased to play their former role with integrity, and they merged with the landlord class.¹³³ The general condition prior to the advent of Ghazan Khan was vividly illustrated by Rashīd al-Dīn:

. . . provinces were given [by the ruler] to hākims (governors) through a [tax] contract. The totality of the [taxes] fixed was entrusted to each one of them, and all regular expenditures were to be paid by him. The [hākim] used to collect 2 qubčurs per year from the people, and in some places 20 or 30. The custom of the hākim was such that he used to consider the result of a qubčūr was the amount of a qubčūr which had been included in his total (i. e., whatever he got became his quota). Every time that an envoy used to come to demand tribute or necessities, the hākim used to assess a levy (qubčūrī, qismat mi-kardi) on that pretext. However, many envoys arrived, and [however] measureless their expenses and demands might be, the hākim used to become happy at their arrival. He used to assess [levies] sometimes in the name of fodder and expenses, and sometimes in the name of promises and demands.¹³⁴

This is to say that the hākim, governor or tax-farmer, put aside the amount which was needed to make up what he had to account for

¹³²Juvaini, pp. 30-31; and also John Massion Smith, "Mongol and Nomad Taxation," p. 75.

¹³³Lambton, p. 82.

¹³⁴Schurmann, p. 385.

by contract. Then every time an envoy came to demand money, or for some other reason, he levied a fresh qubchūr. Each time the tax-farmer took out a large portion of the levy and distributed the rest among the envoy, the shahnah, and the bitikchis. Then the envoy went back to the court and said that the province in question still owed a part of its contribution, which must be paid. The mission was repeated again and again without end.

The Mongols based their assessment of taxes upon the census conducted immediately after the conquest. In Baghdad, the census was made in 657/1259. In that year, Ibn al-Fuwatī reported, the people of Baghdad were ordered to get together and their names were registered. Then they were commanded by the amirs to divide and subdivide themselves into thousands, hundreds, and units of ten for tax purposes. Everyone's capability to pay annual levies was prescribed under his category; but the old and the young under legal age were exempted.¹³⁵

Conclusion

Coming from the steppes and without any experience in centralized administration, the Mongols had to rely on the experienced people of the conquered land for a smooth operation of their newly established country. In the case of al-^cIrāq, the conquerors did not interrupt the operation. Almost every thing returned to normal as soon as the conquerors left for their residence in northern Persia. In fact, the Mongols' strength was spent on the wars with

¹³⁵ Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 339.

Egypt and with their cousins. Internal administration seemed to be a secondary consideration. They showed their genuine ability, however, in adapting themselves to a difficult situation. Abaqa Khan, who had been surrounded by imminent external danger, successfully consolidated his empire through alliance, agreements, and pacification. Under his rule, the Ilkhanate was prospering. However, all his success was brought to waste in just a few years after his death. The rule of Gavkhatu was particularly devastating. The state treasury became empty as a result of his extravagance and the weakness of his vizier.

Except for the taxation system, which adhered in part to nomad practices, administration in al-^CIrāq was based on that of the ^CAbbasids. In order to evaluate the Mongol rule in al-^CIrāq, further study about other areas, such as irrigation and religious policy, must be made.

CHAPTER V

RELIGIOUS POLICY OF THE ILKHANITES

Religious indifference constituted one of the most unpopular aspects of the Mongol rule in the Muslim East.¹ For the first time since the rise of Islam, Muslims found themselves governed, up to 694/1295, by non-Muslim rulers--either pagan Shamanists or Buddhists. By virtue of the principle of toleration towards all religions--a principle rigorously maintained by the Ilkhans--all the restrictions imposed upon the Protected People, i. e., the ahl al-Dhimmah,² were lifted after the conquest of Muslim territory. Islam lost the dominant position which it had enjoyed for more than five centuries, and became a religion along with all the others.

Following the conquest of Baghdad, the first Ilkhan, under the influence of his zealous Christian wife, Doquz Khatun, showed much favor to Christians. The Christians were allowed to build their churches and to organize public processions. One of the palaces belonging to the Caliphs and the Dār al-Dawitdār was granted to the Nestorian Catholicus and his church, and he was allowed to build a

¹The Muslim East means the land east of the Mediterranean.

²They are the Christians, Jews, and Sabians with whom the Muslims made covenant.

new cathedral in their grounds.³ Because of their diplomatic policy whereby they relied upon those who had in earlier regimes been inferiors, the Mongols were construed as being "anti-Muslim."⁴ One observation is, however, informative: Bar Hebraeus, the famous Jacobite contemporary chronicler, remarked, "With the Mongols there is neither slave nor free man, neither believer nor pagan, neither Christian nor Jew; but they regard all men as belonging to one and the same stock."⁵

Furthermore, there were reports indicating that the early Mongols in Iran favored Buddhism over other religions and erected many Buddhist temples in Persian towns and even villages. However, these reports were not absolutely reliable, for we hear of them only when Ghazan Khan, after embracing Islam, ordered those temples to be destroyed.⁶ Moreover, such reports were written by the Muslims and Christians, and were not without exaggeration. In any case, as Spuler states, "the position of Buddhism in the realm of the Ilkans

³Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 333; and also Laurence E. Browne, The Eclipse of Christianity in Asia from the Time of Muhammad till the Fourteenth Century (Cambridge: The University Press, 1933), p. 149.

⁴Alessandro Bausani, The Persians from the Earliest Days to Twentieth Century, translated from the Italian by J. B. Donne. (London: Elek Book Limited, 1971), p. 117.

⁵Bar Hebraeus, p. 490.

⁶Alessandro Bausani, "Religion under the Mongols," The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 5; The Saljuq and Mongol Period, ed. by J. A. Boyle. (Cambridge: The University Press, 1968), p. 542. See also Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāhn,

was so isolated that there could be no prospect of forcing it on the populations."⁷

The Religion of the Early Mongol Khans

Buddhism did not begin to spread among the Chingizid Mongols until after their conquest of Northern China.⁸ Their native religion was primitive Shamanism, which acknowledged the existence of God, but offered no prayers to Him.⁹ They also considered the Sun, the Moon, the Earth, and Water to be superior beings, to whom they prayed. They also believed in an indefinite sky-power (Tengri).¹⁰ Nevertheless, they feared especially the evil spirits whose power for harm had to be placated by means of sacrifices. There was no regular priesthood, but certain persons were supposed to be in communication with Heaven and hence were able to derive magical powers of prophecy.

Although the earlier rulers were never shaken in their primitive belief, the simplicity of their religion, which was incapable of providing any principle of spiritual unity or of satisfying an organize body of religious teachers, must have been recognized. Once the Mongols were brought into contact with civilized races, Chingiz Khan adopted a broad policy of general toleration in matters of religion

⁷Spuler, Mongol Period, p. 31.

⁸Marco Polo, I, 256.

⁹Dawson, p. 9; Howorth, IV, 92; and T. W. Arnold, The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1965), p. 223.

¹⁰Turkish term meaning Heaven. See Marco Polo, I, 256-257.

for the sake of harmony among all religious groups.

The steppes were the meeting place of world religions. Long before the rise of Chingiz Khan, Mongolia and Turkestan were the center of various ethnic peoples. The Uighur Turks became Buddhists and Christians after their withdrawal south of the Great Gobi desert in Mongolia to the oases of Turfan and Hami valleys in Turkestan. The Keraits and the Naimans, who were most closely allied to the Mongols by culture and political relations, were mainly Nestorian Christians. So were the Ongut Turks on the northern frontier of China. The Qara Khanites and the Jurchens were Buddhists or Taoists, while the western Turks from Transoxiana to Asia Minor were Muslims. Under such circumstances Chingiz wisely proclaimed that all religions were to be respected without favoritism and that the priests and holy men were to be treated with deference--a principle to which all his descendants adhered faithfully both in the East and in the West for successive generations.¹¹ Upon this policy, Juwaynī had this to say,

Being the adherent of no religion and the follower of no creed, he eschewed bigotry, and the preference of one faith to another, and the placing of some above others; rather he honoured and respected the learned and pious of every sect, recognizing such conduct as the way to the Court of God. And as he viewed the Moslems with the eye of respect, so also did he hold the Christians and idolaters¹² in high esteem.¹³

As for his children and grandchildren, they could choose any religion

¹¹Dawson, pp. xxiii-xxiv.

¹²Here, it meant both the Buddhists and Taoists.

¹³Juvaini, I, 26.

according to their own inclination. Among them were Muslims, Christians, and idolaters, as well as Shamanists.¹⁴ In spite of their differences, Chingiz Khan's children, according to Juwaynī, "still for the most part avoid all show of fanaticism and do not swerve from the yasa of Chingiz-Khan, namely to consider all sects as one and not to distinguish them from one another."¹⁵ At the courts of Mongke and Kubilai, the Buddhist and Christian priests and the Muslim Imāms alike enjoyed the patronage of the Mongol prince.¹⁶

However, Christianity seemed more dominant in the Mongol courts because many of the wives and mothers of the Khans, including some of the most influential of them all, like Sorqotani,¹⁷ mother of Mongke, Kubilai, and Hūlāgū, and Doquz Khatun, were Christians.¹⁸ Furthermore, Christians, like Chinqai and Qadaq Noyan, were leading officials in the Mongol court. Chinqai was much trusted by Chingiz Khan, for he was among a few followers who drank the muddy water of Baljuna Lake and was present at the guriltai in 1206 in which Chingiz was elected Khan. When Ogotai succeeded his father, Chinqai was the

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Arnold, The Preaching of Islam, p. 223.

¹⁷She was the younger daughter of Ja-Gambu, the brother of Wang Khan, the ruler of the Kerait, the Christians.

¹⁸She was a niece of the Christian Wang Khan of the Kerait. In addition, many members of Hulagu's entourage were also Christians. See I de Rachewitz, Papal Envoys to the Great Khans (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1971), p. 146.

chief Secretary of State and had control over all the business of the Empire. No official documents of any kind were considered legal without his confirmation written in Uighur script.¹⁹ During the regency after the death of Ogotai, he withdrew to the background only to become much more powerful under Kuyuk Khan. Due to the ill-health of Kuyuk, almost the whole weight of government fell upon Chinqai and his colleague Qadaq. Qadaq was the atabeg²⁰ of Kuyuk. According to Juwaynī, since Qadaq was a Christian, Kuyuk too was brought up in that religion.²¹ However, both Chinqai and Qadaq Noyan were executed after the ascension of Mongke in 1251.²²

It was during Ogotai's reign that the situation of the Christians in the Mongol Empire was reportedly improved compared to their previous condition under the rule of the Muslims. Previously in Muslim towns no one dared to pronounce the name of Christ and not even to show themselves as Christians. Even the Christians from "Damascus and Rum²³ and Baghdad and the As²⁴ and the Rus²⁵," were

¹⁹Peng Ta-ya, Hei Ta Shih Lueh, commentary by Hsu T'ing. 1237 edition.

²⁰This is a Turkish term indicating that the atabeg is the guardian of a prince at the court.

²¹Juvaini, I, 259.

²²Arthur Waley, The Travels of an Alchemist; the Journey of the Taoist Ch'ang-ch'un from China to the Hindukush at the Summons of Chingiz Khan (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1931), p. 35.

²³Rum: Asia Minor.

²⁴As: the Alans.

²⁵Rus: the Turkish term for Russians.

looking towards Kuyuk Khan as a protector.²⁶

Coincidentally, the papal envoys arrived at the imperial camp of Shira Ordo in Mongolia within half a day's journey of Qara Qorum just in time to witness the coronation of Kuyuk Khan on 24 August 1246.²⁷ One of these envoys, John de Plano Carpini, was very well-known and left us abundant material. Suffice it here to say that his embassy was well treated; not only were its members lodged in better quarters but they were not required to prostrate themselves when Kuyuk was placed on the golden throne.²⁸ Several audiences with the Great Khan were granted to him. The objects of this embassy was twofold: to convert the Mongols to Christianity, and to induce them to treat the Christians less rudely. The mission was fruitless. He finally returned to Pope Innocent IV (1243-1254) at the end of 1247 and brought with him Kuyuk's reply, "which, though noncommittal, was neither forbidding nor even unfriendly."²⁹

Following the European initiative, the Mongols also sent their mission to Europe. On 14 December 1248, a Mongol embassy

²⁶Juvainī, I, 259; Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 184.

²⁷"The date of the enthronement had actually been fixed for a few days earlier, but there had been a great hailstorm on 15 August, and this was regarded as a bad omen. . . . The ceremony was postponed. . . ." See Rachewiltz, p. 99; and Voegelin, p. 379.

²⁸Ibid. Other embassies which were little known were the embassy of Lorenzo of Portugal and the embassy of Ascelline, a Dominican Friar of Lombard origin. The former went no further than Lajazzo and the latter reached only as far as the domain of Baiju in Western Asia. See also Atiya, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages, pp. 240-241.

²⁹Atiya, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages, p. 241.

arrived at Cyprus and on the 19th came to Nicosia where the Frankish King, St. Louis, had just established his residence with Henri I de Lusignan. This embassy headed by two Nestorian Christians from Mawsil--David and Marcus--brought a letter from Eljigitei, the newly appointed commander of Persia and Armenia. The letter addressed to St. Louis suggested that the Franks should carry out an attack on Egypt next summer, while the Mongols would simultaneously attack the ^cAbbāsid caliphate in Baghdad. The mission was colored with religious sentiment, for the Khan's envoys emphasized through their personal explanations and exaggeration the fact that the Mongol court was largely Christianized and the Khan himself baptized. If a military entente was established, the ensuing campaign could be considered as a crusade against the common enemy, Islam.³⁰ St. Louis responded by sending an embassy under the leadership of Andrew of Longjumeau to confer with the Khan. However, they arrived at the Mongol court only to find the Great Khan had died. The whole scheme was miscarried under the regent Ogul Gaimish, and not until the establishment of the Ilkhans in Persia was an alliance between the Mongols and the European states again contemplated. Once more, however, it failed to materialize.

Religious fervor motivated the dispatch of missions to the Mongol court, but what the missionaries found was indifference on the part of the Mongols. During his stay among the Mongols, John de Plano Carpini realized that any effort to convert their hosts to Christianity

³⁰Ibid., pp. 240-243; Voegelin, pp. 379-380; Rachewiltz, pp. 120-122; and Pelliot, "Les Mongols et la Papauté," IV, 118ff., 129ff.

would be premature and thus he made no attempt to act in this direction. Furthermore, the Great Khan Kuyuk enjoined the pope and the kings of Europe to come together to the Mongol court to pay homage and receive his commands. Should they disobey, the letter continued, the Mongols were ready to invade their domains.³¹ Clearly, this letter showed Kuyuk's religious policy was subordinate to the Mongol aim of world conquest. Throughout, Kuyuk was still a Shamanist.³²

When Mongke ascended to the throne in 1251, religious toleration again prevailed in the Mongol court despite the fact that Christian influence was still strong. Mongke's mother, Sorqaqtani, and his favorite wife, Oghul Tutmish, had been devout Christians, but had both died when William of Rubruck was in Mongolia. Furthermore, Ariq Buqa, his younger brother, had strong leanings towards Christianity, and his chief secretary Bulgai was a Nestorian Kerait. Nevertheless, Mongke's general toleration in matters of religion convinced various religious leaders of different denominations of his favorable inclination to their religion. These religious leaders followed his court as flies did honey, and they all prophesied blessings to him.³³ Only William of Rubruck observed that Mongke did not believe in any of them. Like his predecessors, he remained a Shamanist, for we know that his dependence on the soothsayers was

³¹See appendix IV, pp. 330-331.

³²Bausani, "Religion under the Mongols," p. 541.

³³Rockhill, p. 182; Dawson, p. 160.

very great.³⁴

Of Mongke, the Armenian historian Haithon had this to say:

he wished to receive the sacrament of baptism, and so was baptised by the hands of a certain bishop who was chancellor of the kingdom of Armenia; and all those of his house were also baptised, and many others of both sexes, nobles and magnates.³⁵

On the other hand, the Muslims also praised his respect for their religion and said,

And of all the peoples and religious communities he showed most honor and respect to the Muslims and bestowed the largest amount of gifts and alms upon them. A proof of this is the following: On the occasion of the Cīd-i fitr in the year 650 [5th of December, 1252] the Cadi Jalāl al-Dīn Khujandī and a group of Muslims were present at the gate of the ordo. The cadi delivered the sermon and led the prayers, adorning the khutba with the titles of the Caliph. He likewise prayed for Mongke Qa'an and uttered praises of him. Mongke ordered them to be given wagon-loads of gold and silver bālish³⁶ and costly clothing as a present for the festival, and the great part of mankind had their share thereof.³⁷

Early Mongol-Muslim Relations

Before the days of their expansion, the Mongols were not entirely cut off from the Muslim world, for a certain amount of trade was carried on in Mongolia by Muslim pedlars. After the rise of Chingiz Khan, the relations between the Mongols and Muslims became amicable and even fraternal. Due to the fact that the Mongols of Chingiz Khan were largely illiterate, the organization of their civil

³⁴Rockhill, pp. 239-247; and Dawson, pp. 197-201.

³⁵Assemani, III, pt. 2, p. cvi, quoted from Browne, p. 149.

³⁶An ingot of gold or silver. It means literally "cushion" in Persian.

³⁷Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 220.

administration was entrusted to the hands of Muslims.³⁸ However, the association of Mongols and Muslims can be traced as far back as 1202 A. D., when Temujin was isolated and abandoned by his followers as a result of the intrigues of his rival Jamuqa, head of the Naimans. In the ensuing battle Temujin was defeated and forced, with a small body of faithful followers, to retire to the Baljuna Lake and drink of its turbid water. At this time, Temujin, moved by the loyalty of these followers, raised his sword toward the sky swearing, "If I finish the great matter, then I shall share with you the sweet and the bitter; if I break my words, then let me be as the water of the river."³⁹ Thus, a covenant was established.⁴⁰ These faithful few, who had remained loyal to Temujin even in the dark days at Baljuna, afterwards enjoyed great privileges as "Baljuntu" in the empire founded by Chingiz Khan.⁴¹

It is important to note that three Muslims out of a total of nineteen followers were among them. They were, according to

³⁸They were, of course, Central Asian Muslims, and most of whom engaged in commerce. See Barthold, Turkestan, p. 386.

³⁹Archimandrite Palladii, "Old Mongolian Story about Chingizkhan," Works of the Members of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Pekin, IV (1866), pp. 1-258. Quoted from Francis Woodman Cleaves, "The Historicity of the Baljuna Covenant," HJAS, XVIII (1955), pp. 375-421.

⁴⁰For the historicity of this covenant see the detailed study of F. W. Cleaves, ibid. Prof. Cleaves established its truthfulness from mainly Chinese sources, and he called for further study of it from Persian and Arabic sources.

⁴¹Barthold, "Chingiz-Khan" EI, II, 856-862.

Barthold, Ja^cfar Khoja, Hasan, and Danishmānd Hājib,⁴² and they rendered great service to Chingiz Khan in later times. As for Ja^cfar Khoja, he was later promoted to administer an area south of Chu-yung-kuan⁴³ and north of the Yellow River.⁴⁴ The latter two accompanied Chingiz Khan on various campaigns against the Khwārizm Shāh and other palaces and carried on the negotiations between the Mongols and the inhabitants of these lands. Hasan served the Mongols loyally until he met his death in the conquest of Sighnāq in Transoxiana. After the conquest of Samarqand the Mongols, led by Juchi, the eldest of Chingiz Khan's sons, approached Sighnāq with whose inhabitants Juchi opened negotiations. Hasan was sent as an envoy to negotiate with the inhabitants of the city, but was killed by them. Enraged by the unsubordination of its inhabitants, Juchi razed the city to the ground and its inhabitants were massacred. Afterwards, the son of the murdered Hasan was left as governor of the district.⁴⁵ Furthermore, before these events occurred, Hasan had been particularly responsible for the success of Chingiz Khan in his struggle against Jamuqa. It was reported that after the Baljuna incident, Hasan had helped Chingiz Khan defeat his rival by persuading Alqush Digid Quri, leader of the Onguts (White Tatars), to come to Chingiz

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³This famous pass is located north of Peking. See E. Chavannes et Sylvain Levi, "Note préliminaire sur l'inscription de Kiu'yong koan," JA, IV (1894), 354-373.

⁴⁴Yuan-shih, 120.

⁴⁵Barthold, Turkestan, p. 414.

Khan's side.⁴⁶ Danishmānd Hājib served Ogotai and Mongke and was also a tutor to Chingiz Khan's grandson, Malik, the seventh son of Ogotai.⁴⁷

The reign of Ogotai witnessed not only the founding of political institutions, but a policy of magnanimity and leniency. Historical sources--even those absolutely independent of the Mongol Khans or even hostile to them-- speak of the virtue of this Khan. Muslim historians speak with particular admiration about Ogotai's kindly disposition toward the Muslims. Rashīd al-Dīn, al-Juwaynī, and al-Jūzjānī--the Muslim historians most bitter against the Mongols--recorded some of the anecdotes about Ogotai showing the preference he gave to the Muslims against their enemies and opponents.⁴⁸

It was a strictly observed law that anyone who infringed upon the yasag would be punished to death. According to an article in the yasag no one was allowed to enter the water or to wash his face at the edge of any waterway. Once when Ogotai was riding with Chagatai (who, as chief guardian of the yasag, had to see to it that its articles were strictly observed), they caught sight of a Muslim sitting in midstream washing himself. Chagatai wished to put the man to death immediately for his offence. But Ogotai persuaded Chagatai

⁴⁶"Mong-ku pi-shi hsin-yi ping ch'u-hsi," ("A New Translation and Commentary on the Secret History of the Mongols") tr. by Jaqchid Sechin and ed. by Yao Ch'ung-wu, in Wen-shih Che Hsueh, IX-X (1960-1962), sec. 190.

⁴⁷Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 28; and Barthold, Turkestan, p. 464.

⁴⁸Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, pp. 76-93; Juvaini, pp. 205-207; 223-227 and passim; and Jūzjānī, pp. 1107-1108ff.

to conduct a trial the next morning and to punish him accordingly. He handed the man over to Danishmānd Hājib. At the same time he secretly ordered that a silver balish be thrown in the water where the Muslim had been washing and that the Muslim be instructed to say, when brought up before the court, that he had dropped a piece of silver into the water and that, being all the property he possessed, he had been trying to retrieve it. The next day, upon hearing the Muslim's story, Chagatai ordered a search for the silver, and at the point where the offender had been washing, a piece of silver was actually found. Consequently the Muslim was pardoned, for only in great distress had he committed sacrilege in order to recover what he had lost.⁴⁹

In the short reign of Kuyuk Khan, it was reported that the Muslims suffered oppression and persecution, and that no Muslim dared to raise his voice to the Christians.⁵⁰ After Kuyuk, Mongke Khan returned to a policy of religious tolerance, as shown above.

Christians and Jews Under the Ilkhans

Although William of Rubruck was disillusioned by the performance of Mongke's religious toleration, he did not fail to observe that the Tatars treated the Christians fairly well. On one occasion, an Armenian fled to the Khan to complain that a church in his native land had been destroyed by the Muslims; and Mongke, upon hearing this, ordered that it be rebuilt at his expense from the

⁴⁹Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 77. Jūzjānī,

⁵⁰Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 184.

tribute paid by Persia and Greater Armenia.⁵¹ This and other favorable treatment accorded to the Christians soon aroused sentimental affection towards the Mongols among all other Christians of the East.⁵² They looked forward to the end of half a millenium of Muslim domination, and hailed the ruin of Baghdad. The Georgian and Armenian cavalry joined in the sack of the city and took a prominent part in the massacre of its inhabitants.⁵³ The rapid capture of certain Mesopotamian fortresses was no doubt due to the help of the Christians.⁵⁴

The Christians in Baghdad escaped the fate of others by order of Doquz Khatun, for she was a devout Nestorian Christian. Other Christians in Mesopotamia were also saved by their own appeal to the Mongols. Bar Hebraeus, "the august historian of that age,"⁵⁵ reported that after the fall of Baghdad the Christians of Takrit sent their messengers to the Catholicus, Patriarch Machicha II (1257-1265 A. D.), whom the Mongols respected and gave the palace

⁵¹Atiya, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages, p. 244.

⁵²It was reported that a Syrian doctor named Simeon asked Ogotai to issue an order exempting the innocent people who did not resist the Mongol arms from massacre. Ogotai agreed and sent him westwards bearing a note for the Mongol commander. The note ordered the commander to conform to the wishes of the Syrian doctor. On his return, he greatly eased the condition of the Christians and built churches. The Christians openly professed their religion. All who opposed were liable to death penalty. The Mongols treated Simeon with great deference and were converted to Christianity. See Howorth, III, 34; and Browne, p. 148.

⁵³Blake and Frye, p. 333; and Howorth, III, 126.

⁵⁴Spuler, The Mongols in History, p. 34.

⁵⁵Atiya, A History of Eastern Christianity, p. 209.

of the Caliphs, asking for protection from the Mongols. A Mongol ruler was thus sent for this purpose and the people were protected.⁵⁶

From this time on, the Christians under Mongol dominion enjoyed unprecedented favor. Their situation may be illustrated by the Christians of Damascus who, as al-Marqrīzī, the historian Mamluke Egypt, related,

began to be in the ascendant. They produced a diploma of Hulāgū guaranteeing them express protection and the free exercise of their religion. They drank wine freely in the month of Ramadān, and spilt it in the open streets, on the clothes of the Muslims and the doors of the mosques. When they traversed the streets, bearing the cross, they compelled the merchants to rise, and ill-treated those who refused. They carried the cross in the streets, and went to the Church of St. Mary, where they preached sermons in praise of their faith. . . .⁵⁷

Nevertheless, Christians were not absolutely free from adversities and punishment. As already stated, the Christians in Takrīt were (among others) protected by the Mongols; but because of their brutality in killing many Muslims, and their greed for property, they were slain by the order of Hūlāgū. Their cathedral also was handed over to the Muslims.⁵⁸

Despite the fact that Hūlāgū's mother and wife were Christians, he remained a heathen,⁵⁹ and adhered to Chingiz Khan's

⁵⁶Bar Hebraeus, p. 433.

⁵⁷al-Maqrizi, Sulūk, I, 245; and also in Browne, p. 150 and Howorth, pp. 140-141.

⁵⁸Bar Hebraeus, p. 433.

⁵⁹He was a Shamanist, but later leaned toward Buddhism.

policy of tolerance. If Hūlāgū seemed to favor Christianity, it was for political reasons that he tended to lean on the Christians or the non-orthodox Muslims, for these groups had suffered under the old regime and therefore were more likely to support the new. As a result, the Christians took him as their coreligionist or at least a potential convert. In 1261 Pope Alexander IV, after being informed that Hūlāgū was thinking of being baptised as a Catholic, sent the Ilkhan a letter urging him not to delay his baptism, and said:

See how it would enlarge your power in your contests with the Saracens if the Christian soldiery were to assist you openly and strongly, as it could, with the grace of God. You would thus increase your temporal power, and inevitably also secure eternal glory.⁶⁰

In the same manner, Bar Hebraeus referred to the death of Hūlāgū and Doquz Khatun in 1265 as a great blow to Christians throughout the world, "because of the departure of these two great lights, who made the Christian religion triumphant."⁶¹

Abaqa, who succeeded his father, was occupied immediately with internecine struggle among the Mongols, i. e., the Khans of the Golden Horde and Chagatai, and Abaqa himself. Internally, because of his leaning towards Buddhism, he faced resistance from the Muslims. Like his father, the Ilkhan was a Buddhist who sought to promote his religion among the grandees of his court and among his people. Many Buddhist temples were reportedly erected in numerous Persian towns and villages.⁶² To the Muslims, Buddhism

⁶⁰Howorth, III, 210; and Browne, p. 151.

⁶¹Bar Hebraeus, p. 444.

⁶²Spuler, Mongol Period, p. 30.

appeared particularly evil and idolatrous. Abaqa thus met with sharp resistance from his Muslim subjects. Under such a circumstance he had to rely upon numerous Christian communities for support, and in return he gave them freedom of missionary activity.⁶³ The relations between the Christians and the Mongols were further strengthened after Yabhalāhā III, a Uigur monk from Mongolia, was appointed to succeed Denha (1265-1281) as Catholicus of the Mongol Ilkhanate. The monarch's attitude towards Christianity was dictated simply by political considerations rather than religious inclinations. Despite the fact that he married Maria, a daughter of Michael VIII Palaeologos (1261-1283 A. D.) of Byzantium, he had no great affection for Christians. Maria, on the other hand, possessed no power to influence her husband like Doquz Khatun had had upon Hūlāgū.⁶⁴

It is true that the later Ilkhans were no more absolutely neutral than the early Khans with regard to the major religions; but the fact that they continued to observe religious toleration as ordained in the yasaq by Chingiz Khan cannot be completely regarded as fading. Abaqa Khan reinstated the Chingiz Khan's yasaq in which he exempted from taxation all religious priests, with the exception of the rabbis.⁶⁵ Furthermore the Muslim author of Shajarat al-Atrak⁶⁶ praised Abaqa's just and liberal attitude towards religions, and

⁶³Ibid., p. 31.

⁶⁴Bertold Spuler, Die Mongolen in Iran; politik, Verwaltung und Kultur der Ilchazzeit 1220-1350 (3rd ed. Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1968), p. 214.

⁶⁵Spuler, The Mongol Period, p. 31.

⁶⁶The authorship has not been established.

pointed out that during Abaqa's reign the learned and religious were protected and received every encouragement.⁶⁷

During the reign of Abaqa's successor and brother, Ahmad Khan,⁶⁸ who had just embraced Islam after his coronation, the Christians reportedly suffered a setback. Ahmad Khan withheld the gift bestowed by his predecessor upon the Christians. Yabhalaha III, for instance, who had been authorized to levy tax of thirty thousand dīnārs each year on behalf of the churches, monasteries, monks, priests, and deacons, was deprived of all his privileges.⁶⁹ Furthermore, his conversion to Islam was followed by that of many of his people, and by the inauguration of a wave of Christian persecution.⁷⁰ Despite these accusations, the Jacobite Bar Hebraeus had this to say:

. . . he exhibited great mercifulness of disposition and liberality of hand. . . . And he looked upon all peoples with a merciful (or, sympathetic) eye, and especially on the heads of the Christian Faith, and he wrote for them Patents which freed all the churches, and the religious houses, and the priests (elders), and monks from taxation and imposts in every country and region.⁷¹

Bar Hebraeus not only denied that the Christians had been persecuted, but stressed Ahmad's kindness towards the Maphrianus, i. e.,

⁶⁷The Shajrat ul Atrak, or Genealogical Tree of the Turks and Tatars, translated and abridged by Col. Miles. (London: Wm. H. Allen, 1838), p. 248.

⁶⁸His name was Takudar Oghul. His mother, Qutui Khatun, may have been a Nestorian Christian, and he himself was baptized in his youth.

⁶⁹Budge, The Monks, p. 157.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 158; and Haythorn, pp. 56 and 185.

⁷¹Bar Hebraeus, p. 467.

the head of the Eastern part of the Jacobite Church. His account further stated that

. . . when the Maphrianus arrived there [the Mongol court], the illustrious Ahmad was placed on the throne of the kingdom, the Maphrianus was introduced into his presence by the nobles, and, according to custom, prayed for his welfare. The king in turn granted an admirable diploma for the building of the churches of Adharbaijan, Assyria and Mesopotamia.⁷²

Ahmad's conversion in fact had little effect upon the fundamental religious policy of the Mongols. It was rather in the hope of bringing the war with the Mamluks to an end that Ahmad embraced Islam.⁷³ He made contact with the Mamluks and proposed that his change of religion should be followed by an alliance. During the protracted negotiation, Ahmad was overthrown due to an alliance between the Mongol nobles who opposed his conversion, and Arghun who coveted the throne. He was finally put to death according to the Mongol manner by breaking his back and in his place Arghun reigned in 683/1284.⁷⁴

Arghun was a convinced Buddhist,⁷⁵ but was very friendly to the Christians. First of all, he paid Yabhalaha III very great honor and exalted his position.⁷⁶ He had a church tent erected next to the

⁷²Assemani, III, pt. II, cxiv, quoted from Browne, p. 157.

⁷³Cl. Cahen, "The Mongols and the Near East," A History of the Crusades, Vol. II: The Later Crusades, ed. by Robert Lee Wolff (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962), p. 720.

⁷⁴Miles, p. 260; and Budge, The Monks, p. 164.

⁷⁵He invited a Buddhist from India to his court. Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, II, 158-159.

⁷⁶Budge, The Monks, pp. 163-164.

royal tent in the camp, and ordered the regular recitation of the Eucharist and the daily offices.⁷⁷ He loved the Christians because he "intended to go into the countries of Palestine and Syria, and to subjugate them, and take possession of them."⁷⁸ For this reason negotiations between the Mongols and the European states were resumed only to end, like previous negotiations, in failure.

Gaykhatu succeeded Arghun in 690/1291. He returned to his father's policy of tolerance in that he paid honor to the leaders of all religions whether they were Christian, Muslim, Jewish, or Panga.⁷⁹ The author of the History of Yabhalaha praised the Khan's impartiality towards religion, emphasizing that the glory of the Holy Catholic Church became greater than it had been before.⁸⁰

However, the decade after the death of Ahmad witnessed the spread of Islam among the Mongols and even into the ruling family. The constant conflicts between the two religious groups--the old Buddhists and the new Muslim converts--must have prompted Gaykhatu's leaning toward Christianity, and thus explains the favor he showed to the Christians.⁸¹ In Gaykhatu's reign, the difficult economic conditions that affected the whole empire developed into a bond of union against the Ilkhan. Finally, in 694/1295, a rebellion broke

⁷⁷ Browne, p. 158.

⁷⁸ Budge, The Monks, p. 165.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 201.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 202.

⁸¹ Bar Hebraeus, p. 486; and Spuler, The Mongols in History, p. 46.

out against Gaykhatu, and in March he was overthrown.

A disastrous financial situation developed as a result of his extravagant spending. He was a very liberal prince, remarked the author of Shajrat ul Atrak , "so much so that the revenue of his kingdom could scarcely supply his expenses. . . ." ⁸² The author of the History of Yabhalaha also related that gold was accounted as dross in his sight. "His alms were boundless," continued the same author, "and there was no end to his gifts in charity." ⁸³ To remedy the situation, Gaykhatu ordered the issue of paper money (the ch'ao) ⁸⁴ in 693/1294 after the Chinese fashion. But because no one in the empire had any faith in this kind of money, it was subsequently abolished. ⁸⁵

After the common foe, Gaykhatu, was overthrown, the two religious groups began to emerge on the scene again and to fight for supremacy. Baidu, an idolator, ascended to the throne and was supported by the Christians. For many years Baidu had been familiar with Maria, the wife of Abaqa, and was therefore very favorably inclined toward the Christians. Nevertheless, he never dared to be

⁸²Miles, p. 266.

⁸³Budge, The Monks, p. 201.

⁸⁴This is Chinese vocabulary for paper money.

⁸⁵There is a good article on the subject of paper money written by K. Jahn, "Das iranische Papiergeld; Ein Beitrag zur Kultur- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Irans in der Mongolzeit," Archiv Orientalni, X (1938), pp. 308-340. A revised English translation of the article can be found in Journal of Asian History, IV (1970), pp. 102-135 under the title "Paper Currency in Iran; A Contribution to the Cultural and Economic History of Iran in the Mongol Period."

called publicly and openly a Christian.⁸⁶ On the other hand, Ghazan, son of Arghun and governor of Khurāsān, was favored by the Muslims who promised to give him the kingdom which Baidu held if he would renounce the Christian faith.⁸⁷ After a few months fighting, Baidu was deposed and killed in November 1295.

On 9 November 1295, Ghazan ascended the throne. His accession marked a decisive turning point in the religious struggle. He became a Muslim and made the whole of his court and large numbers of Mongols in the Empire become Muslims. Ghazan's conversion was followed by a period of persecution of Christians and idolators. An edict was proclaimed that,

The churches shall be uprooted, and the altars overturned, and the celebrations of the Eucharist shall cease, and the hymns of praise, and the sounds of calls to prayer shall be abolished; and the heads (or chiefs) of the Christians, and the heads of the congregations [i. e. synagogues] of the Jews, and the great men among them shall be killed.⁸⁸

However, Ghazan later reverted to the policy of alleviating the persecution of the Christians.⁸⁹ Another of his new edicts was issued later, and this stated that,

poll-tax should not be exacted from the Christians; that none of them shall abandon his faith; that the Catholicus shall live in the state to which he hath his rank; that he shall rule over his throne; and shall hold the staff of strength over his dominion.⁹⁰

Thereafter, various edicts were issued to protect Christians

⁸⁶Hayton, p. 190.

⁸⁷Assemani, III, pt. II, cxxi, quoted from Browne, p. 161.

⁸⁸Budge, The Monks, p. 210.

⁸⁹See later discussion.

⁹⁰Budge, The Monks, pp. 221-222.

from Muslim attacks, and Ghazan even permitted Yabhalaha to erect a monastery in Marāghah. In 1303 the Patriarch went to Baghdad to meet Ghazan Khan at al-Hillah where they concluded arrangements very favorable to the Christians.⁹¹

Uljaitu followed Ghazan as Ilkhan in 704/1305. To the Christians he seemed to be the hope of a restoration, for he had been baptized by Yabhalaha. He and the Patriarch had been great friends. Nevertheless, after he ascended the throne, he professed Islam. Despite his conversion to Islam, however, he appears to have been kindly disposed towards the Christians and treated the Patriarch well. The Patriarch also was able to repeal the poll-tax which had been imposed on all the Christians in 1306. Therefore, despite the fact that the Christians were constantly attacked by the Muslims, they were to some extent protected by the edicts of Ilkhans.⁹²

In the reign of Abū Sa^cīd, who ruled in the years 715-734/1316-1335, there is no further record of the situation of the Christians in the Ilkhanite Empire--except for events which took place at the beginning of his reign. This was the persecution of the Christians in ^cAmid in 1317, the year of Yabhalaha's death.⁹³ The fact that the Christians were on the decline from the time of Ghazan Khan's conversion to Islam is certain.

As one of the major groups affected by the ahl al-Dhimmah policy during the Muslim rule, the Jews likewise experienced a

⁹¹Ibid., pp. 240-250.

⁹²Ibid., pp. 255-270.

⁹³Browne, pp. 170-171.

considerable amelioration of their position under the Mongols. Still, the Jews were in an inferior position to that of the Christians, and even the Muslims. First of all, unlike the Christians and the Muslims, the Jews possessed no political potential that the Mongols could look to for alliance against their enemies. It was alliance with Christian Europe and Muslim Egypt that the Mongols had always sought. Secondly, the rabbis were not among those (the Christian priests, deacons, and monks, the Muslim ^culamā', and Buddhist priests) who were exempted from taxation.⁹⁴ In general, the situation of "Babylonian-Persian Jewry in the thirteenth century was very gloomy."⁹⁵

It was only under Arghun Khan that Jews ventured to appear on the stage of history and played some role in politics. The man responsible for that temporary political rise was Sa^cd al-Dawlah, who was born in Abhar in Jibal Province.⁹⁶ In his early years, he worked in Mawsil as a broker, or auctioneer, (dallāl) in the artisan market.⁹⁷ Later we meet him as a physician in government service in Baghdad.⁹⁸ However, in 682-1283-1284 he was appointed to succeed

⁹⁴Bar Hebraeus, pp. 418.

⁹⁵Fischel, p. 95.

⁹⁶Rashid al-Din/Arabic, II, 138; and *ibid.* Also J. B. von Loon, Ta'rikh-i Shaikh Uwais (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1954), p. 41.

⁹⁷Abū al-Fidā', al-Mukhtasar fī Akhbār al-Bashar, IV, 17-18. See also Fischel, p. 96 and Yūsuf Razq Allah Ghanīmah, Nujhat al-Mushtāq fī Tārikh Yahūd al-^cIrāq (Baghdad: Matba^cah al-Furāt, 1924), p. 142.

⁹⁸Fischel, p. 96; Ghanīmah, p. 142; and Wassaf, 197.

Jalāl al-Dīn al-Samanānī as a member of the Dīwān of the Baghdad administration, for he was familiar with fiscal questions and administrative conditions at Baghdad. His ability in dealing with administrative problems aroused the enmity of his colleagues and he was removed from Baghdad. Then we meet him again at the Court of Arghun as a lauded physician in 687/1288. From there he moved on to heading the financial administration of Baghdad and in a very short time became governor of al-^cIrāq.

Sa^cd al-Dawlah did not remain in Baghdad for long. In 688/1289, he was appointed sāhib dīwān of the Empire.⁹⁹ With his appointment as sāhib dīwān al-mamālik ascended the star of the Jews. He immediately removed all his opponents and filled the posts of most authority in the administration with members of his own family. His brother, Fakhr al-Dawlah, became sāhib dīwān of al-^cIrāq, while another brother, Amīn al-Dawlah, was given the governorship of Diyar Bakr and Mawsil.¹⁰⁰ To his nephew, Muhaddhib al-Dawlah Abī Mansūr, the physician, he gave the district of Tabriz.¹⁰¹ Thus these and other important provinces of the Ilkhanite Empire were in the control

⁹⁹The title of his office has been disputed. Wassaf described his post as Hākīm Māl wa-mulk (Administrator of Finance and Tenure). Ibn al-Fuwāṭi called him sāhib dīwān al-Mamālik (Imperial sāhib dīwān). Rashīd al-Dīn entitled him as vizier Mustawfī. Bar Hebraeus called him Chief of the administrative officials i. e. Sāhib Dīwān, throughout all provinces of the Empire.

¹⁰⁰Ibn al-Fuwāṭi, p. 466, mentioned only Mawsil and Rashīd al-Dīn gave only Diyar Bakr. Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, II, 152. However, Bar Hebraeus included Mārdīn, in addition to Mawsil and Diyar Bakr, in his domain.

¹⁰¹Rashīd al-Dīn/Arabic, II, 152.

of Jews.¹⁰²

The appointment of Jewish administrators in a predominant Muslim country was sure to evoke opposition. The feelings of the Muslims were well expressed by the Christian author, Bar Hebraeus, who cried out,

And behold, at the present day there is a Jewish governor and general director on the throne of the House of ^CAbbās. Observe how Islām hath been brought low! And the Muslims neither cease nor rest from their wickedness and their tyranny.¹⁰³

The Muslims were presumably further offended by the suggestion of Sa^Cd al-Dawlah that Arghun should convert the Ka^Cbah at Mecca into a temple.¹⁰⁴ Sa^Cd al-Dawlah, who tried to gain favor with Arghun, declared that

Chingiz-Khan was a prophet, that the gift of prophecy was hereditary, and that Arghun should follow in the footsteps of the prophet Muhammad and found a new ummah (religious nation), which would be universal and would turn the Ka^Cba into a pagoda!¹⁰⁵

Nevertheless, Sa^Cd al-Dawlah improved the lot of Muslims as will be seen later.

On the other hand, the Mongols also disliked Sa^Cd al-Dawlah because he deprived them of privileges and powers. He forbade the military commanders from interfering with decisions of the courts, while enjoining them to support the cause of justice, and to protect

¹⁰²For other appointments see Fischel, pp. 103-104.

¹⁰³Bar Hebraeus, p. 479.

¹⁰⁴Miles, p. 263.

¹⁰⁵Bausani, "Religion under the Mongols," p. 541.

the weak and innocent. A stop was put to the requisition of food and post-horses for the grandees.¹⁰⁶ He made many enemies among the most influential Mongols--first and foremost in the person of Amīr Tughan.

The sudden serious illness of Arghun marked the beginning of Sa^cd al-Dawlah's downfall. As a physician, Sa^cd al-Dawlah did everything he possibly could to heal the sick Khan, for he knew that Arghun's death would signal his own misfortune. However, his destiny came sooner than he could expect. He and his supporters were arrested and executed at the end of the month of Safar of 690/October 1, 1291 without the knowledge of the Khan, who followed him to the grave on Rabi^c 1, 690/October 1, 1291.¹⁰⁷

There followed a general massacre by the Muslims and the Mongols of all the Jews within the Ilkhanite Empire. Thus ended the era of Sa^cd al-Dawlah. Until Ghazan Khan's time, only one other Jew became prominent, but he was converted to the Muslim faith.¹⁰⁸

The Ilkhans and European Christendom

The religious indifference of the Mongols produced a series of reactions from European Christendom. The Christians were the first to approach the Mongols with the purpose of forming an alliance against their common foe, i. e., the Muslims; but at that time the

¹⁰⁶Howorth, III, 333; and Bar Hebraeus, p. 491.

¹⁰⁷Fischel, p. 114.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., pp. 118-121.

Mongols were so intoxicated by their victories, and so sure of their ability to conquer the whole world, that they showed little interest in the Christian offer. The initiative of the Christians is easy to understand on account of the information then acquired about the Mongols from the eastern Christians. These eastern Christians made a Christian "King David" out of the Mongol conqueror, Chingiz Khan, who would have destroyed the Muslim Empires.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, European Christendom was kept informed about the relations between the Mongols and the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia, which was also a close friend of the Europeans.

A Mongol-Christian alliance against Islam had long been depicted by the famous Muslim historian, Ibn al-Athīr, who during the Crusaders' attack on Egypt and the irruption of the Mongols into Muslim territory in 1219, believed that a coalition of the Christian and Mongol infedels might bring about the end of the Muslim faith.¹¹⁰ In fact, the Fifth Crusade, which at this time was in Damietta waiting for reinforcements, heard of the Mongol invasion with joy.¹¹¹ After the conquest of Persia, the Mongols withdrew and the West did not hear of them again until the conquest of Eastern Europe.

The Mongol invasion of Europe in 1240-41 A. D. created hysterical fear among the Europeans, as vividly illustrated by the

¹⁰⁹Jean Richard, "The Mongols and the Franks," Journal of Asian History, III:1 (1969), p. 45. See also R. B. C. Huygens, Lettres de Jacques de Vitry (Edition critique. Leiden: J. B. Brill, 1960), pp. 141-150.

¹¹⁰Ibn al-Athīr, XII, 233-235.

¹¹¹Richard, "The Mongols and the Franks," p. 45.

English chronicler Matthew Paris.¹¹² The Europeans were not relieved from the Mongol threat until 1260 A. D., when it was proved that the Mongols were not invincible at the battle of ^CAyn Jālūt, where they suffered defeat by the Mamluks.

It was during the period of confusion between 1241-1260 that the pope, Innocent IV, initiated a series of missions in an attempt to convert the Mongols who were mistaken as being Nestorian Christians.¹¹⁴ The attempt failed, for the Mongols were themselves concerned with conquering the whole world rather than entering into religious polemics. Christian embassies brought back only invitations to submit to Mongol domination. Even the Mongol mission sent by Eljigitei to St. Louis in Cyprus was motivated by political concern rather than religious sentiment. The primary aim of the Mongols was to make sure that, while they invaded the caliphate of Baghdad, the Egyptians were kept busy in another field.¹¹⁵ Secondly, they also wanted to keep those countries which had submitted to them free from attack by the Crusaders' army. For the Mongols, as Jean Richard remarks, had experienced the valor of Frankish warriors who had

¹¹²Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora, ed. by Luard. Vol. IV of Rerum britannicarum medii aevi scriptores, pp. 76-78, 109-120, 131-132, 270-277, and 386-389.

¹¹³See chapter II.

¹¹⁴For these missions, see Atiya, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages, ch. X; Pelliot, "Les Mongols et la Papauté."

¹¹⁵Atiya, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages, p. 242, and Voegelin, pp. 379-380.

served as mercenaries in some Oriental armies.¹¹⁶

In spite of the efforts of European Christians to persuade the Mongols to conclude an alliance with them, and despite the presence of a strong Christian element in the Near East, the Mongols had not faltered in their will to subjugate the whole world¹¹⁷ until they suffered defeat at the hands of the Mamluks. It was only following this defeat that Hūlāgū, decided to establish relations with the pope. In 1263 A. D. he sent an embassy to the pontiff which was intercepted en route, but to which nevertheless, Urban IV returned an answer in 1264. A policy of cooperation between the papacy and the Mongols of Persia began. Hūlāgū soon died and his policy was carried on by Abaqa.

Under Abaqa a plan was outlined to unite the forces of a Crusade sent from the West, with a Mongol offensive starting from the Tigris Euphrates valley, against the Mamluks simultaneously on two fronts. Of the territories to be conquered by their concerted efforts, the Franks would keep the Holy Land.¹¹⁸ Letters were exchanged between the Mongols and the Franks. The contents of these

¹¹⁶Cf. J. Richard, "An Account of the Battle of Hattin Referring to Frankish Mercenaries in Oriental Moslem States," Speculum XXVII:2 (April, 1952), pp. 172-173.

¹¹⁷Richard, "The Mongols and the Franks," pp. 49-51.

¹¹⁸Jean Richard stated that David of Ashby attributed the idea of the alliance to Hūlāgū. However, Hūlāgū's letters were intercepted, with his envoys, by Manfred, king of Sicily. Then David of Ashby again attributed to Abāqā the promise to hand over the kingdom of Jerusalem to the Latins, and see to it, by an interdiction, that they would not be molested. See J. Richard, "Le debut des relations entre la Papauté et les Mongols de Perse," Journal Asiatique, vol. 237 (1949), pp. 287-293.

letters show a remarkable change in the Mongol attitude toward Christendom. They no longer asked for the submission of Frankish leaders to Mongol domination. This change of policy reflected no basic alteration in Mongol religious policy, for Abaqa remained a Buddhist. It was an expediency, for he had to fight against other Mongol Khans. As a result, he was not able to send enough support to the Aragonese and English Crusaders of 1269 and 1271 respectively.¹¹⁹ Although negotiations were resumed and a strong alliance was concluded during the Council of Lyons of 1274, the concerted effort to invade the Holy Land did not materialize, for Pope Gregory X (1271-1276) died and the crusade was postponed.¹²⁰ Although a few minor considerations of cooperation with the Mongols were espoused by the Franks of Cyprus, they were not carried out so long as there was no real crusade coming from the West. Charles I (d. 1285) of Anjou, King of Naples and Sicily and brother of Louis IX, had entered into a truce with Egypt. Furthermore, in 679/1281, the vigorous Egyptian Sultan Qalāūn, who succeeded Baybars I, successfully concluded treaties for a ten-year truce--first with the Templars, and then with the Hospitalers.¹²¹ Later, he also succeeded in entering a truce with Bohemond VII of Tripoli,¹²² while Acre, the dependency

¹¹⁹R. Grousset, Histoire des croisades et du royaume franc de Jerusalem (Paris: 1936), III, 647-662. Also D. Sinor, "Les relations entre les Mongols et l'Europe jusqu'à la mort d'Arghoun et de B la IV," Journal of World History, III, 39 62.

¹²⁰Richard, "The Mongols and the Franks," pp. 53-54; Spuler, Mongol Period, pp. 228-229.

¹²¹Sinor, "Les Relations," p. 54.

¹²²Ibid.

of Charles of Anjou, also tried to observe its truce with the Mamluks. Consequently, when the Mongols launched their attack upon Syria in September 679/1281, Egypt was assured of the neutrality of the Franks in the Holy Land. In this encounter, the Mongols once again were decisively defeated. A few months later, Abāqā Khan succumbed to a bout of excessive drink in 680/March-April 1282.

The defeat had its repercussion, for the successor of Abaqa, Tegudar, was converted to Islam. It was only after the ascension of Arghun two years later that negotiations with the West were resumed in 684/1285. The reason for his eagerness to negotiate an alliance with the West was his intention "to go into the countries of Palestine and Syria and to subjugate them and take possession of them."¹²³ Arghun also expressed his desire to become a Christian if God vouchsafed to him to take Jerusalem.¹²⁴ It was owing to the same policy aiming at the conquest of the Holy Land that the later Khans continued to send their embassies to the West.

After Ghazan Khan embraced Islam in 694/1295, the hostility between the Mongols and the Mamluks was not diminished. In 698/1299 the Mongols occupied Syria, and Ghazan Khan sent to the Western kings the announcement of his success and offered them the Holy Land in accordance with the promises of his predecessors. By then the

¹²³ Budge, The Monks, p. 165.

¹²⁴ A. Mostaert and F. W. Cleaves, "Trois documents mongols des Archives Secrètes Vaticanes," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, XV (1953), 445-467. Browne, p. 158.

West did not even know that Ghazan had been converted to Islam and it was commonly believed that he had, on the contrary, embraced Christianity (or at least that he was going to drive out the Muslims from the Holy Land for religious motives.)¹²⁵ The Pope and the King of Aragon prepared an expedition to be sent to the Holy Land. But the Mongols were driven out of Syria by 1300, and their attempts to retake it in 1302 ended in failure.¹²⁶

During the reign of Uljaytu, there was talk of a Mongol alliance in the West. Uljaytu, who sent his ambassadors to the West in 1307 to inform the Western princes of his accession, received information about the projected crusade under consideration at that time by the entourage of Clement V (1305-1314).¹²⁷ The West, however, was unable to launch any crusade after the death of Pope Clement V,¹²⁸ and diplomatic relations between the East and the West came to an end.

Muslims Under the Ilkhans

Although the Ilkhanite Mongols, by the destruction of the fortress of Alāmut, rendered a great, if unintentional, service to

¹²⁵Richard, "The Mongols and the Franks," p. 55.

¹²⁶Ibid., p. 56.

¹²⁷Abel Rémusat, "Mémoires sur les relations politiques des princes chrétiens et particulièrement des rois de France avec les empereurs mongols," Mémoires de l'Institut. Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, VII (1824), 390-402, and ibid., p. 56.

¹²⁸Atiya, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages, p. 13.

the Sunnite Muslims who had held the Assassins to be no less obnoxious than the Crusades, the extermination of the ^CAbbāsīd caliphate in Baghdad was to the Sunnites a cosmic catastrophe. They were deprived of not only their spiritual head, but also their heretofore exclusive political and religious authorities. In this wise they were reduced to the status of the Shi^Cites, Christians, Jews, and even the pagans since the coming of the Mongols. Despite the fact that other religious groups were in the ascendant, in comparison with their previous status under the covenant of ahl al-Dhimmah, the Muslims continued to enjoy religious freedom without being much disturbed. As in the incident of Takrīt, the Muslims were still protected against brutal killings by Christians.¹²⁹ The massacre of Muslims as a measure of retaliation was rare except in the reign of Arghun, and there was no specific regulation in al-^CIrāq during the Mongol rule luring or forcing the Muslims to apostacize to other religions.

The first two Ilkhans were generally regarded as having strong leanings toward Christianity,¹³⁰ but many Muslim institutions were not impaired as a consequence. The Muslim pious endowment (wagf) continued to function and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī and his sons were responsible for it throughout the Empire.¹³¹ The building of

¹²⁹See p. 15 of the present chapter.

¹³⁰This has been proved as being a political maneuver.

¹³¹Ibn al-Fuwatī, pp. 350, 375, and passim.

minarets and mosques continued without interruption.¹³² Madrasahs (Muslim schools) were also built, and teachers appointed. The course of Muslim life was not ostensibly affected. Most important of all, however, was the encouragement of pilgrims by Mongol authorities.¹³³ Negotiation with the Bedouin for the safety of pilgrims travelling to and from Mecca on their annual pilgrimage now became the duty of the ṣāhib diwān of Baghdad.¹³⁴

During the reign of Ahmad the Muslims must have enjoyed greater prestige than before. In his letter sent to the Sultan of Egypt expressing his desire to end the war with a sister country since his conversion to Islam, Ahmad stated clearly:

If some convincing proof be required, let men observe our actions. By the grace of God, we have raised aloft the standards of the faith, and borne witness to it in all our orders and our practice, so that the ordinances of the law of Muhammad may be brought to the fore and firmly established in accordance with the principles of justice laid down by Ahmad. Whereby, we have filled the hearts of the people with joy, have granted free pardon to all offenders, and shown them indulgences. . . . We have reformed all matters concerning the pious endowments of Muslims given for mosques, colleges, charitable institutions, and the rebuilding of caravaserais. . . . We have ordered the pilgrims to be treated with respect, provision to be made for their caravans and for securing their safety on the pilgrim routes; we have given perfect freedom to merchants, travelling from one country to another. . . .¹³⁵

¹³²Ibid., pp. 371, 372, 408; and ^cAzzawi, I, 263, 271-2, 295.

^{133c}Azzāwī, I, 264; and Khisbak, p. 68.

¹³⁴Ibid.

¹³⁵Wassaf, pp. 233-234. Quotation is from Arnold, The Preaching of Islam, p. 234.

After two years, Ahmad was overthrown by Arghun whose hatred toward Islam was unremitting. Not only did he resume persecution of Muslims, but also took away from them all posts in the departments of justice and finance, and forbade them to appear at his court.¹³⁶ However, under the influence of Sa^cd al-Dawlah, the lot of the Muslims was considerably improved. Sa^cd al-Dawlah urged that civil affairs should be judged by Muslim law, and increased the waqf.¹³⁷ He also ordered that the security and facilitation of the pilgrimage to Mecca should be observed.¹³⁸ In 1290 during the fast month of Ramadān, Arghun ordered that four chairs be established in a madarasah at Tabriz.¹³⁹

Neither Gaykhatu nor Baidu was as hostile toward Islam as Arghun had been. Consequently, after the death of Arghun, the author of Shajarat al-Atrak announced that Islam "became flourishing as a garden by the breezes and showers of spring; and the hearts of its enemies were broiled on the fire of grief and despair."¹⁴⁰

The final triumph of Islam came on 1 Sha^cbān 694/16th June 1295, when the future Ilkhan proclaimed himself a Muslim and assumed the Muslim name of Mahmūd. Immediately after his ascension, Ghazan began the persecution of Buddhists and other believers under the instigation of one of his principal supporter, General Nawruz. Of

¹³⁶Hebraeus, p. 485.

¹³⁷Howorth, III, 333.

¹³⁸Fischel, 108.

¹³⁹Spuler, Die Mongolen in Iran, p. 240.

¹⁴⁰Miles, p. 264.

all those persecuted, however, the Buddhists were to suffer the most. The following statement reflects the situation confronting their community:

When the Lord of Islam, Ghazan, became a Muslim, he commanded that all the idols should be broken and all the pagodas (but-khāna) and (ātaṣh-kada) destroyed, together with all the other temples the presence of which in Muslim countries is forbidden by the sharī^ca, and that all the community (jamā^cat) of the idolatrous bakhshī¹⁴¹ should be converted forcibly to Islam.¹⁴²

In addition to the destruction of Buddhism, the prestige of the Nestorian church was also impaired permanently.

Meanwhile, Ghazan embarked on an active cultural policy in support of Islam. He visited mosques frequently, arranged for public readings of the Qur'^{ān},¹⁴³ built mosques in villages, and founded numerous religious institutions for the poor in the larger towns as well as in Mecca.¹⁴⁴

Having become a Muslim, Ghazan decided to choose the Sunnite rite to which the majority of his subjects belonged, although he also had an inclination towards Shi^cism. He did not treat the Shi^cites with the fanaticism which strictly Sunnite rulers had displayed before. He paid visits to the Shi^cite sanctuaries in Mesopotamia and seemed to have devoted particular care to the building of dār al-siyādahs, which were kinds of hostels in which the descendants

¹⁴¹ Buddhist preacher, but its etymology is uncertain. Barthold (*Turkestan*, p. 51) believed it is from the Sanskrit bhikshu, and Bausani ("Religion", p. 542) stressed that it is from the Chinese po-shih (teacher).

¹⁴² Bausani, "Religion under the Mongols," p. 542.

¹⁴³ See Introduction, p. 3; and Ibn al-Tiqtaqā, p. 23.

¹⁴⁴ Bausani, "Religion under the Mongols," p. 543.

of the Prophet (sayyids) were accomodated free of charge.¹⁴⁵ He even inscribed the coins in the Shi^Cite type: °Alī wali-Allāh.¹⁴⁶

Ghazan's successor and brother, Uljaitu showed definite inclination towards Shi^Cism in 709/1310. Originally a Christian,¹⁴⁷ Uljaitu subsequently became a Buddhist, and eventually a Muslim.¹⁴⁸ After he was converted to Islam, he was called Khudābandah, "Servant of God".¹⁴⁹ Later at the instigation of a certain Shi^Cite, Shaykh Jamāl al-Dīn Husayn, he was formally converted to Shi^Cism. Consequently he not only struck his coin bearing inscriptions of the Shi^Cite type like the ones in Ghazan's reign, but also eliminated the names of the first three Orthodox Caliphs, i. e. Abū Bakr, °Umar, and °Uthmān, from the khutbah, and after °Alī, those of Hasan, Husayn, and the Mahdi °Alī Muhammad were inserted. The names of the leaders of the Shi^Cite Twelvers were placed along side of his own on his coins. Thereupon, the Sunnites changed his Muslim name from Khudabandah to Khar-bandah, meaning "Muleteer."¹⁵⁰

However, in his last few years, Khudabadah was converted to Sunnism again and his successor, Abū Sa^Cīd, was also a Sunnite.

¹⁴⁵Ibid.

¹⁴⁶Miles, p. 291. The meaning of this term is "°Alī, the friend of God."

¹⁴⁷See above, p. 21. He was baptized as Nicholas.

¹⁴⁸Bausani, "Religion under the Mongols," p. 543, says he had been a Buddhist before being a Muslim.

¹⁴⁹Miles, p. 282; and Browne, p. 168.

¹⁵⁰G. E. Browne, III, 46; Howorth, III, 559.

Muslim Missionary Activities

Whatever the reasons for Ghazan's final acceptance of Islam as the official state religion of the Mongol Empire, we cannot discard completely the political motive behind his conversion. By his time, Islam had grown so strong and influential that he could hardly overlook its strength. His General Amīr Nawrūz, the son of Arghun Agha,¹⁵¹ had long embraced Islam.¹⁵² On one occasion, early in his struggle with his rival Baidu, Ghazan Khan was persuaded by Amīr Nawrūz to adopt his faith in order to obtain support from his Muslim subjects. Weighing the situation, Ghazan responded with alacrity. Consequently, in Sha^cbān 694/June 1295 Ghazan Khan was converted to Islam in the presence of the Sufi, Saḍr al-Dīn Ibrāhīm al-Hamawī and the Mongol army.¹⁵³ Six months later Ghazan was enthroned as Khan, assuming the Muslim name of Mahmud and the title Sultan.

Although Islam was previously deprived of the privileged status it had held since the beginning of the Mongol rule as the official religion of the Muslim East, it was never suppressed by the heathen Mongols. As time went on, it became common for the Mongols to embrace Islam particularly after Ahmad's reign; and many

¹⁵¹For thirty-nine years he had governed various Persian provinces for Chingiz Khan and his successors. See Juvaini, en passim; and Ch. II of the present work.

¹⁵²Presumably the army under his control was also converted to the Muslim faith.

¹⁵³Rashīd al-Dīn/Jahn, p. 79; and Dawlatshah, Tadhkirat al-Shu^carā', ed. by E. G. Browne. (London: Luzac and Co., 1901), p. 213.

Mongols had already been converted despite Arghun Khan's strong opposition.¹⁵⁴ By the time of Baidu, the Mongols--both the nobles and the inferior folk alike--had become Muslims.¹⁵⁵ The conversions among the Mongols must have been great, and Baidu could hardly do other than accommodate himself to the situation. In order to please the Muslims, as the continuator of Bar Hebraeus stressed, "Baidū himself became a Muslim."¹⁵⁶ As a result of Baidu's conversion, "all the nobles of his Empire rejoiced exceedingly." On the other hand, Baidu entrusted the Christians with most of the affairs of the administration. To the Christians he confessed that he was a Christian. With such contradictory policies he ruled his Empire for about five months.¹⁵⁷ When the Muslims discovered his hypocrisy they finally turned away from him and supported Ghazan.

The Islamization of the Ilkhanite Mongols must have been the result of Muslim missionary activity, which during the reigns of the last Ilkhans had become more apparent than ever before. Ghazan had been brought up as a Buddhist and had himself erected Buddhist temples within Muslim regimes; and his conversion may be viewed as a success of Islamic missionary work. However, all these efforts seem to have been obliterated in the reign of Uljaitu who was annoyed and disgusted with the controversies among different Sunnite schools of theology--particularly between the Hanafites and the

¹⁵⁴Bar Hebraeus, p. 486.

¹⁵⁵Ibid.

¹⁵⁶Ibid.

¹⁵⁷Ibid.

Shāfi^Cites. The representatives of these two schools vehemently attacked each other in the presence of Uljaytu so that the Emperor was greatly disturbed. For some time he was distracted with doubt. The Mongol amīr Qutlugh Shāh became so confused that he turned to the amīrs and said: "Why have we abandoned the Yasa of Chingiz-Khan and the religion of our forefathers and accepted this religion of the Arabs, which is divided into so many sects?"¹⁵⁸ At length Uljaytu was won over to Shi^Cism through the persuasion of Amīr Taramtāz.¹⁵⁹ Nevertheless, he reverted again to the Sunnite doctrine in the last few years of his reign.¹⁶⁰ His son and successor, Abū Sa^Cīd, followed in his father's footsteps by embracing Sunnism.

As a rule, the Islamic missionary activity was carried out by the Sufi Shaykhs.¹⁶¹ Islam never developed the machinery of

¹⁵⁸ Hāfiz-i Abrū, pp. 50-51, quoted from Bausani, "Religion under the Mongols," p. 544; D'Ohsson, IV, 536-41; and Browne, III, 50.

¹⁵⁹ G. E. Browne, III, 50.

¹⁶⁰ Bausani, "Religion under the Mongols," 543; and M. M. Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safawids: Šī^Cism, Sūfism, and the Ġulat (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner Verlag, 1972), p. 40.

¹⁶¹ The propagation of the Islamic faith was regarded as the responsibility of the state, and not of private individuals. Muslims who traveled for commercial and other purposes did not engage in religious propaganda. Islamic propaganda affected mainly the immediate neighbors of the Muslim world. Independently of government policy, Islam was spread by Sufi mystics who are perhaps the only representatives of a missionary movement, internal or external, in the Muslim world. In the early stage, the Shaykhs of these orders were always more successful on the steppes than in the more civilized regions, and they also confined their activities to the near-lying steppes and did not undertake any distant expeditions. Cf. W. Barthold, Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, translated from the Russian by V. and T. Minorsky. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1956), I, 19-20; and also his Histoire des Turcs d'Asie centrale, adaptation française par M. Donskis. (Paris: Librairie d'Amérique, 1945), pp. 56-58.

spreading religion in the same way as Christian missionaries did, and the task was partly assumed by the Sufi mystical Shaykhs and their followers in an effort to convert heathens to true believers. During the Mongol domination, Sufi orders sprang up everywhere in the Muslim land and formed the bulwark of Muslim missionary endeavor.

Sufism, the mysticism of Islam, developed in early Islamic time, and became popular in the Saljuq period. From the fifth/eleventh century Sufi centers, known in Arabic terminology as zāwiyahs¹⁶² and khānaqāts,¹⁶³ became numerous and played a decisive role in the Islamization of borderland and non-Arab regions in Central Asian and North Africa.¹⁶⁴ By the sixth-twelfth century, Ibn Jubayr, who traveled in the Muslim world in Saladin's time, observed their flourishing condition.¹⁶⁵ However, these centers were institution-alized schools usually endowed and supported by governments.¹⁶⁶

At the same time, Sufi orders were developed around a single master. Sometimes they were settled in a retreat far from the distractions of khānaqāt life, sometimes in a master's zāwiyah home

¹⁶²Zāwiyah, pl. zawāyā, literally means a corner, but here it indicates a small Sufi center.

¹⁶³Khānaqāt, pl. khawāniq, means a religious hostel, and thus Sufi center.

¹⁶⁴J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 9.

¹⁶⁵Ibn Jubayr, pp. 101, 252, 282, 297, 302-4; and Ibid.

¹⁶⁶Trimingham, p. 10.

in the big city, frequently the master was a wanderer traveling around with his circle of disciples. Gradually, centers were established to perpetuate the name of a master and his type of teaching, his mystical exercises, and his rule of life. The school which centered around such a master was called tariqah, and was perpetuated through a continuous chain of disciples (silsilat). Therefore we come across many Sufi orders named after their founders, or masters. Of most significance for the development of institutional Sufism were:

(1) the Suhrawardiyah, attributed to Diyā' al-Dīn Abū Najīb al-Suhrawardī (d. 1168 A. D.), but developed by his nephew, Shihāb al-Dīn Abū Hafṣ (d. 1234);

(2) the Qādiriyah, attributed to ^CAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (d. 1166);

(3) the Rifā^Ciyah, deriving from Ahmad ibn al-Rifā^Cī (d. 1182);

(4) the Yasawiyah of Ahmad al-Yasawī (d. 1166);

(5) the Kubrawiyah of Najm al-Dīn Kubrā (d. 1221);

(6) the Chishtiyyah of Mu^Cīn al-Dīn Muhammad Chishtī (d. 1236);

(7) the Shādhiliyyah deriving from Abū Madyan Shu^Cayb (d. 1197), but attributed to Abū al-Hasan ^CAlī al-Shādhilī (d. 1258);

(8) the Badawiyah of Ahmad al-Badawī (d. 1276);

(9) the Mawlawiyyah, inspired by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Rūmī (d. 1273);

(10) the Naqshbandiyyah, first called Khwajagan which owes its initial insights to Yusūf al-Hamadānī (d. 1140) and ^CAbd al-

Khaliq al-Ghujdawani (d. 1179), but was eventually associated with the name of Bahā' al-Dīn al-Naqshbandī (d. 1389).

All subsequent tariqahs were derivatives from one or more of these chains.¹⁶⁷

When the Mongols overran the Muslim territories, many refugees, accompanied by considerable Sufi migrations, fled to other parts of the Muslim world where they settled in areas remote from the scourge of invaders, such as Anatolia and Hindustan. Thus many Sufis found new homes in these peripheral areas.

These missionary activities, however, were very difficult to dissociate from the Shi^Cite movement of the time. It is even difficult to draw a line between Sufism and Shi^Cism. As Henri Corbin put it, "True Ši^Cism is the same as Tasawwuf [Sufism], and similarly, genuine and real Tasawwuf cannot be anything other than Ši^Cism."¹⁶⁸ This is due partly to the fact that when the Mongols destroyed the fortresses of the Ismā^Cīlites of Alamūt, many Ismā^Cīlites were driven underground and later emerged with the Sufi orders.¹⁶⁹ As a result, they rapidly spread the doctrines of Shi^Cism.¹⁷⁰ In fact, discussions about the Shi^Cite movement would take us beyond the Ilkhanite

¹⁶⁷Trimingham, p. 14.

¹⁶⁸Henri Corbin, "Siḥ guftar dar bab-i tarikh-i ma^Cnawiyat-i Iran," Majalla-yi Danishkada-yi Adabiyat, V (1959), pp. 46-57 and 58-63. Quoted from Mazzaoui, p. 83.

¹⁶⁹S. H. Nasr, Sufi Essays (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1972), p. 115.

¹⁷⁰Bausani, "Religion under the Mongols," pp. 454-459; Trimingham, passim; and Mazzaoui, passim.

era, and would be outside the scope of the present study. In short, the Mongols did not obstruct the spreading of the Islamic faith, but encouraged it in accordance with their policy of religious tolerance.

Conclusion

At the beginning of the Mongol domination in Iran, Islam suffered a setback. Religious tolerance continued in practice throughout the whole period of the Ilkhans. Chingiz Khan's yasaq concerning all religions was closely observed. In the yasaq, Chingiz Khan enjoined:

That all religions were to be respected and that no preference was to be shown to any of them. All this he commanded in order that it might be agreeable to God.¹⁷¹

Mongke Khan once also remarked that all creeds were like the fingers of the hand, meaning that they essentially sprang from the same base.¹⁷² As a result of their indifference towards religions, the Mongols treated Islam as just another faith. Islam no longer enjoyed the superior status it had had under the Arab caliphate. Despite this fact, the ummah, the Muslim community, was left undisturbed. To the chief qādīs, the Ilkhans left all that was connected with religion, such as prayers, feasts, legitimate alms and pilgrimage to sacred spots, and all affairs concerning waqfs and judicial decisions concerning the marriage relations.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹Rianosvky, p. 84. See also appendix.

¹⁷²Rockhill, William of Rubruck, p. 235.

¹⁷³Rianovsky, p. 298.

In the long run the Muslims even benefited from this religious tolerance. Hūlāgū, a Buddhist by birth and a Christian sympathizer, did not impose a new religion against the will of the natives. Unlike the Arabs who had conquered Persia seven centuries before and transformed the whole life and ethos of Iran, the Mongols were transformed by those whom they had subjugated. The conversion of the Mongols to Islam was significant to the world of Islam.

However, this was not all. The Mongols directly or indirectly spread the Islamic faith among the nomads of Central Asia and Northern China, and elsewhere. In addition to the Sufi movements, Islamization had been in progress during the early stage of the Mongol conquest. Writing about the conquests of Chingiz Khan, Juwaynī has this to say:

. . . the Banner of Islam is raised higher and the candle of the Faith lit brighter; and the sun of the creed of Mohammed casts its shadow over countries whose nostrils had not been perfumed by the scent of Islam, whose ears had not been charmed by the sound of the takbir¹⁷⁴ and the azan¹⁷⁵ and whose soil had not been trodden save by the unclean feet of the worshippers of al-Lat and al-ʿUzza;¹⁷⁶ whereas to-day so many believers in the one God have bent their steps thitherwards and reached the farthest countries of the East, and settled, and made their homes there, that their numbers are beyond calculation or computation.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴It means the recitation of the formula Allah akbar.

¹⁷⁵The muezzin's call to prayer.

¹⁷⁶The names of two goddesses worshipped by the ancient Arabs.

¹⁷⁷Juvaini, p. 13.

CHAPTER VI

IRRIGATION SYSTEM IN IRAQ AND THE MONGOLS

Most ruinous of Hulaku's acts had been the studied destruction of dykes and headworks whose ancient and perfected system had been the sole source of wealth. Disordered time, and the very fewness of the spiritless survivors, forbade repair; and silting and scouring of the rivers once let loose, soon made the restoration of control the remote, perhaps hopeless, problem to-day still unsolved.¹

This often quoted statement ascribes the ruin of the irrigation system in al-^cIrāq solely to the Mongol invaders who conquered the ^cAbbāsīd caliphate in 656/1258 and ruled al-^cIrāq for about eighty years. It has dominated the minds of historians for over forty years and is still upheld by many, such as Seton Lloyd.² Few are aware that the ruin of al-^cIrāq was a long process of administrative neglect stemming from the time of the ^cAbbāsīds. One exception was the author of Iraq and the Persian Gulf who made the following remarks:

The common view that the ruin of the land was effected in a few years by the destruction of irrigation headworks at the hands of Mongol invaders in the thirteenth or fourteenth centuries A. D., is certainly false.³

¹Stephen Longrigg, Four Centuries of Modern Iraq (London: Gregg International, 1968), p. 13.

²Seton Lloyd, Twin Rivers: a Brief History of Iraq from the Earliest Times to the Present Day (3rd ed; London: Osford University Press, 1961), p. 178.

³Great Britain. Naval Intelligence Division, Iraq and the Persian Gulf (London: Naval Intelligence Division, 1944), p. 433.

This author pointed out that some of the canals of the Euphrates were still in use in the early eighteenth century and that the silting up of both main and branch canals took a period of centuries. He omitted mention of the canals of the Tigris, an omission which obviously suggests that they had been silted up before the Mongol invasions. The destruction of the irrigation canals of both the Tigris and Euphrates during the ^CAbbāsīd period is the main theme of this study.

During the rule of the ^CAbbāsīds, as well as during the Roman rule, the government was usually held responsible for the large streams while the local cultivators took care of the smaller ones. Observers noted intensive local efforts at maintaining the irrigation works as late as the nineteenth century. While traveling in southern al-^CIrāq in 1835, J. Baillie Fraser observed a Shaykh and his tribesmen "repairing a sud, or dyke, to restrain the waters of the Euphrates from over-flowing the country."⁴ Local farmers found it relatively easy to maintain some head of water in their distributaries by their own efforts even though this was done at the expense of their weaker neighbors. Clearing canal beds of silt was a constant and costly task which required a concerted effort from all who used the water of the canal. Carrying out this task effectively required a strong central government to co-ordinate local efforts both to insure the economic use of water, and, more importantly, to develop new schemes to comply with the ever changing course of the rivers supplying the

⁴J. Baillie Fraser. Travels in Koordistan, Mesopotamia, &c., Including an Account of Parts of Those Countires Hitherto Unvisited by Europeans (London: R. Bentley, 1890), II, 104.

irrigation water.⁵ Whenever internal strife weakened the government, such duties were often neglected, leading to the deterioration of the irrigation system. Therefore, the decline of irrigation set in gradually over a long period rather than appearing abruptly within the span of a few years. Irrigation system in Mesopotamia is quite complicated and needs special care. In order to understand the importance of maintenance, a discussion of its specific characteristics and the silting process is necessary. Many canals had silted up by the time of Mongol invasion.

Irrigation Development

The development of irrigation in al-^CIra^q dates back to the time immemorial. We know that during the kingdom of Babylon an elaborate irrigation system had been promulgated in the famous "Codes of Hammurabi."⁶ In the fifth century B. C., the historian Herodotus related that a number of canals had intersected the Babylonian plains, and grain had commonly returned two hundred-fold to sowers.⁷ Perhaps because of its productivity, this area, particularly the alluvial valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, are cited in Genesis as the site of the Garden of Eden, one of the four earthly

⁵Iraq and the Persian Gulf, p. 433.

⁶Hammurabi, The Babylonian Laws, edited with translation and commentary by G. R. Driver and John C. Miles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), Arts. 53, 54, 55.

⁷Herodotus, The Histories of Herodotus, translated by Henry Cary, with a critical and biographical introduction by Basil L. Gildersleeve (New York: D. Appleton, 1899), Book I, Ch. 193, pp. 83-84.

paradises.⁸ In reality, those plains present more problems than promise.

Physical characteristics of Iraq. Topographically and structurally, Iraq may be divided into three parts: the western Arabian desert edge; the eastern and northern folded mountain belt; and the Mesopotamian plain. Of these three parts, the last is the focus of this discussion. The Mesopotamian plain, the Babylonian plain of Herodotus, is the gift of the two rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates.⁹ Throughout the historical vicissitudes, it was known by several names. The Greeks called it "the land between the rivers," while the Arabs named it, "al-^CIrāq," or "al-Sawād." However, all these denominations refer only to the southern part of Mesopotamia which is bordered on the north by the Taurus Mountains, on the southeast by the Persian Gulf and Shatt al-^CArab. It extends eastward to the Zagros Mountain Range on the border of Persia and westward to the escarpment of the Syrian Desert. The northern part, the Mesopotamia of the Romans, was Assyria. The Arabs call it al-Jazīrah, the Island, because it is almost "enclosed by a ring of waters, formed by upper courses of the Twin Rivers and by streams of canals joining them to the southward of the stony plains."¹⁰

⁸The Holy Bible, Genesis II.

⁹The Arabic term al-Rāfidain referring to the alluvial plain means exactly the two streams.

¹⁰Guy Le Strange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate: Mesopotamia, Persia, and Central Asia, from the Moslem Conquest to the Time of Timur (Cambridge: University Press, 1905), p. 4.

The two part division is in correspondence with its geographical configuration. Al-^CIraq is an alluvial plain formed by the sediments of the Tigris, the Euphrates, and other streams, while al-Jazirah is generally an undulating plain traversed here and there by mountains. Although Le Strange gives the dividing line of these parts as going east and west "from points on the Euphrates and Tigris, respectively, where these two rivers first began to flow near each other through the Mesopotamia plain,"¹¹ there is no permanent boundary between them. It varies from time to time.¹² Nevertheless, most of the sources conclude that the two parts are divided in accordance with the physical and climatic variations. Thus divided, the south is an arid region depending upon perennial irrigation for agriculture and the north is a mountaineous region with adequate rain and springs for cultivation.

Forces against agrarian development. Despite the fertility of its soil formed by the silt deposits of the Twin Rivers, many hindrances work against its becoming an agricultural country by nature. The Mesopotamian plain has only two pronounced seasons: a summer of intense heat without any appreciable rainfall which extends from May until early October, and a winter with occasionally heavy rainfall and sometimes severe frost lasting from November through March. Even though the winter months never fail to provide some rain, the actual amount varies greatly from year to year. Recent

¹¹ Ibid., p. 3.

¹² See chapter IV, pp. 145-148.

studies show that during the period from 1887 to 1918, the highest annual precipitation in Baghdad was 439 mm and the lowest 51 mm. During the period from 1937 to 1956, the annual precipitation varied from 315 mm to 72.3 mm.¹³ Although periodic rain is beneficial to the crops, heavy rain may turn the plain into a morass which can be traversed only along the slightly raised levees of present or former watercourses. It may even wash out the winter crops.¹⁴

In addition, the Euphrates and the Tigris have little distance between the headwaters and the alluvial plains to retain water when abundant and discharge it back into the falling rivers at the time when it was most needed. When floods come in the winter months, "much of the flow of the twin rivers occurs in the spring too late to benefit winter crops and too early for summer crops."¹⁵ The winter crop of barley is planted in November and harvested in February. Summer crops, which grow better than winter plantings when water is available, are seeded from early April until the end of May and harvested in early fall. However, the water supply in the Euphrates begins to increase in November and swells throughout the winter; the maximum supply tends to occur during the last two weeks of April

¹³ Ahmed Sousa, Irrigation in Iraq: Its History and Development (Iraq: New Publishers, 1945), p. 15; and Robert McC. Adams, Land Behind Baghdad: A History of Settlement on the Diyala Plains (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 4.

¹⁴ Robert A. Fernea, Shaykh and Effendi: Changing Patterns of Authority Among the El Shabana of Southern Iraq (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 9-10.

¹⁵ Hassan Mohammad Ali, Land Reclamation and Settlement in Iraq (Baghdad: Baghdad Printing Press, 1955), p. 30.

and first two weeks of May.

Furthermore, all the Mesopotamia waterways are liable to very heavy and sudden floods capable of inundating the country, and all irrigation schemes must take account of this factor and provide remedies against it. Since ancient time, the irrigation system in the area was to confine its attention to one bank of each river and protect that bank against inundation. The other bank would allow the floods to waste their energies.¹⁶ This would allow certain fields to be cultivated.

Engineers also had to provide means to clear large amounts of sediment carried by the rivers which quickly choke the canal systems if not constantly attended. The average sediment in both the Tigris and Euphrates is more than three times the average sediment content of samples taken from the Nile in its highest floods.¹⁷

Nevertheless, the rivers are not without their particular physical characteristics which enable irrigation to develop. The Tigris at the northern extremity of the delta flows at a slightly higher level than the Euphrates. By the time it reaches Baghdad, its level is about seven meters lower than that of the Euphrates. Then, further down, its bed resumes its former position and near Kut, it again becomes higher than the Euphrates. These characteristics permit irrigation from one river and drainage into the other so that

¹⁶W. Willcocks, Irrigation of Mesopotamia (London: E. & F. N. Spon, 1911), pp. 17, 18.

¹⁷Nuri K. Al-Barazi, The Geography of Agriculture in Irrigated Areas of the Middle Euphrates Valley (Baghdad: al-Aani Press, 1961), v. 1, p. 155.

a succession of parallel canals can run diagonally between the two rivers. The interchange of direction following the natural sloping line of the district makes the waters flow freely.¹⁸

It is clear that the prosperity of Mesopotamia had to be based upon proper control and use of water for cultivation. In fact, Mesopotamia had been for centuries the home of perennial irrigation.¹⁹ This system of perennial irrigation requires the digging and maintenance of many canals and branch canals. In addition, dams are built across rivers so that a higher level of water can be produced on the upstream side of the dams simply by sufficiently closing the sluices, or gates, placed in them. This enables the water flowing at the higher level to irrigate the land much farther from the headwater of the canals. Dams are also designed to store water against periods of drought and discharge it at the lower level. In addition they also have the function of controlling excessive water in order to prevent floods. Flood occurs, once the dams collapse and canals are silted up. Floods and inundations that prevailed in the latter part of the ^cAbbāsīd caliphate suggest the poor condition of the irrigation system.

Silt clearing. The Tigris and Euphrates floods are not gradual but consist of a series of rapid rises and falls. At the crest of the rise, the water carries a great amount of silt which may reach 750 parts in 100,000 of dry silt weight. Even at its low,

¹⁸Sousa, Irrigation in Iraq, pp. 18-19.

¹⁹Willcocks, p. 5.

it reaches 140 parts in 100,000.²⁰ Clearing silt required the constant attention of the ruling regimes. The ancient Assyrians and Babylonians used their captives of war to clean canals. Hammurabi imposed the responsibility of clearing upon the cultivators and the dredging of the canals upon the district governors.²¹

During the time of Nebuchadnezzar, we find men being hired for the cleaning, and were called "kalle narri", or canal laborers.²² In Islamic time, the responsibility was placed upon both the people and the government. A Diwān al-Mā' (Department of Water, i. e. Irrigation) was entrusted with the surveillance of proportion of water distribution for the provinces, as well as apportioning the irrigation water to individual cultivators.²³ To undertake this task, the Diwān often dispatched delegates to obtain local inquiries. Under it, there was a bureau called kastbazūd (decrease-increase) whose task was to register the annual fluctuations of the water supply and to keep accounts of the harvest incomes of the cultivators.²⁴ Concerning

²⁰Ibid., p. 20.

²¹Hammurabi, Arts. 53, 54, 55.

²²S. Haider, "Land Problems of Iraq," (Unpublished Dissertation, The London School of Economics, University of London, London, 1942), p. 30. Quoted from Muhammad Rashid al-Feel, The Historical Geography of Iraq between the Mongolian and Ottoman Conquests, 1258-1534 (Nejef: al-Adab Press, 1965-67), v. 1, p. 140.

²³Abū Ja'far Muhammad Ibn Mūsā al-Khwarizmī, Kitāb Mafātīh al-^cUlūm, edited by G. van Vloten (Leiden: Brill, 1895), p. 68 and *passim*.

²⁴Frede Løkkegaard, Islamic Taxation in the Classic Period, With Special Reference to Circumstances in Iraq (Copenhagen: Branner & Korch, 1950), p. 161.

the silting of a canal, "the water-sharers must bear the cost of clearing it in proportion to their shares in the water and the lands."²⁵ However, the government through the Treasury should bear the expenses of digging--including supporting poles, the construction of vaulted passages and bridges, the clearing up of rivers, and the maintenance of the post-stations and dams on the great rivers.²⁶ The government, furthermore, had to cooperate with the people to protect the canals.²⁷

However, evidence points to the fact that the task of silt clearing required a strong centralized government prepared to commit huge sums to its development and maintenance on the one hand and on the other to coordinate local efforts to carry effectively their share.²⁸ During the later ^CAbbāsīd times, for example, the shrinking of its power led not only to neglect of the rural economy but to the rise of tribalism independent of central control. Without government supervision, silting gradually developed, to which the following discussion is particularly directed.

Silting process. Examining the Islamic tax laws, one will find that various methods of irrigation were in use. Lands irrigated

²⁵ Qudāma b. Ja^Cfar, Kitāb al-Kharāj (Vol. II of Taxation in Islam, translated and provided with an introduction and notes by A. Ben Shemesh. Leiden: Brill, 1965), p. 61.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 62.

²⁷ Lokkegaard, p. 161.

²⁸ Adams, pp. 69-84.

by flooding were liable for highest taxation, which was one tenth, ḥušr. Included in this category were lands irrigated by rain-flooding, by water dammed in reservoirs, or from underground canals. If drought-cattle and mechanical devices were employed to irrigate the land, a lower tax was allowed which amounted to a twentieth, niṣf ḥušr. Such lands using gharb (bucket) and water-wheel plants, namely dāliyah, dūlāb, nāḥūr, for irrigation belonged to the latter category.²⁹ The predominant method used in Mesopotamia was the canal system, gravity-flow canals.

Where the gravity-flow canal system is used, there are two irrigation methods. The first one is relatively simple. Along the watercourses the farmers simply broke the river banks at some point and allowed the water to flow over into the adjacent fields. As the river bed is always higher than the fields in Mesopotamia, water would naturally flow for considerable distances without artificial help and devices, and would pass from field to field. Finally, the water flowed to a field that might be fallow for the year. However, because of this method that the land lying closest to the waterway is often waterlogged by excess water and the soil becomes salinated, which gradually makes the soil unfit for cultivation.

The method of canalization will solve these problems and increase the economic use of water and total area of land to be irrigated. Nevertheless, when canalization is used, considerable money and labor are necessary, and maintenance becomes a constant

²⁹ Qudāma, p. 60, 61.

endeavor. As indicated previously, the rivers of Mesopotamia are susceptible to heavy deposits which silt up the head of each canal faster than the tail. Therefore, the activities of the farmers occupying land at the head of the canal affects the farmers at the tail of the canal.

The amount of silt carried by a stream is determined by the velocity of the current as well as the size of the waterway. As water enters a canal from a river, there is an immediate drop in velocity, and the result is that the percentage of silt which was supported by the differential of size and speed of the parent stream immediately begins to settle to the bottom of the canal where the water enters. If this silt is not regularly cleared away, the total amount of water entering the canal gradually declines and the silt accumulates, but the water level at the head of the canal remains at the same level as the parent stream. As long as the farmers near the head of a canal have a plentiful water supply, they neglect the clearing of silt because they will only have more silt to remove, with less consequent personal advantage, than those at the tail. Even if downstream farmers are willing to clean silt from the head section of the canal, upstream irrigators must agree to the temporary closure of the canal so that the cleaning may take place.

With no other alternative, the farmers at the tail of the canal find themselves with a diminishing supply of water and are forced to migrate elsewhere and leave the canals unattended. The size of the canals is reduced year by year and finally becomes more and more difficult to clear until at last the entire canal has to

be abandoned. This is what happened to the canals of Mesopotamia before the Mongol invasions.

The ^CAbbāsīd Irrigation Network³⁰

During the early centuries of our era, Mesopotamia probably witnessed its greatest prosperity under the Sāsānids. Yet, shortly before the rise of Islam, an extraordinary flood in 71/629 devastated the whole country so that the effect was still being felt at the time of the Mongol invasion.³¹ The embankments of the Twin Rivers and most of the irrigation works, including the gigantic Nimrūd Dam, were washed away. At this time a permanent swamp was formed at the southern tip of the plain by the water thrown off from the two rivers.

Under the Umayyad Dynasty (41-132/661-750), reclamation of land from this swamp, called by Muslim geographers al-Bata'ih, had already begun.³² But only after the ^CAbbāsīds established themselves in al-^CIraq that a large scale reclamation work was carried out by remodeling canals.³³ However, not all districts that had been under

³⁰See Map IV.

³¹Sousa, Irrigation in Iraq, p. 29.

³²Philip Khuri Hitti, The Origins of the Islamic State; being a translation from the Arabic accompanied with annotations, geographic and historic notes of Kitāb Futūh al-Ḍuldān of al-Imām abu-l-^CAbbās Ahmad ibn-Jābir al-Balādhurī. (Beirut: Khayats, 1966), p. 453.

³³Sousa, Irrigation in Iraq, p. 30.

cultivation in the time of the Sassanids were reclaimed.³⁴ Under the ^CAbbāsids, new canals were opened and ancient ones redug. Villages grew up along the canals and those on the Tigris and the Euphrates were so numerous that the cocks crowed in answer to one another from house to house along the roads from Baghdad to al-Basrah.³⁵ Most important works were carried out on both banks of the Tigris. On the left bank of the Tigris, new headworks were built to the Nahrawān canal, a canal had been in existence before the Sassanids. Control works were also built on the al-^CAzaim (or al-Adhaim), and Diyālā rivers, the tributaries of the Tigris. The Ishāqī-Dujayl canal system was reinforced to prevent damage to the main stream from winter spates. At the same time, at the exit of the al-^CAzaim from the Jabal Hamrīn, a dam was constructed which could prevent an excessive volume of water in the lower reaches. The Diyālā was tapped for irrigation near its exit from the hills, and its surplus water controlled at various points as they entered al-Nahrawān. Water was drawn from the Lesser Zāb, another tributary of the Tigris, to irrigate the plain north of the Jabal Hamrīn. The districts north and east of Baghdad were intensively irrigated by these canals, while those south of the capital between the two rivers were enriched by a series of canals thrown out from the Euphrates and drained to the Tigris, namely the Nahr ^CĪsā, Nahr Sarsar, Nahr al-Mālik, and Nahr Kūthā. With these canals and their tributaries that traversed

³⁵Sousa, Irrigation in Iraq, p. 30.

the fertile district west of the City of Peace, an official name for the caliphal capital, an irrigation network system was developed in the vicinity of the capital.³⁶

However, the prosperous condition of the ^CAbbāsīd canals soon declined coinciding with the political decline in the power of the caliphs and the shift of the Tigris River from east to west, in the middle of the tenth century A. D. The struggle for power between the two amīrs al-umārā', commanders-in-chief, of the caliphal army, Ibn al-Rā'iq and Bajkam led to the general destruction of the canals from which the ^CAbbāsīds could never recover.³⁷ Floods and inundations became recurrent and toward the end of the ^CAbbāsīd dynasty the situation became so serious that they took place almost every year. For our purpose, a discussion of the conditions of major canals separately is necessary.

Canals fed by the Tigris. The maximum development of the canal system in ^CAbbāsīd times was credited by the author of Iraq and the Persian Gulf with the building of new headworks to the Nahrawān and the digging of the Ishāqī-Dujayl canals.³⁸ The most important canal among these was the Nahrawān canal on the east bank of the Tigris, a canal generally credited to the Persian king Anūshirwān on the eve of the Arab conquest. However, according to Ahmad Sūsah, an expert on the history of Iraqi irrigation, it is traceable to the

³⁶ For detailed discussions on these canals see following pages.

³⁷ The Eclipse, IV, 439-440.

³⁸ Iraq and the Persian Gulf, p. 443.

time of the Assyrian kingdom.³⁹ This canal was the greatest and widest canal of its time and perhaps is the longest and biggest canal in the world to date.⁴⁰ It left the Tigris at a short distance below Dūr al-Hārith, a town north of the once caliphal capital, Sāmarrā', and flowed southward passing a great number of towns most of which have disappeared by now.⁴¹ After crossing a distance of about three hundred kilometers, it finally poured into the Tigris again a little south of Madharāyā, near the present al-Kūt, which by the time Yāqūt (d. 623/1226) wrote his al-Mu^cjam al-Buldān (the Geographical Dictionary) early in the thirteenth century A. D., was for the most part in ruin.⁴²

The main function of the canal was to solve the problem of chronic water shortage by supplementing the flow of the Diyālā River, a tributary of the Tigris, with a large additional supply obtained from the Tigris.⁴³ Thus, it served to irrigate all the lands along the east bank of the Tigris from above Sāmarrā' to about one hundred

³⁹ Ahmad Sūsah, Rayy Sāmarrā' fī 'Ahd al-Khilāfah al-Abbāsiyyah (Baghdād: Matba'ah al-Ma'ārif, 1948-1949), v. 1, pp. 106-159; and His "Rayy Baghdād, Qadīman wa-Hadīthan" in Baghdād (Baghdad, n. p., 1969), 102.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibn Serapion, "Description of Mesopotamia and Baghdad, Written about the Year 900 A. D." The Arabic Text edited from a MS. in the British Museum Library, with translation and notes, by Guy Le Strange. JRAS (April, 1895), 270-271.

⁴² Shihāb al-Dīn Abū 'Abd Allāh Yāqūt al-Hamwāī, Mu^cjam al-Buldān edited by Ferdinand Wustenfeld (Leipzig, 1866-1873), v. 1, p. 252; v. 4, pp. 240-250.

⁴³ Adams, p. 76.

miles (160 km) south of Baghdad. At a place of some two parasangs (or farsakhs, about five km), below the capital, it was joined successively by three lesser streams: Nahr al-Yahūdī, Nahr al-Māmūnī, and the Abū al-Jund. Al-Yahūdī of a comparable or even larger size than the parent canal is the only one still largely preserved, while al-Māmūnī's upper portion has been cut away by the northward movement of the Tigris. The third one, Abū al-Jund allegedly cut by the Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd (170-193/786-809), was the largest of the three, but it has completely disappeared. According to Ibn Serapion of the early tenth century, it was the finest of the three and the best cultivated along both its banks.⁴⁴ From it, branch channels which irrigated the domain lying on the eastern bank of the Tigris derived their water.

The entire length of the canal was divided into three sections in accordance with their names: Qātūl al-Kisrawī, Tāmarrā, and al-Nahrawān. The Qātūl al-Kisrawī took its water from the Tigris' east bank and followed a fairly direct southeasterly course across the alluvial plain of al-^CAzaim River to another river, al-Diyālā, below Ba^Cqūba. At about ten parasangs north of Baghdad, the great canal changed its name to Tāmarrā, until it reached a town called Jisr Nahrawān. From then on, the canal was known by its name al-Nahrawān. In the middle course, at a town called Bājisrā, the canal sent off from its right bank a branch channels of East Baghdad derived their water, and finally flowed into the Tigris at Baradān

⁴⁴ Ibn Serapion, p. 77.

to the north of the capital. Again at Jisr Nahrawān, another canal branched out from its right and poured into the Tigris at Kalwādhā. This was the Nahr al-Bīn, which supplied water for the lower quarter of East Baghdad. According to Ibn Serapion, another canal called Nahr Diyālā branched out from the Nahrawān one mile south of Jisr Nahrawān and after flowing across many villages and domains fell into the Tigris three parasangs below the ^CAbāsīd.⁴⁵

In addition to the Tigris, which was the main supplier of water, al-Nahrawān was fed by the water from al-^CAzaim and Diyālā rivers as mentioned before. However, for the most part of the year, the flow of al-^CAzaim was insignificant, but occasional floods were very destructive.⁴⁶ During the Islamic times, a dam known as Band al-^CAzaim was constructed to disperse the waters of that stream and control floods.⁴⁷ Another dam was also constructed near Mansūriyah al-Jabal, while passing the Jabal Hamrīn.

All these major canals on the east side of the Tigris had probably come into existence either in the Sassanid time or earlier.⁴⁸ But the canal system did not stay in good condition for very long during the ^CAbbāsīd period. The first sign of decline occurred at a canal called al-Qūraj dug by Chosroes Anushirwan to compensate for

⁴⁵The Nahr Diyālā is in fact the lower course of a river also called Diyālā. In order to distinguish to two, the names Nahr Diyālā and Diyālā River are used to indicate the lower course and the main stream respectively.

⁴⁶Adams, p. 77.

⁴⁷E. Herzfeld, Geschichte der Stadt Samarra, die Ausgrabungen von Samarra, 6 (Hamburg: 1948), pp. 76ff.

⁴⁸Adams, pp. 67, 77-78.

the water carried off by Qātūl al-Kisrawī, south of Sāmarrā', when Hārūn al-Rashīd under the advice of his officials closed its head.⁴⁹ In its stead, he ordered the enlargement of another inlet from al-Nahrawān which later was known as Abū al-Jund. The closure of the headwater of the al-Qūraj became the main threat of inundation of the capital in later times.⁵⁰

Nevertheless, more serious damage was done to the Nahrawān canal by Ibn al-Rā'iq, who broke its bank in an unsuccessful attempt to defend his amirate against Bajkam's advance from Wāsīt upon the capital.⁵¹ For the next twenty years or so, floods and inundations frequently occurred in the Diyālā Valley until the Buwayhid sultan, Mu^cizz al-Dawlah (320-356/932-967), began to repair the breaches. The area around it was uncultivated and its inhabitants were forced to emigrate elsewhere.⁵² Baghdad, not directly dependent upon al-Nahrawān water, was also affected to the extent that the food supply was scarce. In Baghdad, women were caught killing children and eating them. The practice became so common that many women were executed for this offense.⁵³ Although Mu^cizz al-Dawlah succeeded in closing the breaches, the neglect and lack of maintenance of his successor once again led to later breaches accompanied by new

⁴⁹Yāqūt, v. 4A, p. 199; and Sūṣah, Rayy Sāmarrā', v. 1, pp. 226ff.

⁵⁰Sūṣah, Rayy Sāmarrā', v. 1, p. 227.

⁵¹Margoliouth and Amerdroz, v. 4, pp. 439-440.

⁵²Dams, pp. 85-87.

⁵³Yāqūt, V, p. 99.

abandonments. Shortly after ^CAdud al-Dawlah (367-372/977-982), the third sultan of the Buwayhids, was interested in mending the breaches of the Nahrawān, the most important of which was the repairing of the Sahliyah dam and al-Yahūdī dam.⁵⁴ However, internal strife among the Buwayhids after the death of ^CAdud al-Dawlah prevented further improvement. Thus, in the remaining years of the Buwayhids rule in Baghdad, we hear of nothing but poverty and ruin.⁵⁵ All these occurrences led eventually to the cessation of cultivation and settlement in what had been one of the most prosperous areas under the control of the caliphate.

The declining canal conditions not only continued, but were aggravated in the time of the Saljuq rule in Baghdad (447-511/1055-1117). In the decade of the 460s A. H./1066-1076 A. D., for example, there were inundations in the capital year after year.⁵⁶ The final condition was eloquently described by Yaqūt:

It is now in ruins and all its cities and villages are mounds and can be seen with standing walls. The destruction of this canal was caused by the difference among the Sultans and the fighting between them at the time of the Suljuks. None of these Sultans was interested in construction and building, their only aim was to collect taxes and

^{54c} Abd al-^CAzīz al-Dūrī, *Dirāsāt*, p. 268; and Mafizullah Kabir, *The Buwayhid Dynasty of Baghdad (334/946-447/1055)* (Calcutta: Iran Society, 1964), p. 65.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

⁵⁶ All these inundations are conveniently listed by George Makdisi in his "The Topography of Eleventh Century Baghdad: Materials and Notes", in *Arabica* VI (1959), 178-197, 281-309.

consume them. It was also on the route of their armies, so the population left their lands and it continued to go to ruin.⁵⁷

The shift of the middle course of the Tigris, approximately from Qādisīyah to Baghdad, accelerated the decline of clearing, began in the middle of the tenth century.⁵⁸ Until then, the middle course of the river in the thirteenth century A. D. had a more westerly course than it then had. By the first decade of the thirteenth century, when the change of the river bed was completed,⁵⁹ the Nahrawān area was almost totally abandoned.

The shift of the Tigris affected the area west of the River more seriously than the east. When Caliph al-Mustansir (623-640/1226-1242) came to the throne, he saw the horrible plight of the people living in lands around al-Shutaytā, which was caused by the changing of the river bed, and ordered the redigging and widening of the Dujayl River to irrigate the land which the Tigris had left dry.⁶⁰

The Dujayl River was one of the two canals on the right bank of the Tigris fed by itself. The other canal, to the north of the Dujayl, was called al-Ishāqī and built in the remote past. The original course left the right bank of the Tigris at a point near Takrīt and flowed back to the river at the lower ^CAqarqūf, west of

⁵⁷ Yaqūt, I, 252.

⁵⁸ Ibn Serapion, p. 38, n. 4.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

Baghdad. It irrigated a vast area between the Twin Rivers throughout its course, but was later neglected and became almost obliterated. It remained abandoned until the ^CAbbāsīd caliph al-Mu^CTasīm (218-227/833-842) built his new capital of Sāmarrā' in 221/836. In order to supply the new capital and its vicinity with water, he ordered the canal redug under the supervision of his chief of police, Ishāq ibn Ibrāhīm, whose name was given to the canal. However, the canal given life again was confined to the upper part of the ancient canal from its headwater to the south of Sāmarrā' and finally joined the Dujayl River.⁶¹ The function of this canal seems limited to the use of the city itself. Sāmarrā' soon fell in ruin after Baghdad regained its prominence from 281/894. Therefore, the canal could not have stayed in good condition too long, although Ibn Hawqal, during the middle of fourth/tenth century, still mentioned the canal as flowing from Takrīt to al-Sarāt.⁶² The clearing of silt from its sister canal, Dujayl, was recorded.

The Dujayl River took its water at a place opposite al-Qādisiyah, ten kilometers south of Sāmarrā' and rejoined the river between ^CUkbarā and Baghdad after irrigating a vast area west of the Tigris.⁶³ Many towns flourished on both banks of the canal and

⁶¹Sūsah, Rayy Sāmarrā', I, 80-84.

⁶²Ibn Hawqal, p. 243.

⁶³The course of Dujayl River is quite controversial. Ibn Serapion stated that during his time, the Dujayl branched out from the Euphrates and poured into the Tigris. However, since then, no other Muslim authors and geographers mentioned the course of the Dujayl as running from west to east. Le Strange believed that it had been there but gradually fell out of use and became silted up

its distributaries. However, it was silted up several times during the ^CAbbāsīd rule, particularly in the twelfth century.⁶⁴ The shift of the Tigris caused the redigging and widening of its head in the reign of al-Mustansīr.⁶⁵ The canal was thus kept open and flowing which survived the Mongol invasion for many years.

Canals fed by the Euphrates. These were four major canals traversing the alluvial plain of the Twin Rivers and carried surplus waters of the Euphrates into the Tigris and irrigated the lands through which they and their tributaries passed. Like most of the canals in Mesopotamia, they all owed their existence to the remote past, although they were redug in the ^CAbbāsīd period due to years of neglect. In descending order from north to south, the first canal was Nahr ^CĪsā, a canal redug by an ^CAbbāsīd prince, either the nephew of the ruling Caliph al-Mansūr (136-158/754-775), or the uncle of the same, in early ^CAbbāsīd times.⁶⁶ Its ancient name was al-Rufayl, and after it took off from al-Anbār across the district of Fīrūz Sābūr, it bifurcated at al-Muhawwal. Both branches, al-Sarāt in the north and the ^CĪsā (branch) in the south, were then sending many branch channels to supply the adjacent land and the

in the later date. Writing in the middle of the ten century A. D. Istakhrī said that the Dujayl started from the Tigris immediately below Takrīt. Ahmad Sūsah, on the other hand, argued that it had never had such a course. Ibn Serapion must have confused the Dujayl with Nahr ^CĪsā. See Guy Le Strange, Baghdad during the Abbasid Caliphate from Contemporary Arabic and Persian Sources (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 49, and his notes in Ibn Serapion, p. 748. Sūsah, Rayy Sāmarrā', I, 223-224.

⁶⁴ al-Feel, I, 151-152.

⁶⁵ Ibn Serapion, p. 38.

⁶⁶ Cf. Ibn Serapion, pp. 72-73.

capital with water, which will be discussed later.

The second in order was Nahr Sarṣar, a great canal with swift-flowing waters.⁶⁷ This canal took off from the Euphrates at a point three parasangs below the village of Dīmimmā and entered the Tigris four parasangs above al-Madā'in, the ancient twin city of Seleucia-Ctesiphon. Farmers on both banks of this canal had to use water-wheels (dālyah), and loaded levers (or shaduf), to irrigate their lands.⁶⁸ In the twelfth century, al-Idrīsī related that the major town, Sarṣar, was still a flourishing agricultural and commercial center nine miles from Baghdad.⁶⁹

At the village of al-Fallūjah, five parasangs below the head of the Nahr Sarṣar, the third transverse canal, Nahr al-Mālik, flowed out and poured back to the Tigris at three parasangs below al-Madā'in. Along its water course, it was said to have had 360 villages and many branch canals.

The last canal in order, the Nahr Kūthā, originated from the east bank of the Euphrates three parasangs below the Nahr al-Mālik, and with its branches irrigated the district of Kūthā. After flowing through the main town of the district, Kūthā Rabbā, the canal reached the western bank of the Tigris ten parasangs below al-Madā'in.

⁶⁷ Al-Feel, I, 158.

⁶⁸ Ibn Serapion, p. 69.

⁶⁹ For reference, cf. Aḥmad Sūsah, Rayy Samarrā', I, 185-186.

Whether these four major transverse canals were really in good condition since the fourth/tenth century is doubtful, because even in the reign of Hārūn al-Rashīd, the zenith of the ^CAbbāsīd power, they "were far inferior to what they were in the old Babylonian and Sassanian days."⁷⁰ The reopening of many of their branch canals in the days of ^CAdud al-Dawlah suggests their becoming silted up in part. Discussions of these branch canals are necessary to show the ruin that had gradually developed before the Mongol invasion.

Canals around Baghdad. Evidence points to the fact that before al-Mansūr, the second Caliph of the ^CAbbāsīds, built his round city in Baghdad in 145/763, there had been many canals serving the area. When he was searching for a site for his new capital, he was told that it should be built there "in the midst of four districts, on the east Būq and Kalwādhā, and on the west Qatrabbul and Bādūrayā." "In this way," he was further advised, "thou shalt always be surrounded by palm trees and be near water, so that if one district suffers from drought, or fails to yield its harvests in due time, there will be relief in another; while, being on the banks of aṣ-Ṣarāt, provisions will reach thee in the boats which ply on the Euphrates. . . ."⁷¹ It seems that the canals were intended to be communication lines as well as transport means of provisions for the city. This is not entirely true, because the area

⁷⁰Willcocks, p. 19.

⁷¹Muhammad ibn Ahmad Al-Muqaddasi, Ahsan-u-t-Taqāsīm fī Maṣrifati-l-Aqālīm. Translated from the Arabic and edited by G. S. A. Ranking and R. F. Azoo (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1901), p. 186.

where the Round City of al-Mansūr stood had been agriculturally productive.⁷²

The western side of the Tigris River in the vicinity of Baghdad received its water from the canals of Nahr ^CIsā and al-Dujayl. Al-Sarāt was the north branch of the main ^CIsā canal bifurcated at a short distance before it reached al-Muhawwal, while the south branch kept the same name. Then al-Sarāt at a distance of about one parasang from its head bifurcated again, and the north channel called the Trench of Tāhir, took its name from the General of al-Ma'mūn (198-218/813-833) and later became the founder of the Tāhirid Dynasty in Khurāsān.⁷³ After watering the land along its course, it turned around the walls of Baghdad and continued flowing through Bāb al-Anbār, Bāb al-Hadīd, Bāb al-Harb, Bāb Qatrabbūl, and the Fief of Umm Ja^Cfar until it finally emptied into the Tigris above the Palace of Ibrahim ibn Ishāq ibn Ibrāhīm al-Tāhirī.⁷⁴ Since it was the custom to name the canal after the person who dug or redug it, this Trench most likely goes back at least to the earliest occupation of al-Harbiyah in the reign of al-Mansūr.⁷⁵ In the time of Yāqūt, there was no trace of the Bāb al-Hadīd.

⁷²Sūsah, "Rayy Baghdad", p. 103.

⁷³Ibn Serapion, p. 291.

⁷⁴al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh Baghdād (Cairo: Matba^Cah Siran, 1931), I, 112.

⁷⁵Jacob Lassner, The Topography of Baghdad in the Early Middle Ages; Text and Studies (Detroit: Wayne State University, 1970), p. 278, n. 7. See also Le Strange, Baghdad, p. 69. It is said to have been dug by ^CIsā, the uncle of the Caliph al-Mansūr.

The al-Sarāt continued to flow southward and at a short distance down its course, it threw out a branch canal to the right known as the Lesser Sarāt. After a comparatively short course, it curved back to merge with its mother canal and thus formed the island of al-^CAbbāsīyah between them.⁷⁶ It irrigated the domains and gardens of Bādūrayā and numerous channels branched from it until it reached Baghdad. It flowed by many qantarāt (or bridges), but Yāqūt reported that only al-Qantarāh al-^CAtīqah and al-Qantarāh al-Jadīdah (Old and New Bridges) remained standing.⁷⁷

Below al-Muhawwal, the ^CIsā canal (the branch) sent out another branch canal called Karkhāyā irrigating the suburb of Karkh between the Nahr al-Sarāt and Nahr ^CIsā, which was called Tassuj al-Bādūrayā. After sending out four branches to the left and one to the right, it finally passed by the Qantarāt of the Fief of the Jews, Qantarāt Darb al-Hijārah, Qantarāt al-Bimāristān, and Qantarāt Bāb al-Muhawwal. The four left-hand branch canals were called Nahr Razin, Nahr Bazzazīn, Nahr al-Dajāj, and Nahr al-Qallāyyin, and the single right-hand branch was Nahr al-Kilāb. Ultimately, the Karkhāyā rejoined the ^CIsā canal and its lower course was known as the Nahr Tābiq.⁷⁸ However, the Karkhāyā canal was not

⁷⁶ Aḥmad ibn Abi Ya^Cqūb al-Ya^Cqūbī, Kitāb al-Bulḡān, edited by M. J. de Goeje. (Leiden: Brill, 1891), p. 242.

⁷⁷ Yāqūt, III, pp. 377-378.

⁷⁸ Ibn Serapion, p. 288; al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, I, 113.

traceable in the time of Yāqūt.⁷⁹

The northern part of the City of Peace on the western bank of the Tigris, called the Harbiyah Quarter, took its water from the branches of the Dujayl canal. Among them was a canal called Nahr Batātiyā originating six parasangs from the head of the Dujayl and irrigating numerous domains and villages in the district of Miskin where it disappeared.⁸⁰ During the early Abbāsids, the district of Miskin flourished and farms and villages crowded together.⁸¹ The most important of them were Harbī, Awānā, Miskin, Dujayl, al-Manārīyah, Juwayth, and al-Ajamañ. Somewhat below the Jisr of the Batātiyā, there branched off from the main canal three streams, three water conduits in fact, and after irrigating the lands along their courses, they ran dry and disappeared.⁸²

The canals that served East Baghdad were derived indirectly from the Nahrawān, through two transverse canals, the Khālīṣ and the Nahr al-Bīn, flowing westward to the Tigris. The Khālīṣ left the parent canal at a point near the town of Bājisrā, flowed into the Tigris at Rāshidiyah, and watered the northern quarters of East Baghdad. Its branch canal, the Nahr al-Fadl, flowed into the Tigris at Bāb al-Shammāsīyah, where the Nahr al-Mahdī and Nahr al-Sūr branched out. These two branch canals were later joined by Nahr al-Ja^cfariyah, an offshoot from the parent stream of the Nahr al-Fadl.

⁷⁹Yāqūt, IV, 252.

⁸⁰Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, I, 113-114.

⁸¹Sūsah, "Rayy Baghdād," p. 103.

⁸²Ibn Serapion, p. 27; al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, I, 114-115.

The Nahr al-Bīn which supplied water for the suburbs to the south of East Baghdad emptied its contents into the Tigris two parasangs below the capital. The Nahr al-Bīn had two important branches Nahr Mūsā and Nahr Kalwādhā or Qātūal Kalwādhā. From Nahr Mūsā, three smaller canals branched out. All the canals on the east of the Tigris River deriving water from the Nahrawān disappeared after the Nahrawān silted up in the early part of the thirteenth century A. D.

Flood Occurrences

In the foregoing discussion, the use of water for irrigation was emphasized. However, it is only one of the two characteristics in which canalization functions. The other is flood control. There are many ways to mitigate floods. Two are most common on the Mesopotamian plain. One is an enlargement of a large river bed, principally by deepening it, in order to increase its discharging capacity. The other more effective way of mitigating floods is to reduce the peak of the flood by withdrawing some part of the natural discharge from the river. This withdrawal may be done either by diverting the flow in a low-lying depression or by building a dam across the valley of the river and storing behind it a part of the flood discharge.

The rivers of Mesopotamia are susceptible not only to heavy deposit of sediment but to sudden rise of floods in the spring time, flood control has been given great attention since the dawn of its civilization. The ^cAbbāsids, for this matter, were particularly cautioned in selecting the site for their capital. Its site was deliberately chosen and decided upon the western side of the Tigris

where the plain stood at a higher level than the eastern side. To insure the protection against danger of inundation, walls were built around it and trenches dug outside. Furthermore, the water of the Tigris above the city was diverted to the low land at its eastern side until it rejoined the river again to the south of the city. As for the waters of the Euphrates, they were led to the Tigris through the four transverse canals.⁸³

When the canal system was in decay, the main rivers became inadequate to carry down the discharge of floods. Consequently, the waters overflow the banks in flood time and inundate adjacent low-lying land. The result was more directly and immediately felt through the abandonment of cultivated lands by the farmers caused by the silting up of irrigation canals. The condition of the canal system can thus be depicted by just examining the frequency and seriousness of floods.

However, the discussion of flood condition during the ^cAbbāsīd times will be concentrated on Baghdad, the caliphal capital, where the seriousness of flood may illustrate the case of other places, because as a capital, Baghdad was more securely guarded against inundation than any other cities and attracted more attention from many chroniclers.

The first flood ever recorded after the founding of Baghdad

⁸³ Aḥmad Sūsāh, Fayadānāt Baghdād fī al-Tārīkh (Baghdad: Matba^cah al-Adīb al-Baghdadiyah, 1963), I, 227.

took place in 186/802 during the reign of Hārūn al-Rashīd.⁸⁴ It was reported that the water of the Tigris increased excessively and the city was threatened by imminent danger of inundation.⁸⁵ Toward the end of al-Ma'mūn's reign, another dangerous flood from the Tigris inundated an area as far as the suburbs of West Baghdad.⁸⁶ In 270/884, when Sāmarrā' replaced Baghdad as the caliphal capital temporarily since 221/836, a great flood broke out over the banks of the Euphrates, demolishing many dams on the ^CIsā canal and inundating the area west of Baghdad. Seven thousand houses were reported to have been wiped out.⁸⁷ This last instance strongly suggests that administrative neglect contributed to the decay of the Euphrates canal system.

After Baghdad regained its position as the capital in 279/892, flood occurrences had become so critical that they grew into special problems of government concern. The ^CAbbāsīd government felt the need to control the movement of the rivers and thus began to

⁸⁴We have no knowledge about the floods in the period between the Arab conquest of al-^CIrāq and the founding of Baghdad. Ibid., p. 227.

⁸⁵Abū al-Faraj ^CAbd al-Rahmān ibn ^CAlī Ibn al-Jawzī, Manāqib Baghdad, edited by Muhammad Bahjat al-Atharī (Baghdad: Matba^Cah Dār al-Salām, 1342 A. H.); p. 32. In addition, there was another flood in the time of Hārūn al-Rashīd. See Muḥammad ibn ^CAbdus Jahshiyārī, Tārikh al-Wuzarā' (Cairo:

⁸⁶Ahmad ibn Abī Tāhir Tayfūr, Baghdād, edited by Hans Keller (Leiden: Brill, 1908), pp. 263-264.

⁸⁷Tabarī, III, 2105.

supervise and register the levels of the rivers during the flooding season. The water level in Baghdad on both sides of the Tigris was recorded for the first time in 292/906,⁸⁸ which was reported to have reached 21 cubits⁸⁹ above the sea level. In that year, the water of the Tigris increased greatly, demolishing many houses on both sides of the river.⁹⁰ In 316/928 the flood of the Euphrates, along with that of the Tigris, overflowed their banks and flooded the countryside.⁹¹

Although the ^CAbbāsīd government had taken some measures to supervise the flood condition, it has not been effectively put it under control. Internal crises precluded the government's effort to improve the canal condition. In the period prior to the advent of the Buwayhids to Baghdad, the contention for power between the amīrs al-umārā' caused further decay of the canal system in that floods from the two rivers successively overflowed their banks. Much damage was done to the countryside and even the streets in

⁸⁸There is no knowledge as to where the water levels were registered. It is probably, according to Aḥmad Sūsāh, in Baghdad for the Tigris and in Anbār for the Euphrates. Sūsāh, Fayadanāt, pp. 283-285.

⁸⁹In Arabic, the term is Dhirā^C. I have adopted George Makdisi's and Henry Sullivan Jarrett's usage. See G. Makdisi's "Topography," and Jarrett's translation of al-Suyutī's History of the Caliphs.

⁹⁰Abū al-Faraj ^CAbd al-Rahmān ibn ^CAlī Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam fī Tarīkh al-Muluk wa al-Umam (Istanbul: Dā'irah al-Ma'arif al-^CUthmāniyah, 1358 A. H.), VI, 50.

⁹¹Ibid., VI, 50-300.

Baghdad became filled with water.⁹² At the same time, the destruction of the Sahliyah dam on the Tamarrā section of the Nahrawān canal contributed another cause of threat to inundating the capital.⁹³ All these happenings were not merely accidental, but they were the result of many years of political decadence.

The breakdown of the Sahliyah dam occurred in 367/979, shortly after ^cAdud al-Dawlah became the third Buwayhid sultan in Baghdad. Immediately, the sultan ordered the Sahliyah dam, along with the al-Yahūdī dam, repaired. Nevertheless, breaches of the dams continued to be the cause of concern. Thereafter, flood condition became more serious than ever, since the Tamarrā joined hands with the Tigris and the Euphrates to inundate the area.

During the Saljūq rule in Baghdad, the condition of the canals was very much neglected because in the first place of the contention for the supremacy of power between caliph and sultan⁹⁴ and secondly the civil wars waged among the sons of Malik Shāh after his death in 1092. Again all these struggles precluded a strong policy for the restoration of the canal system even when the illustrious Persian vizier, Nizām al-Mulk (d. 1092) was in power. During his thirty year vizierate, several serious floods broke out. In 466/1073-74, a dangerous flood burst out of the banks of the Tigris and

⁹²Ibid., pp. 300-316; Miskawayh, II, p. 9; Khatīb al-Baghdādī, I, 76; and Tabarī, III, p. 1403.

⁹³See Sūsah, Fayadanāt, pp. 297-299; and Ibn al-Jawzi, Muntazam, VII, 87.

⁹⁴G. Makdisi, "Topography", p. 282.

greatly affected the city on both banks of the raging river. The flood which occurred in the night was augmented with a torrential rain coupled with a violent wind. The caliph's palaces were flooded and a whole residential area, Darb al-Qayyār, was completely demolished.⁹⁵ People fled in panic to the safety of the highlands.⁹⁶ Relating to this flood, "the first (dangerous) flood",⁹⁷ al-Suyūṭī's statement is worthy of quoting.

In the year 466 there was a great inundation in Baghdad. The Tigris rose thirty cubits,⁹⁸ the like of which had never occurred and property and lives and cattle were destroyed. The people went about in boats and the Friday prayers were twice held on sailing vessels on the face of the waters, and the Caliph arose supplicating the Lord. Baghdad was levelled at a stroke, one hundred thousand houses or more being destroyed.⁹⁹

In the next three years, two more floods caused much ruin. In 467/1075, a torrential rain threatened to repeat the horrible experience of the previous year. The Tamarrā canal was also flooded and an epidemic spread widely. Ten thousand people were said to have perished. The people of Awānā, Ṣarīfīn, Ukbarā, Wāsit, al-Baṣrah, the Khurāsān Road, and Khuzistān suffered the same tragedies.¹⁰⁰ The

⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 288-289.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 288; Ibn al-Athīr, X, 62; Ibn al-Jawzī, Manāquib, p. 34; and also his Muntazam, VIII, 284-286.

⁹⁷Sūsah, Fayadanāt, I, 323; also his "Rayy Baghdad", p. 110.

⁹⁸Ibn al-Jawzī reported it reached 21½ cubits. Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, VIII, 225.

⁹⁹Al-Suyūṭī, pp. 442-443.

¹⁰⁰Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, VIII, 289-290.

flood of 469/1077 again entered "Dār al-Khilāfah" and forced the people to flee carrying what they had of their belongings. The vizier, Abū Shujā^c,¹⁰¹ fought his way in the flood to "Dār al-Khilāfah" to transfer the coffin of the caliph al-Qā'im who had passed away a year or so ago to the Mausoleums in the Rusāfah.¹⁰²

With the passing away of both Nizām al-Mulk and Malik Shāh ended the glory that covered the rule of the first three Saljūq sultans. Thereafter, floods were not uncommon. Following several smaller floods,¹⁰³ the water of the Tigris once again rose very high in 502/1108. In this flood roads were blocked and communication cut off. Winter and summer crops were destroyed.¹⁰⁴ A more serious flood took place in 544/1159 when the water of the Tigris overflowed its banks. Because of its destructive effect comparable to that of the year 446/1073-74, this flood was always referred to as the "second flood."¹⁰⁵ Baghdad was so affected that part of the wall was flooded out and many quarters inundated. Many people fled to the highland on the western side of the river by boats and the boat fee rose to

¹⁰¹ He was appointed to the office of vizier in 476/1083. His name was Abū Shujā^c Muhammad ibn al-Hasan and was given the title of Dhahir al-Dīn (Defender of the Faith). See al-Suyūtī, p. 445.

¹⁰² G. Makdisi, "Topography", p. 290; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, VIII, 290.

¹⁰³ Such as the floods of 469 and 499 A. H. See Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, VIII, 305 and IX 146.

¹⁰⁴ Ibn al-Athīr, X, 198, 330. See also Anastase al-Kirmalli Anastasi-Marie al-Kirmalli "Gharaq Baghdād" al-Mashriq, X (1908), p. 652.

¹⁰⁵ Sūrah, Fayadanāt, p. 323.

several dīnārs. Not all of them, however, were able to afford it.¹⁰⁶

The worse was yet to come. By the end of the 6th/12th century, the flood situation became more critical. First of all the shift of the Tigris course was completed and its completion resulted in the almost total abandonment of the Nahrwān area. At the same time, the dam on the al-^cAzaim River and the Nimrūd dam on the Tigris north of Takrīt were destroyed.¹⁰⁷ All these happenings contributed to the serious floods that overflowed the banks of the Tigris, and inundated the city. No less than eight considerable size floods took place in the first half of the 7th/13th century and the last two were joined by the Euphrates to devastate the Mesopotamian plain. It would be too monotonous to enumerate and discuss them all here, but one or two examples will give a clear picture of how destructive these floods were. For convenience, the last two floods of the ^cAbbāsīd period are thus presented.¹⁰⁸

In 653/1255, the banks of both the Tigris and the Euphrates were broken open after a period of torrential rain in Mawsil and Baghdad. The water of the Tigris submerged a great part of the wall of Baghdad and many of its districts. In the western city, the Mosque

¹⁰⁶ Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, X, 169-190.

¹⁰⁷ Sūsah, Fayadanāt, pp. 324, 336.

¹⁰⁸ Some of these floods have been summarized by al-Duri in his "Baghdad." "In 641/1243 floods reached the Nizamiyya and its neighbourhood and ruined some quarters. In 646/1248 floods surrounded east Baghdad, destroyed a part of the wall, and reached the quarters of the Ḥarīm. It also flooded Ruṣāfa and many of its houses fell down. West Baghdad was submerged, and most houses on the river collapsed. . . ." p. 902.

of al-Mansūr was pulled down by the water. The Khudarā' tomb and its neighboring buildings, and the Qamariyah Mosque were altogether destroyed. In the eastern city, many mosques, among them were the Mahdī Mosque in al-Ruṣāfah, Sūltan's Mosque and the Qasr Mosque, fell down. The Nizāmiyah College and "Dār al-Khilāfah" were greatly affected. The flood of the Euphrates destroyed a vast area, including the Nahr ^CIsā, Nahr al-Mālik and its adjacent area along the Euphrates, including ^CAnah, al-Hadīth, Hīt, al-Anbār, al-Hillah, al-Kūfah, and Qūsān. The crops were destroyed and the houses that were destroyed in the flood amounted to 12,875 in number. Furthermore, the people of the countryside were enfeebled by the high rise of prices that were out of their reach. The ruin caused by this flood remained until Diyā' al-Dīn, the uncle of ^CAlā' al-Dīn ^CAtā' Malik Muhammad al-Juwaynī the historian, repaired them in 664/1266. The restoration was later completed by his brother, Shams al-Dīn, in 678/1280.¹⁰⁹

"The worst flood was in 654/1256," said Ahmad al-Dūrī,
"when both sides of Baghdad were surrounded by water. . . ."¹¹⁰

In fact, this flood repeated what the previous one had done in 653/1255 only on a larger scale. The flood, which reached to the chest of a man, forced the Caliph al-Musta^Cṣim to flee to the highlands

¹⁰⁹ Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, pp. 277-278, 303-304.

¹¹⁰ Dūrī, "Baghdād," p. 902.

and pitch camp there.¹¹¹ This flood was also different from the previous one in one more aspect. It lasted for fifty days and covered an area of almost half of the Sawād.¹¹²

Reconstructions under the Mongols

If the flood of 7/629 foretold the Arab conquest of al-^cIrāq, the floods of 653/1255 and 654/1256 were the omens of the ^cAbbāsīd downfall. By the time the Arabs marched to al-^cIrāq in the latter part of the 630s, the people of the area were still kept busy fighting to repair breaches which were threatening further inundation. The Mongols who occupied al-^cIrāq in 656/1258 were compelled to undertake the same measures to prevent additional breaches. Although the Ilkhanites had no clear cut policy to enforce the reconstruction of the irrigation system,¹¹³ evidences of their efforts to restore its condition to what it had been before were not completely absent. Work of reconstruction must have been started as soon as they settled in al-^cIrāq, because, first of all, no mention was made of any inundation until 676/1277. In that year, it was reported that the water of the Tigris rose and the banks of al-Qūraj canal collapsed. Baghdad and many places were flooded. However, the breaches were soon sealed up under the command of ^cAlā' al-Dīn al-Juwaynī, the Sāhib diwān of

¹¹¹Ibn al-Fuwatī, pp. 318-319; and see also al-Kirmalī, pp. 653-654.

¹¹²Sūsah, Fayadanāt, p. 335.

¹¹³Khisbāk, p. 92.

Baghdad.¹¹⁴

In the reign of Abāqā Khān, the second Ilkhan, "the empire began to revive."¹¹⁵ The vizier, Shams al-Dīn al-Juwaynī, and his brother 'Alā' al-Dīn were the major force behind all the reconstruction work. Waṣṣaf, the eulogetic historian of the Mongols, praised Shams al-Dīn's work by saying:

The sheep recovered the blood-tax which the wolves had so long taken, and the partridge exchanged loving looks with the falcon and hawk. Through him the good name of the Padishah was inscribed in fortunate characters on the white and black pages of the day and the night.¹¹⁶

"Baghdad," which was deprived of its metropolitan status, "began once more to flourish."¹¹⁷ As discussed above, as early as 664/1266, Diyā' al-Dīn was entrusted to reconstruct the vast area which had been laid waste by the floods since the last years of the 'Abbāsids. Alā' al-Dīn further erected water wheels (dūlāb) to lead water from the Tigris to the Mustansiriyyah College, built by the 'Abbāsīd Caliph Mustansir in 632/1234. He also ordered to be rebuilt the dam of the Qamariyyah Mosque district in West Baghdad which had been washed off by the flood of 653/1255 and a wooden sluice gate placed in it.¹¹⁸ He even spent one hundred thousand dīnārs in

¹¹⁴Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 384. No damage was reported. See also 'Azzawī, I, 287.

¹¹⁵Howorth, III, 220.

¹¹⁶Quoted from Howorth, III, 220.

¹¹⁷Ibid.

¹¹⁸Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 365.

digging a canal leading from the Euphrates to Mashhad, near Kufah, and the neighborhood of Najaf.¹¹⁹ As a result, the area became a land flourishing with gardens and farms.¹²⁰

The work of reconstruction seemed to have been discontinued some time in about 1278 A. D. This was caused by the intrigue of Majd al-Mulk, the former protégé of the vizier Shams al-Dīn, who accused the two brothers of being in treacherous correspondence with the Mamlūks of Egypt and of amassing huge sums from the Treasury.¹²¹ Although the accusations were eventually dropped through the interventions of some royal ladies, Shams al-Dīn and his brother were not free from suspicions. Thus, they were not fully restored to favor. Majd al Mulk's intrigue continued to play its part until he was put to death by Alā' al-Dīn, according to Ibn al-Fuwatī, in 681/1285.¹²² Consequently, the projects of restoring the canal system were hindered as floods soon broke out.

In addition to the flood mentioned above, several others followed. In 683/1284, the Tigris rose very high and inundated many quarters in the west side of the city of Baghdad, such as the tombs of Dayr al-Tha^calib, al-Junbathah, and Ma^cruf. The second flood took place in 685/1286. This time the Euphrates flooded the districts of

¹¹⁹Howorth, III, 220. A special treatise is said to have been written particularly for this canal by "Taj al-Dīn ibn Amīr Dogfendi."

¹²⁰Wassāf, I, 59.

¹²¹Howorth, III, 260. Also, Boyle, "History of the Īl-Khāns," p. 362.

¹²²Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 419.

al-Kūfah, al-Hillah, Nahr al-Malik, Nahr ^CIsā, al-Anbār, and Hīt. In 690/1293 there was an alert to another flood from the Tigris, but it was only a false alarm.¹²³

With the accession of Ghāzān Khān in 693/1296, the Ilkhanite Empire regained its vigor. Helped by his vizier, Rashīd al-Dīn Fadl Allāh Hamadānī (1247-1318), he carried out various administrative and economic reforms throughout the Empire. Al-^CIrāq also witnessed a more prosperous condition than the period between the death of Abāqā and the accession of Ghāzān. No flood was reported from this time until the end of the Ilkhanites. This simply proves that the canal system has since then been put back into operation. Only in 698/1301, according to al-Fuwatī, it was related that Ghāzān Khān ordered the redigging of a canal leading from the Euphrates from a place above al-Hillah to Mashhad al-Husayn, about eight Parasangs northwest of al-Kūfah.¹²⁴ Soon many gardens and farms sprang up along its banks spreading to Karbalā'. Farm products became the sources of supply for Baghdad and the districts around it. The canal was large enough to be navigable by boats coming down from Baghdad and other cities through the water course of the Tigris and the Euphrates.¹²⁵ In addition, Rashīd al-Dīn Fadl Allāh reported that a channel was led out from it to Mashhad Sayyidī.¹²⁶ This canal, formerly called by the Arabs al-^CAlqamī, was named after Ghāzān Khān

¹²³ Ibid., pp. 442, 449, 468.

¹²⁴ See Le Strange, Eastern Caliphate, p. 78.

¹²⁵ Khishbāk, p. 93.

¹²⁶ For Mashhad Sayyidī Cf. Le Strange, Eastern Caliphate, p. 78.

as al-Nahr al-Ghāzān.¹²⁷

The effect of Ghāzān's reforms was still felt during the reign of Oljeitu, who came to the throne in 1304, when control of affairs remained in the able hands of Rashīd al-Dīn Fadl Allāh.¹²⁸ Finally, Rashīd al-Dīn's death in 1318 marked the end of a period of economic upsurge hinging on the reforms of Ghāzān Khān.

Al-^CIrāq was also affected. The canal system in al-^CIrāq must have fallen into ruin, because in 720/1324 a flood broke out of the banks of the Tigris inundating Baghdad, and destroying many places.¹²⁹

During the seventy-eight years of Mongol occupation of al-^CIrāq, there were only three floods that were recorded by the Arab chroniclers. Except the last one, which Ahmad Susah and al-Kirmalli singled out as the only real flood during this period,¹³⁰ the other two were relatively weaker than those in the latter part of the ^CAbbāsids. It is thus clear that the Mongols maintained the canal system in al-^CIrāq in good operative conditions.

¹²⁷ Ibn al-Fuwatī, p. 497; Waṣṣāf, IV, 401; and Khisbāk, p. 93.

¹²⁸ Petrushevsky, p. 495.

¹²⁹ Al-Kirmalli, p. 654; Khisbāk, p. 94. Also Sūṣah, "Rayy Baghdād," p. 117.

¹³⁰ Ibid., and Sūṣah, "Rayy Baghdād," p. 117.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The fall of Baghdad which accompanied the elimination of the ^CAbbāsīd caliphate was viewed by medieval Muslim historians as a complete break with the past. For their appalling slaughter of the inhabitants of the City of Peace, their destruction of the irrigation system, and their subsequent misrule, if we literally accept the said historians' verdict, the Mongols were accused of having laid waste the whole country of al-^CIrāq. Baghdad, which had once been the capital of the ^CAbbāsīd Empire and the center of world culture and commerce, was reduced to an insignificant town after the Mongol conquest. Al-^CIrāq which had been a prosperous agricultural country became a barren land as a result of the destruction of its irrigation canal system. Modern Muslim historians also contend that even the backwardness of the Muslims today may in large measure be ascribed to Mongol inroads in the Islamic world and the burning and obliteration of the libraries in Baghdad and elsewhere. In the light of our discussions in the foregoing pages, most or all of these accusations are rendered dubious or without foundation.

There is no doubt that the ^CAbbāsīd Empire was one of the most powerful states in the world of the Middle Ages, but its prosperity had begun to decline around the middle of the third/ninth

century as the political power of the Caliphate started to wane. Since the reign of Caliph al-Mu^ctaṣim (218-227/833-842), the Empire was gradually shrinking until the metropolitan area of the legendary City of Peace was all that virtually remained in the hands of the ^cAbbāsids, who became figure-heads ceaselessly tossed around by their own Turkish bodyguards. Thereafter, the Empire had been twice conquered in the fourth/tenth century and fifth/eleventh century by the nomad peoples of Central Asia before the advent of the Mongols. The ^cAbbasid Caliphs were stripped of all their former political power, and the new sultans who were titularly caliphal creations strove with the help of their slave armies in vain to maintain some sort of stability against the nomads and their ambitious leaders. With rare exceptions the history of the splintered Empire became a sad story of grim and constant revolts and political anarchy, with all the attendant evils of devastation and fiscal exactions. Gradually, the center of political and cultural gravity shifted from the Twin River basin to the Nile Valley where stable Muslim dynasties ruled one after the other.

Although the spiritual authority of the ^cAbbāsīd Caliphs was kept intact by the Buwayhids and the Saljūqs, it was challenged by rivals from without. The Caliphs only possessed the prerogative of granting investiture to the local rulers of various small principalities, and they were not capable of summoning the faithful to a jihād (Holy War) either against the crusaders or against the Mongols who were an imminent threat to their very existence. Since the Umayyad ruler of Spain, ^cAbd al-Rahmān III (299-350/912-961),

declared himself Caliph, rival caliphs sprang throughout the Muslim world one after another. The Fātimids in Egypt (296-567/909-1171) were the first ones who followed ^CAbd al-Rahmān's example. At the time of advent of the Mongols the ^CAbbasids were virtually an isolated minority state in their own ghost of a realm, deserted by their nominal subjects everywhere.

The Mongol invasion of Baghdad and the elimination of the powerless ^CAbbāsīd caliphate created no more than ripples in a pond which soon returned to normal. No Muslim ruler wanted to see a strong caliphate restored in Baghdad; even the champion of the Muslim cause, Sultan Baybars I (658-663/1239-1244), did not help the first Caliph in Cairo to recover his power, and later sultans in Egypt did very little to challenge the Mongol rule in al-^CIrāq.

On the other hand, as soon as the Mongol wrath had subsided, everything in al-^CIrāq returned to normal. Officials were immediately appointed to administer the province, and the rebuilding of devastated areas was carried out by a team of workers. The tempo of life was not altered, for the administration of the country was entrusted to experienced officials of the old native stock.

By this time the Mongols had developed a concept of permanent occupation of conquered territory, and their former way of preying upon sedentary societies as sources of booty had been abandoned. However, at this early stage the nomadic tribal spirit was still strong and the political and social principles of the conquered land were in operation only under nomadic customs and practices.

This was a period of confusion in so far as the political and social situations are concerned.

Such a period of transformation and adaptation of the primitive way of life of the Mongol nomads to the advanced sedentary principles of an urbanized society not only is necessary, but also falls within the first period of Ibn Khaldun's theory of the metamorphosis of dynasties. In his famous Prolegomena, he divided the the lifespan of dynasties into three periods, each of which lasted approximately forty years. In the first period, the feeling of tribal kinship (ʿasabiyyah) of the dynasty continued to be preserved among the ruling classes. Their nomadic qualities of toughness and savagery were retained. After forty years, that feeling disappeared in the course of the process of urbanization and the adoption of cultural sedentary life. This is what had taken place during the reign of Ghazan Khan (694-704/1295-1305). In the third period, the desert life and toughness were abandoned, as if it had never existed. ʿAsabiyyah disappeared completely and luxury reached its peak among the ruling class. Then it was the end of the dynasty.¹

Even in the first period of the Mongol occupation of al-ʿIrāq, the country suffered relatively little from misrule, except for the Ilkhanite fiscal system. This fiscal system was a combination of nomadic practices and sedentary principles which led to exactions. However, as already shown, these exactions were necessary.

¹ Abd al-Raḥmān Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal (New York: Pantheon Press, 1958), I, 344, 353-355.

for supporting the Mongol contingents against external threats. Nevertheless, the Muslims derived at least some benefit from the nomadic practices of the Mongols. It was owing to their religious tolerance that Islam was able to escape suppression. The Mongols did not force the Muslims to change their faith and in the end were themselves converted by them. In the meantime, the Christians and even the Jews made considerable gains under the Mongols since their status was equalized with that of the Muslims for the first time.² Muslims, albeit some of them were Shi^Cites, were not prevented from becoming influential and high ranking officials. There was no distinction between the Shi^Ca and the Sunna with the new masters.

Neither racial nor religious differences played any role among the Mongols in determining the appointment of persons to high office. As Karl Jahn observes: "When selecting their advisers and officials the decisive factors with these princes were the usefulness and ability of the candidates." Jahn concludes, "Only thus can it be explained that the Jew Sa^Cd al-Daula was able to occupy the highest position in the state for nearly two years under Arghun Khan."³

It also became a common practice to blame the Mongols for

²One should be reminded, however, that the Jewish rabbis were not among the tarkhans who were exempted from taxes like the Christian priests and Muslim Culamā'.

³K. Jahn, "Paper Currency in Iran: A Contribution to the Cultural and Economic History of Iran in the Mongol Period," Journal of Asian Studies, IV (1970), 110.

the destruction of the irrigation network in al-^CIrāq. Canals were the lifelines of al-^CIrāq's prosperity and without them the entire area would have become a desert. As a result of their destruction, many medieval as well as modern historians contend that al-^CIrāq sank into a decadence from which it was never able to recover. However, accusers have overlooked three facts: first, the condition of the canals was worse under the ^CAbbāsids than it had been under the Sāssānids; secondly, the canals were in very poor condition of repair under the later ^CAbbāsids; thirdly, there is no record proving that the Mongols destroyed canals either deliberately or inadvertently. During the Mongol period, al-^CIrāq seldom became a battle-field as it had been in the Buwayhid and Saljūq times. Silting, which is a long process, must have started before the Mongols at whose advent we know that the canals had already been abandoned. However, salt probably caused even more damage than silt. Even though the water of the Tigris and the Euphrates is sweet, it nevertheless contains salt. Constant irrigation without drainage causes salt to accumulate in the soil. Centuries later, the subsurface water becomes unusable for agriculture on account of the growing density of its salinity. Since ancient engineers did not comprehend the salt problem and made no provision for drainage, it was inevitable that the land in al-^CIrāq would eventually become uncultivable. Thus, al-^CIrāq's canals had within themselves the seeds of their own destruction.

There is no evidence indicating that the Mongols actively destroyed canals in al-^CIrāq. They even repaired some old canals

and dug a few new ones when the internal situation permitted it. During most of the Ilkhanite period, Mongol rulers were short-lived and thus generated succession struggles. Moreover, the internecine wars among Mongol Khans also absorbed all the resources which might have been used to improve the internal problems. It was because of this situation and neglect that the Mongols were held accountable for further deterioration of canal conditions.

In al-^CIrāq, the devastation wrought by the Mongols was often exaggerated. Except in the case of Wāsīt, towns like al-Hillah, al-Kūfah, al-Basrah, and Najaf which opened their gates to the Mongol invaders and readily came to terms with them were left undisturbed. Even concerning Baghdad, the massacre of the native population has been shown to be grossly exaggerated by medieval Muslim historians. Further, before the elimination of the last ^CAbbāsīd Caliph, Hūlāgū had queried the assembled Muslim ^Culama' as to whether a just, unbelieving ruler was not preferable to an unjust Muslim ruler. The response indicated their preference of the former.⁴

On the positive side, the Mongol invasion as a whole contributed to the progress of relations with Europe. Direct contact between the East and the West was made possible and European travelers were encouraged by the Mongol Emperors. They could go to the Orient by the land or the sea routes, and they brought back with them to their home countries many new ideas and inventions from

⁴Cf. pp. 101-102 above.

the Far East. The art of printing, the mariner's compass, and the firearms were introduced for the first time to Europe from China. All these and other significant contributions have been generally neglected.

In fact, the impact of China and the Orient on medieval Europe during the age of the Mongols is a subject pregnant with possibilities and calls for many hands and many minds.

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APPENDIX I

THE DESCRIPTION OF AL-^CIRĀQ*

An Excerpt

from


KITĀB AL-AQĀLĪM

by

AL-SHAYKH ABĪ ISHAQ AL-FĀRISĪ KNOWN AS AL-ISTAKHRĪ
..

Few biographical details are available for Shaykh Abī Ishaq who received the cognomen of Istakhri from his native city of Istakhr or Persepolis, and he is also called al-Fārisī from the province of Fars in which that city is situated. His travels extended through all the Muslim countries, from India to the Atlantic Ocean, from Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea. He must have lived in the first half of the fourth/tenth century as there is evidence of his contact with Ibn Hawqal, another great medieval Muslim geographer, in about 340/951-952 in the valley of the Indus. He wrote this book based upon Balkh's earlier work of the same title. In his work maps play an important part and he made colored maps for each country.

*Gatha MSS, Arabic no. 312, dated 569 A. H./1173 A. D.



كتلى الافاق

تأليف

الشيخ ابي اسحق الفارسي المعروف بابن الصخر



ذكر العراق

العراق حامي الطول من حد بركت الى حد عبادان على بحر فارس وفي العرض
 بغداد والكوفة من المادسة الى جوان وعرضه بواسط من واسط الى حد
 الطيب وعرضه بالصرة من الصرة الى حد ودحي والى كطف حدوده
 من بركت فيما يلي المسرة حتى خور خرد وسهرورد ثم يطوف على جوان وجرود
 السروان والصيرة وجرود الطيب وجرود السون حتى يسمي الى حد ودحي
 ثم الى البحر فدون من هذا الحد من بركت الى البحر يهوس ويرجع على حد المعرب من ورا
 الصرة في المادسة من سواد الصرة ويطأ بها الى واسط ثم على سواد الكوفة
 ويطأ بها الى الكوفة على ظهر الفرات الى الانبار ثم يمر من الانبار على حد بركت
 من الالطه والفرات وفي هذا الحد من البحر الى بركت ايضا يهوس وهذا الخط
 لحدود العراق الصرة فمذسة عظمه لم يكن في ايام العم واما
 لخطها المليون ايام من الخطات وهي الله عن ومصرها عنته من غزوان
 وهي خط وقف ابل كلها وخط يعربها المادسة مقوسا وشرفها مياه
 الالها مقوسا ووصل ان انهار الصرة عن في ايام بلال بن رده فزادت
 على ما به الف وعشرين الف ثم جرى فيها الروا ووقفت انكر ذلك حتى رات
 ثورا من ملك البقاع فزادت في ربه سم عمدا من الانهار الصغار جرى وكلها
 زوار يوم صغار ولكل يرا اسم ينسب الي صاحبه الذي اختفاه او الى الناجي الذي
 نصب فيها وانشاه ذلك من الاسامى محزوب ان يكون ذلك في طول هذه المسافة
 او غيرها واكثر ابدتها بالاجرة وهي من بين ساير العراق فله عشرينه ولها
 حيا متصله من عمدا الى عبادان بنف وحميد بن قيس متصلا لا يكون لاسان فيه
 مذان الا في نهر وشميل او تحت براها وهي في مستواه من الارض لا حيا فيها
 الا حيا من جبالها وبنها من طلع من عمدا لله من الصحابه في المادسة

وخارج المدرسه في البادية فير اسن بن مالك والحسن البصري وابن سيرين والمشاهير
 من علماء البصرة وزهادها ولها نهر يعرف بنهر الابله طوله اربع فراسخ ماسن البصرة
 والابله على حافة هذا النهر وصور وسائر منضله كانها سنان ولط قدماء على حطوط
 وتبع الى هذه الانهار اشهر شهر فسمها ما بقارت هذا النهر في الكثر كان تحتها
 عرسب على حطوط واجل وهذه الانهار كلها محرفه بعضها الى بعض ولذا ك عامه انهار
 البصرة حتى اذا جازهم المدا تراجع املان في كل نهر حتى يدخل ختلهم وخطابهم وجمع انهارهم
 من غير تكلف فاذا جرد المدا الخطب حتى تجلوها الساس وسعى الانهار الا ان
 الغالب على ما يسم الملوحة وانما سفوراد اجرد المدا الى حطوط معتقل بم عذب ولا يعرف
 ما النهر والابله على هذا النهر وعلى نهر الابله في نهرها هور عظيم الخطر وان السمن
 لسلم في سائر الاماكن في البحر وربما عرف في هذا الهور وهو معروف بنهر الابله والابله
 مرده صغيره حصصها حطوطها نهر الابله وحطوطها الى الرحله التي تتبع منها عدا النهر
 عاطفا عليها وتسمى عوده الى عما حان والبصر فاملع اذان والابله والمفص والمدا
 وعلى سبط الابله وهي مثل صغيره متفارت في الكثر عامره وان نهرها الابله وهي حذود
 البصرة في اصعب فراها اجام شبره ويطاخ ان نهرها سار فيه بالمرادى فربته المعرف
 كنها لان على قديم الايام ارضها مشوهه ونسبه ان يكون ما نبت البصرة ونسبه الانهار
 كثر انهارها واستفاو بعضها الى بعض فراجعت المياه وعلت على الاراضى المنفله
 فصارت بخارا وهي البطاخ واما وسط فابها ايضا على سبط الابله متقابلان
 بهما حبر من سفن كل جانب منها مسج جامع وهي محذبه في الاسلام ساها الخراج بن يوسف
 النعمي ويحط حدها العري البادية بعد مزارع سبوره وهي حصه سبوره السحر والخل
 والزرع وهي اصح هو من البصرة والسب بها بطاخ وارضى ورسا سفها متصله بمجورون
 واما الكوفة فانها بقارت البصرة في الكثر وهو اوصها اصح وماؤها عذب وهي على
 الهرات وناوها مثل بنا البصرة ومبصرها سعد بن ابي وقاص وهي ايضا حطوط وقابل
 من العرب الا انها خراجي خلاف البصرة لان صباغ الوفه جاهله وصباغ البصرة
 اجساموان في الاسلام والفا دسته والخبره والخورون هي على
 شرف البادية مما يلي المسترو والخل والابهار والزرع وهما الوفه في اقل من حله

والخبره مدنيه حمله طينه التربه مغير شبه النسا مشهوره الا انها خوف من الامل
 لما عرفت الكوفه ونراها وهو اواها اصح من الكوفه وسها ومن الكوفه بجرسج والكوفا
 من امر المومنين على ان لا يطلب لهم الدرج وهو من نرحم انه مفنور في زاوية على باب
 مسجد الجامع اخفى من احدى امية درانت في هذا الموضع دنان علاف ومنهم من يرحم ايه من
 الكوفه على فرسخ وعليه منظره واثار المقابر والهادسة على سورها الياديه وهي
 مدنيه صغيره ذات دروع ومياه واما مدنيه السلام بغداد فهي مدنيه في
 الاسلام لم يبن بها عمارة وانبتى المنصور المدينه في الجانب الغربي وجعل حولها فطابع
 الجائنيه ومواليه مثل طينه الربع والخارنه وقبرهايم عرفت فلما كان في ايام المهدي
 جعل عسكره في الجانب الشرقي وسمى عسكر المهدي كرم عرفت بالناس والسيان فاسفلت
 الخلافة الى الجانب الشرقي وظهرت قصور الخلافة وسائر بناها من بغداد الى ارض بصرى
 على حدار واجط حتى يصل من ارض الى شمالها لطم يصل النيان بلار الخلافة من تفعل على
 الالطه الى التماسيه بجرسجه اميال وعاد كاساسه في الجانب الغربي الجويه بمد
 نازلا على الالطه الى امر الكرخ وسمى الشرقي باب الطاق وسمى الرصافه وسمى عسكر
 المهدي عسكر شامه جانب الطاق نسبة الى راس الطاق وهو موضع السور الاعظم ومن نسبه
 الى الرصافه نسبة الى قصر كان الرصافه يهرب من مسجد الجامع بها ومن نسبه الى
 عسكر المهدي فان المهدي كان عسكره من هذا الجانب حرامدينه الى جعفر وبها مسجد
 جامع في ياربه مواضع في مدينه المنصور وفي جانب الطاق وفي دار الخلافة ويتصل
 العمارة والسيان بكلاواذي وبها مسجد جامع فله عاك في حمله بغداد حاز وقاعد
 من الجانبين على الالطه فرب من وسطها جسر من سفروينون من باب خراسان الى ان
 يبلغ الجسر وبلغ باب الياسريه وذلك عمن الجانبين بجرسجه اميال واعرفعه
 وبها الكرخ وبها مساكن النجار عماره من بغداد الكرخ اقل عمارة واكثر حرارا
 لاسفل العمارة الى الجانب الشرقي ويعرف اليوم بنهر معلى فاما الاسحار والانهار

بعد نصف من ما النهر وان واما ما يقع اليها من الريحه واما الجانب الغربي فقد
 سمي اليها من الفرات نهر عيسى من قرب الانبار تحت فطره دما ويحيط من هذا
 النهر صينات جمع قصير يسمى الصراه والصغره والكبره ويسمى الى اخره عيسى الى الريحه في جوف مدينه
 بغداد فاما نهر عيسى فان السفن تجري فيه من الفرات الى ان تقع في الريحه واما الصراه
 فانها تجري من جري الماء السفين فسمي السفين منها الى فطره الصراه ثم تحا حول
 مائه ويطور به ذلك الحجر الى سفن غيرها ومن بغداد والكوفه سواد مستنك
 غيرهم يجرى قربها انهار من الفرات فاولها ما يلي بغداد نهر صرصر عليه مدينه
 صرصر تجري فيه السفن وعليه جسر من سفن عبر عليه ومدينه صرصر صرصر
 عامره بالنخل والزرع وسائر الثمار من بغداد على نهر اسخري يسمى علي وسبحان الى نهر
 الملك وهو نهر صرصر اعفان نهر صرصر وعليه جسر عبر من سفن وهو الملك
 مدينه البر من صرصر عامره بالاهل كثيره بالنخل والزرع والهارم يسمى الى قصر
 ابن هبيرة وليس من بغداد ومن الكوفه مدينه اكبر منها وهي قرب نهر الفرات
 الذي هو العمود والها انهار منه في لست بكار الا انها تجمع وبفضلها هي عمر
 هذا السواد ثم سمي الى نهر شورا اكبر الماء ليس للفرات سعب اكبر منه حتى سمي
 الى سوراء الى سائر سواد الكوفه ونفع الفاضل في البطاخ وكروان عرني
 الفرات فيما تجدي قصر نهره في قرية وبها قبر الحسن علي عليه السلام
 واما ستر من راي فانها لها في الجانب الشرقي من الريحه وليس معها في الجانب الشرقي
 ما حاد الانهار الفاضول الذي يصب الى السواد بعد عنها فاما ما حط بها
 وبنية وعماراتها واشجارها ومبانيها في الجانب الغربي لخداها وهي ممتده مع
 سبلها من الكرخ والاورج ومجره لا يقطع بناؤها وهي مدينه اسلاميه ابتداء
 المعنم واستتم بناها المنوكل وهي حرابر باسمه الرحيل في مقدار فرسخ منها
 لا حد بها ارامجوره وهوها اصح من بغداد واما النهر وان فانها


مدنه تسوق البحر وان وسطها مدينة صغيرة من بغداد على اربعة فراسخ وبها
 النهر وان يقضى الى سواد بغداد في اسفل عن دار الخلافة الى اسداف من حيند وعبرها
 من المذار والقرى واد اجرف النهر الى الاسكندرية حفت المناه والمحل بمصير الاسكندرية
 الى جرجان لادله من عطفه منقطع العارة من مدينة من مدينة المنازل والقرى
 حتى يروى على نهر او حد وديسهم وروا الى حد كرت واما المذار فانها مدينة
 صغيرة جاهلية وقد اذنت عظيمه فعلى عامه انبسط الى بغداد وهي من بغداد على مرحلة
 وكانت مسكن الاسكندرية وبها انواع كثيرة الى بوضاهل وهو انواع عظيم معهود
 باخر وحصل ليس للاسكندرية انواع كثيرة واما المذار فبمصيرة الانهار اقدم
 الاقليم انبسط الى انبسط اليها الاقليم وكانت مدينتها الكنعانية وعبرهم بمسور بها وبها
 انار انبسطه وكانت في قديم الزمان مصر اعظمها ويقال ان الضمير بولانست اول من بناها
 بانك وكوتى رانما الى ان ابراهيم عليه السلام طرح نهار النار وكوتى اتان اجدها
 كوتى الطوبى والاخر كوتى ربا ويكوتى ربا الى هذه الغاية تلال عظيمه من رما
 رعمون انما باربر ودين كنعان الذي طرح بها ابراهيم طبل الحجر عليه السلام
 والحيات من مدينته عبر حوالها راسا واما من حيث حلا والمذار من
 سور والادله من بغداد على مرحلة ويقال انه كان رعمونها حسر من اجرة ايام
 الفرس ولم يسهل ان واما عكبرا واوانا والبردان والبعانته ودر العاقول
 وحثل وخر جرابا وقر الصلح وبها ساس وسائر ما ذكرناه على سبط الدخلة من الملك
 في مدينته في الكبر ليس بها مدينة لشبهه مستبكه العارة لكل مدينة من ذلك
 كوره واما جرجان فبها مدينة عامه ليس بارض العراق بعد اللوه والنصره
 وواسط وبغداد وسر من راي والحيثه مدينة اكبر منها واكثر ما رها اليه
 وهي قرب الحبل وليس للعراق مدينة تقرب الحبل عنها وروا اسقط بها البج ولما

على جبلها فان الشبح يسقط داما والاسكندر بها خيل درر ووع غامره وحاديتها
 حصن مرطين داخله فادع وانما هو مرزعه يقال ان الملك كان يقيم هناك في بعض فصول
 السنه فسميت دسره الملك لذلك فاما من بكرت الى ان تجاوزت من راي الى
 قرب العلت فما يطوف على مثال الهوس الى الامس ثم يطوف على مثال الهوس الى
 خط عمل واسط من حد العراق الى حد كابل فان وقت العجازه وما في كمنه
 والعاله عليها الاكراد والاعراب وهي مراعي لهم ولداك من بكرت عن عرضها
 الى ان يسهى الى الانبار من اللجه والهرات قليل العجازه وانما العجازه منه ملكا دي من راي
 امثال شهره والباقي مباديه ولم يالعب ووصف العراق لاسفار عامه ما يدخر منها

واما المسافات بالعراق

فان من حد بكرت الى البحر مائتي امسور وهو من جوس شهر ومن البحر الى حدي
 المغرب وهو من الحد بكرت جوس شهر ومن بغداد الى سامره ثلاث مراحل
 ومن سامره الى بكرت مرحلتان ومن بغداد الى الكوفه اربع مراحل ومن
 الكوفه الى القادسيه مرحله ومن بغداد الى واسط خمس مراحل ومن
 بغداد الى حلوان ست مراحل ومن حد ود الصيره والسيروان حدودا
 ومن واسط الى البصره ثمان مراحل ومن الكوفه الى واسط جوس مراحل
 ومن البصره الى البحر مرحلتان طريق البطيخ وعرض العراق بغداد من
 حلوان الى القادسيه احدى عشر مرحله وعرضه بواسط جوارع مراحل
 وعرضه بالبصره من البصره الى حد ود جوس مراحل

وهذه صورة العراق



THE DESCRIPTION OF AL-^CIRAQ¹

A Translation

As regards al-^CIrāq, its extension² in length is from the border of Takrīt to ^CAbbadan on the Faris Sea,³ and its width is a line from Qādisiyyah near al-Kūfah to Ḥulwan through Baghdād, from Wāsiṭ to the vicinity of al-Ṭīb at Wāsiṭ, and from al-Baṣrah to the boundary of Jubba at al-Baṣrah. Whoever goes round the territory of al-^CIrāq in an eastward direction will come to the limits of Shahrzur and then passes through the regions of Ḥulwan, al-Sayrawan, al-Saymarah, al-Ṭīb, and al-Sus until he reaches the limits of Jubba and then to the Sea. This line is winding. If one turns westward by way

¹There is an English translation of al-Iṣṭakhrī's work by William Ouseley who erroneously attributes it to Ibn Hawqal. The translation is made from a Persian version and is quite inadequate. Cf. William Ouseley, The Oriental Geography of Ebn Haukal, an Arabian Traveller of Tenth Century. (London: Printed at the Oriental Press by Wilson and Co., 1800), pp. 61-72. The present translation though based upon our MSS is supplemented by M. J. de Goeje's edition of the same work, Kitāb Masālik al-Mamālik (Viae Regnorum Descriptio Ditionis Moslemicae). (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1870), pp. 78-88.

²The Arabic word for it is ḥadd which literally means line or border. The present translation is adopted from V. Minorsky's Hudūd al-^CĀlam: 'The Regions of the World': A Persian Geography, 372 A.H.-982 A.D. (London: Luzac and Co., 1937). The plural form of ḥadd, ḥudūd, is here translated by Minorsky as extension. However, he admits that it would have been better to translate it as limits or limited areas.

³I. e., Persian Gulf.

of al-Baṣrah in the edge of the steppe and its countryside, and its swamps, he will come to Wāsiṭ, to al-Kūfah after passing the its countryside and its swamps, and to al-Anbār after crossing the Euphrates. Then he will traverse al-Anbār to Takrīt which is situated between the Tigris and the Euphrates. This line from the Sea to Takrīt is likewise winding. This is the area of al-^CIrāq.

Al-Baṣrah is a great city which the Muslims of the time of ^CUmar ibn al-Khāṭṭab (may God be pleased with him) planned and ^CUtbah ibn Ghazwān built. It is divided into quarters and settled by clans. On its western side, it is surrounded by curved steppes and on its eastern side, there are winding canals. It is said that the canals of al-Baṣrah were counted during the time of Bilāl ibn Abī Burdah and amounted to one hundred and twenty thousand, on which boats could sail. I did not believe it until I saw many of them on the spot. Within a single arrow's flight, I saw several small canals on which small boats were sailing. Each canal has a name which is attributed either to the person who dug it or to the place where the canal pours in. I warrant that this is the way all over the country. Many of them were built by baked bricks. Al-Baṣrah is the only country which pays tithe taxes in al-^CIrāq. It has palm trees spreading from ^CAbdasī to ^CAbbadān. For fifty-five farasakhs, there are no inhabitants except where there are palm trees and canals. It is situated on a plain where there are no mountains one's eye sight can reach. There lies the tomb of Ṭalḥah ibn ^CUbayd Allāh, one of the Companion of the Prophet in al-Madīnah. Outside the city in the countryside there lie the tombs of Anis ibn Mālik, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣri, Ibn Sīrīn, and

celebrated ^Culamā'. There is a canal, called al-Ubullah, of four farasakhs long running between al-Baṣrah and al-Ubullah. On both banks of the canal, houses and gardens are so thickly interspersed that they are as if one garden. And they are all in one line. From this canal, it branches out many others. Many of them are almost equivalent in size. Similarly the palm-trees are planted in a straight line. The canals are interwoven with each other. This is the canal conditions in al-Baṣrah. When the water of the sea rises or increases, the water of those canals goes into the gardens and fields. When the water subsides, only canals have water. The water is of bitter taste.

Al-Ubullah is situated on a canal of same name. There is a dangerous whirlpool. Many ships which have traveled safely in the sea are sunk by its waves in this whirlpool, which is known as the Ubullah River. Al-Ubullah is a small city, but well supplied with provisions, and pleasantly situated, one side being towards the Tigris and the other towards al-Baṣrah.

With regard to the cities of the Basrah district, ^CAbbadān, al-Ubullah, and al-Maftah are well known. However, they are small cities situated on the Tigris. Al-Ubullah is the largest among them. There are villages thickly situated along the Basrah territory and also many swamps. Boats or vessels are moved here by the strength of men. Near this place are great gulphs or abysses: one would imagine that the land had been dry at some former time. It is possible that the water, making its way from the rivers of Basrah, had

settled wherever it found a deep furrow or pit.

Wāsiṭ is situated on the two banks of the Tigris. It has been built since the introduction of Islam. The foundation was laid by al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf. It is strongly built; and the castle of Ḥajjāj is there, one the western side, with a few fields belonging to it. Wasit is a populous town, and well supplied with provisions. It has a more pleasant climate than al-Basrah. The vicinity of it is planted with gardens, and well cultivated.

Al-Kūfah is almost as big as al-Basrah and its atmosphere is healthier and its water sweeter. It is situated near the river Euphrates and its buildings are just like those of the al-Basrah. The suburbs of al-Kūfah were built by Sa^cd ibn Waqqāṣ and it has districts for the Arab tribes but has no land taxes.

.....

Baghdad is a celebrated city, erected since the introduction of Islam. It was built by Abū Ja^cfar al-Manṣūr. At first the western quarter was built, and every one settled himself there in any manner he thought fit. Afterwards, it became populous; and when Mahdi succeeded to the caliphate, he encamped his troops on the eastern side. Buildings were then erected, and that quarter also became thickly inhabited. The villas and palaces extended for nearly two farasakhs from Baghdad to the river (the Tigris), and this city became the residence of the Caliphs. The buildings were contained from the river to the district of Wāsiṭ. From above the Tigris to Shamāsiyyah, a distance of nearly five farasakhs. The eastern side of the city is called Bāb al-Tāq Raṣāfah,

and also ^cAskar al-Mahdī (Military camp of al-Mahdī). It is said that the name Bab al-Tāq is derived from a certain great dome, or cupola, in the principal bazaar or market-place, called Sūq al-^cAzaim.

Raṣāfah is a considerable suburb, built by Rashīd, near the Masjid al-Jāmi^c. The Western side is called Karkh. Here are three mosques: the Masjid al-Jāmi^c al-Manṣūr; another, situated at the Bāb al-Tāq; and the other, at the Dār al-Khilāfah. The buildings continue as far as al-Kalwadhi, where there is a mosque. Over the river Tigris a bridge has been constructed of boats; and from the Khurasan gate to the place called Bāb al-Yāsiriyyah, the breadth of the city at both sides is about six miles.

Karkh is very well inhabited, and considerable commerce is there carried on; but the trees and streams are on the eastern side. The water they drink is of the river Nahrwan (a canal). On the western side there is a stream, called Nahr ^cIsā--a branch of the Euphrates which passing by Baghdad falls into the Tigris.

Between Baghdad and al-Kufah, there are many districts and villages, through which run streams from the river Euphrates. Here is situated the town of Ṣarṣar, on the stream called Ṣarṣar, at a distance of three farasakhs from Baghdad. It is a pleasant town, with land well cultivated. After that, at a distance of two farasakhs, is the Nahr al-Malik. There is a bridge over it; and it is much more considerable than the river of Ṣarṣar. The district of Nahr al-Malik is better cultivated, and affords more corn

and fruits, than Şarşar. From that one proceeds to Qaşr ibn Hubayrah situated on the Euphrates, and one of the most considerable places between al-Kūfah and Baghdad. Here are several streams, so that the water is much augmented, and passes on to the town of Sūrā. The great River Euphrates has not any branch more considerable than this. From Sūrā it proceeds to the district of al-Kūfah. It falls into the Great Swamp.

• • • •

Sāmarrā' is altogether situated to the east. In this quarter there is not any running water, but the river al-Qutul that runs at some distance from the town. Buildings, and streams, and trees, are opposite, on the western side, and extend for near one day's trip. The first founder of this place was al-Mu^ctaşim. It has since fallen into the hands of al-Mutawakkil and is now all in ruins, so much that within the space of a farasakh there is not any building or cultivated land to be seen. The air and fruits of Sāmarrā' are better than those of Baghdad.

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APPENDIX II

THE FALL OF BAGHDAD

An Excerpt

from

HSI SHIH CHI

by

Ch'ang Te

Ch'ang Te was an envoy dispatched by the Mongol Khan, Mongke, in 1259 to his brother Hūlāgū, who at that time had just succeeded in overthrowing the caliphate in Baghdad. After his return, the report of his journey was taken down by a certain Liu Yu, who termed his pamphlet as Hsi Shih Chi (Record of an Embassy to the Regions in the West).

西使記

元 劉郁撰

壬子歲。皇帝旭烈統諸軍。奉詔西征。凡六年。拓境幾萬里。己未正月甲子。帝總師仁。馳驛西覲。自和林。出兀孫中。西北行二百餘里。地漸高。入站經瀚海。地極高寒。雖暮積雪不消。山石皆松文。西南七日。過湖海。行三百里。地漸下。有河關數里。曰昏木策。夏漲以舟楫濟。數日。過龍骨河。復西北行。輿別失八里。南以相直。近五百里。多漢民。有二麥秦穀。河西注。瀦爲海。約千餘里。曰乞則里八寺。多魚可食。有磬磔。亦以水激。之行。漸西。有城曰藥。又西南行。過孛羅城。所種皆麥。稻山多柏。不能銖絡石。而長城居。肆圍。閉錯土屋。窗戶皆琉璃。城北有海。鐵山風出。往往吹行人墮海中。西南行二十里。有關曰鐵木兒。鐵寨守關者皆漢民。關徑崎嶇。似棧道。出關至阿里麻里城。市井皆流水。其有諸果。唯瓜葡萄石榴最佳。回紇與漢民雜居。其俗漸染。頗似中國。又有赤木兒城。居民多并沙人。有獸似虎。毛厚金色。無文。善傷人。有蟲如蛛。毒中人。則頰渴。飲水立死。惟過醉葡萄酒。吐則解。有畜。孛羅城。迤西。金銀銅爲錢。有文而無孔。方至麻阿中。以馬牽。拖牀。運。負重而行。疾。或曰。乞里乞。易馬以。大二月二十四日。過赤塔。兩山間。土平民。擊。洩。映。帶。多。故。填。間。之。蓋。契。丹。故。居。也。計。其。地。去。和。林。萬。五。千。里。而。近。有。河。曰。亦。連。流。洶。洶。東。注。土。人。云。此。黃。河。也。二。十。八。日。過。塔。刺。寺。三。月。一。日。過。賽。騰。城。有。浮。圖。諸。回。紇。祈。拜。之。所。三。日。過。別。石。蘭。諸。回。紇。貿易。如。上。已。節。四。日。過。忽。章。河。渡。船。如。弓。鞋。然。土。人。云。河。源。出。南。太。山。地。多。產。玉。疑。爲。崑崙。出。以。西。多。龜。

蛇行相雜。鄰客食。如濟。門戶皆以琉璃飾之。民賦歲止輸金錢十文。然貧富有差。八日過。得思十城大而民繁。時花正開。惟梨花普。玫瑰如中國。徒多不能名。城之西所植皆葡萄。類有麥亦秋種。滿地產藥十數種。皆中國所無。藥物療疾甚效。曰阿兒兒狀如苦參。治馬鼠。婦人損胎及打撲。內損用豆。許嘔之自消。曰阿息兒狀如地骨皮。治婦人產後表不下。又治金瘡。膿不出。嚼碎傅之。即出。曰奴哥。猴兒形似桔梗。治金瘡及腸胃筋斷者。嚼碎傅之。自結。餘不能盡錄。十四日過。暗不河。夏不雨。秋則雨。溉田以水。地多。有鳥飛食之。十九日過。里。其地有桑。東征。西與魯屯。駐於此。二十六日過。馬蘭城。又過。納。草皆首。滯。以相。二十九日過。滯。兒。城。滿山皆。如水晶狀。近西南六七里。新得。國曰木乃。奚。牛。皆。地無水。土人。山。非。相。數十里。下通。流。以。溉。田。所。屬。山。城。三。百。五。十。已。而。皆。下。惟。橋。塞。西。一。山。城。名。乞。都。不。孤。峰。峻。絕。不。能。矢。石。丙。辰。年。主。帥。至。城。下。城。絕。高。險。仰。視。之。帽。為。陸。道。拉。進。敵。大。驚。令。相。大。者。納。失。兒。來。納。款。已。而。兀。魯。兀。乃。算。灘。出。降。算。灘。猶。國。主。也。其。父。領。兵。別。據。山。城。令。其。子。取。之。七。日。而。陷。金。玉。寶。物。甚。多。一。帶。有。直。銀。十。笏。者。其。國。兵。皆。刺。容。俗。兒。男。子。勇。壯。者。以。利。誘。之。令。手。刃。父。兄。然。後。无。兵。醉。酒。扶。入。窟。室。娛。以。音。樂。美。女。縱。其。欲。數。日。復。置。故。處。既。醒。問。其。所。見。教。之。能。為。刺。客。死。即。享。福。如。此。因。授。以。經。咒。日。誦。誑。使。盡。其。心。志。死。無。悔。也。令。潛。使。未。服。之。國。必。刺。其。主。而。後。已。雖。婦。人。亦。然。其。木。乃。奚。在。西。城。中。最。為。兇。悍。咸。曾。鄰。國。四十餘年。主帥既克。誅之無遺。四月六日過。訖。立。兒。所。產。蛇。皆。西。對。長。五。尺。餘。身。黃。皮。如。鯉。魚。口。吐。紫。煙。過。阿。刺。丁。城。稱。謂。若。兒。人。被。處。辜。以。紅。帕。勒。首。衣。青。如。鬼。然。主。帥。自。入。西。城。降。者。幾。三十。國。有。佛。國。名。乞。石。迷。西。在。印。毒。西。北。蓋。傳。釋。迦。氏。兵。鉢。者。其人儀狀甚古。如世所繪。摩像。不如。雅。酒。日。一。合。所。談。皆。佛。法。斷。定。至。暮。方。語。丁。巳。歲。取。報。達。國。南北二千里。其王曰合法里。其城有東西。城中有大河。西城無壁。東城固之。以。繞。繞。其。上。甚。盛。王。帥。至。城。下。一。交。戰。破。勝。兵。四。十。餘。萬。西。城。陷。皆。屠。其。民。縛。圍。東。城。六。日。而。破。死。者。以。數。十。萬。合。法。里。以。輜。走。獲。焉。其。國。俗。富。庶。為。西。城。冠。宮。殿。皆。以。沈。檀。為。木。降。真。為。之。壁。皆。以。黑。白。玉。為。之。金。珠。珍。貝。不。可。勝。計。其。后。妃。皆。漢。人。所。產。大。珠。曰。太。歲。彈。丸。石。瑟瑟。金。剛。鑽。之。類。帶。有。五。十。金。者。其。國。六。百。餘。年。傳。四。十。主。至。合。法。里。而。亡。人。物。頗。秀。於。諸。國。所。產。馬。名。脫。必。察。合。法。里。不。悅。以。權。漿。和。糖。為。飲。聽。管。三。十。六。絃。初。合。法。里。忠。頭。痛。醫。不。能。治。一。伶。人。作。新。琵琶。七。十。二。絃。聽。之。立。解。士。人。相。傳。報。達。諸。胡。之。祖。故。諸。胡。皆。臣。服。報。達。之。西。馬。行。二。十。日。有。天。房。內。有。天。使。神。胡。之。祖。葬。所。也。帥。名。辯。顏。入。兒。房。中。懸。鐵。繩。以。手。捫。之。心。誠。可。及。不。誠。者。豈。得。捫。經。文。甚。多。皆。辯。顏。入。兒。所。作。轄。大。城。數。十。其。民。富。實。西。有。密。乞。兒。國。尤。富。地。產。金。人。夜。視。有。光。處。聽。之。以。旅。翌。日。發。之。有。大。如。栗。者。至。報。達。六。千。餘。里。國。西。即。海。海。西。有。富。浪。國。婦。人。衣。冠。如。世。所。畫。善。勝。狀。男。子。朝。服。皆。善。疑。不。去。衣。雖。夫。婦。亦。異。處。有。大。鳥。號。鷲。蒼。色。鼓。翅。而。行。高。丈。餘。食。火。其。如。升。許。其。失。雅。子。國。出。珍。珠。其。王。名。奧。思。阿。塔。卑。云。西。南。海。也。探。珠。盛。以。革。囊。止。露。兩。手。腰。纏。石。墜。入。海。手。取。蚌。并。泥。沙。貯。於。囊。中。遇。惡。虫。以。醃。曬。之。即。去。既。得。蚌。講。囊。裁。繩。舟。人。引。出。之。往。往。有。死。者。印。毒。國。去。中。國。最。近。軍。民。一。千。二。百。萬。戶。所。出。細。藥。大。胡。桃。珠。寶。烏。木。雜。香。寶。鐵。諸。物。國。中。懸。大。鏡。有。辟。者。錄。之。司。錄。者。

A Translation

In 1252 Hūlāgū, the younger brother of the Emperor (Mongke), had taken the supreme command of the troops, and received orders to attack the Western Asia. In the space of six years he succeeded in extending the frontier of the Empire by nearly ten thousand li.¹

On the 20th of the first month (of the lunar calendar)² of 1259, Ch'ang Te set out as a courier dispatched to the west (to the prince Hūlāgū). . . .

On April 22, he (Ch'ang Te) passed the city of Ti-sao-er.³ The mountains there abound in salt which resembles rock crystal.

At a distance of six or seven li to the south-west from this place is the frontier of the lately conquered realm of the Mulāhids. All the oxen there are black, and bear a hump on the neck. The country is destitute of water; the people dig wells on the summits of the mountains, and conduct the water several tens of li down into the plain, for the purpose of irrigating their fields.

This realm of the Ismā'īlites had 360 mountain fortresses, all which had been reduced. There was, however, west of Damghan a mountain fortress, Ghirdkuh on a very steep rock which could not be reached either by arrows or by stones thrown by catapults. In 1256 the imperial army arrived at the foot of this fortress. The rock

¹Li is a measure of length equivalent to 1890 feet.

²February 13. Thereafter, dates will be in Christian calendar year.

³Unable to identify.

was so steep, that when one looked upwards his cap fell off. But as the army advanced simultaneously from all sides, the enemy was seized with terror. The minister, Khoja Naṣir,⁴ was delegated to offer submission. After this Su-lu-wu-nai (Rukn al-Dīn?) Sultan surrendered. Sultan (in their language) means king. His father with one part of the army maintained himself in the (other) fortresses.⁵ Then the son received orders (from Hūlāgū) to take these fortresses, and in seven days all surrendered. The booty of gold, precious stones, and other precious things was enormous. Among the spoil were girdles valued at a thousand silver each.

. . . .

In 1258 the kingdom of Bao-da (Baghdad) was taken. It stretches from north to south 2000 li. The king had the title of Khalifa. The City was divided into a western and an eastern part. A large river ran between them. The western city had no walls, but the eastern one was fortified, and the walls were built of large bricks. The upper part of the walls was of splendid construction.

When the imperial army arrived beneath the walls, the battle began, and a great victory was gained over 400,000 men. At first the western city was taken and the population massacred; then the army continued besieging the eastern city. After six days'

⁴The Chinese author must have intended for Naṣir al-Dīn al-Tūsī. However, he was not in Ghirdkuh at this time, but Rukn al-Dīn in Maymudiz. The author was confused with many historical facts.

⁵The Chinese author again was confused with the fact. Rukn al-Dīn's father was not alive at this time.

storming it was taken, and the killed amounted to a number of one hundred thousand. The Caliph tried to flee in a boat, but was captured.

The kingdom of the Caliph at that time, considering its wealth and its numerous population, stood at the head of all the realms in the regions of the west. . . .

APPENDIX III

THE YASAQ OF THE MONGOLS*

1. An adulterer is to be put to death without any regard as to whether he is married or not.
2. Whoever is guilty of sodomy is also to be put to death.
3. Whoever intentionally lies, or practises sorcery, or spies upon the behavior of others, or intervenes between the two parties in a quarrel to help the one against the other is also to be put to death.
4. Whoever urinates into water or ashes is also to be put to death.
5. Whoever takes goods (on credit) and becomes bankrupt, then again takes goods and again becomes bankrupt, then takes goods again and yet again becomes bankrupt is to be put to death after the third time.
6. Whoever gives food or clothing to a captive without the permission of his captor is to be put to death.
7. Whoever finds a runaway slave or captive and does not return him to the person to whom he belongs is to be put to death.
8. When an animal is to be eaten, its feet must be tied, its belly ripped open and its heart squeezed in the hand until the animal dies; then its meat may be eaten; but if anyone slaughter an animal after the Muhammadan fashion, he is to be himself slaughtered.
9. If in battle, during an attack or a retreat, anyone let fall his pack, or bow, or any luggage, the man behind him must alight and return the thing fallen to its owner; if he does not so alight and return the thing fallen, he is to be put to death.
10. He (Chingiz Khan) decided that no taxes or duties should be imposed upon the descendants of Ali-Bek, Abu-Talib, without exception, as well as upon fakirs, readers of the al-Qur'ān, lawyers, physicians, scholars, people who devote themselves to prayer and asceticism, muezzins and those who wash the bodies of the dead.

* Adopted from Valentin A. Riasanovsky, Fundamental Principles of Mongol Law (Bloomington: Published by Indiana University, 1965), pp. 83-86.

11. He ordered that all religions were to be respected and that no preference was to be shown to any of them. All this he commanded in order that it might be agreeable to God.

12. He forbade his people to eat food offered by another until the one offering the food tasted of it himself, even though one be a prince and the other a captive; he forbade them to eat anything in the presence of another without having invited him to partake of the food; he forbade any man to eat more than his comrades, and to step over a fire on which food was being cooked or a dish from which people were eating.

13. When a wayfarer passes by people eating, he must alight and eat with them without asking for permission, and they must not forbid him this.

14. He forbade them to dip their hands into water and ordered them to use some vessel for the drawing of water.

15. He forbade them to wash their clothes until they were completely worn out.

16. He forbade them to say of anything that it was unclean, and insisted that all things were clean and made no distinction between the clean and unclean.

17. He forbade them to show preference for any sect, to pronounce words with emphasis, to use honorary titles; when speaking to the Sultan or anyone else simply his name was to be used.

18. He ordered his successors to personally examine the troops and their armament before going to battle, to supply the troops with everything they needed for the campaign and to survey everything even to needle and thread, and if any of the soldiers lacked a necessary thing that soldier was to be punished.

19. He ordered women accompanying the troops to do the work and perform the duties of the men, while the latter were absent fighting.

20. He ordered the warriors, on their return from the campaign (battle) to carry out certain duties in the service of the Sultan.

21. He ordered them to present all their daughters to the Sultan at the beginning of each year that he might choose some of them for himself and his children.

22. He put amīrs at the head of the troops and appointed amīrs of thousand, of hundreds, and of tens.

23. He ordered that the oldest of the amīrs, if he had committed some offence, was to give himself up to the messenger sent by the sovereign to punish him, even if he was the lowest of his servants; and prostrate himself before him until he had carried out the punishment prescribed by the sovereign, even if it be to put him to death.

24. He forbade amīrs to address themselves to anyone except the sovereign. Whoever addressed himself to anyone but the sovereign was to be put to death, and anyone changing his post without permission was also to be put to death.

25. He ordered the Sultan to establish permanent postal communications in order that he might be informed in good time of all the events in the country.

26. He ordered his son, Chagatai Khan to see that the yasaq was observed.

27. He ordered that soldiers be punished for negligence; and hunters who let an animal escape during a community hunt be ordered to be beaten with sticks and in some cases to be put to death.

28. In cases of murder (punishment for murder) one could ransom himself by paying fines which were: for a Muslim--40 golden coins (balish); and for a Chinese--one donkey.

29. The man in whose possession a stolen horse is found must return it to its owner and add nine horses of the same kind; if he is unable to pay this fine, his children must be taken instead of the horses, and if he have no children, he himself shall be slaughtered like a sheep.

30. Chingiz Khan forbade lies, theft and adultery and prescribed love of one's neighbor as one's self; it ordered men not to hurt each other and to forget offences completely, to spare countries and cities which submit voluntarily, to free from taxes temples consecrated to God, and to respect the temples of God and their servants.

31. Whoever violates the following is put to death: to love one another, not to commit adultery, not to steal, not to give false witness, not to be a traitor, and to respect old people and beggars.

32. He prescribed that a man who chokes on food must be driven out of the camp and immediately killed; and whoever puts his

foot on the threshold of the tent of the commander of an army shall also be put to death.

33. If unable to abstain from drinking, a man may get drunk three times a month; if he does it more than three times he is culpable; if he gets drunk twice a month it is better; if once a month, this is still more laudable; and if one does not drink at all what can be better? But where can such a man be found? If such a man were found he would be worthy of the highest esteem.

34. Children born of a concubine are to be considered as legitimate, and receive their share of the heritage according to the disposition of it made by the father. The distribution of property is to be carried out on the basis of the senior son receiving more than the junior, the younger son inheriting the household of the father. The seniority of children depends upon the rank of their mother; one of the wives must always be the senior, this being determined chiefly by the time of her marriage.

35. After the death of his father, a son may dispose of the father's wives, all except his mother; he may marry them or give them in marriage to others.

36. All except the legal heirs are strictly forbidden to make use of any of the property of the deceased.

APPENDIX IV

THE LETTER OF THE GREAT KHAN KUYUK TO POPE INNOCENT IV (1246)*

By the power of the Eternal Sky, We the Oceanic Khan of the whole great people; Our command.

This is an order sent to the great Pope that he may know and understand it.

We have written it in the language of the lands of the kerel (i.e. Latin?).

Counsel was held; a petition of submission was sent; it was heard from your ambassadors.

And if you keep to your word, thou, who art the great Pope, together with all the kings, must come in person to do homage to Us. We shall then cause you to hear every command that there is the Yasa ('Law').

Again. You have said: 'Become Christian, it will be good.' Thou hast made thyself wise (or thou hast been presumptuous); thou hast sent a petition. This petition of thine We have not understood.

Again. You have sent words saying: 'Thou hast taken all the lands of the Majar and the Christian; I am astonished. What was their crime? Tell us.' These words of thine We have not understood either. The command of God, Chingiz Khan and Qa'an (=Ogodei), both of them, sent it to cause it to be heard. They have not trusted the command of God. Just like they words they too have been reckless; they have acted with arrogance; and they killed Our ambassadors. The people of those countries, it was the Ancient God who killed and destroyed them. Except by the command of God, how should anyone kill, how should anyone capture by his own strength?

Dost thou say none the less: 'I am a Christian; I worship God; I despise and . . .'? How dost thou know whom God forgives, to whom He shows mercy? How dost thou know, who speakest such words?

By the power of God from the going up of the sun to his going down He has delivered all the lands to Us; We hold them. Except by the command of God, how can anyone do anything? Now you must say with a sincere heart: 'We shall become your subjects; we shall give our strength.' Thou in person at the head of the kings, you must all together at once come to do homage to Us. We shall then recognize your submission. And if you do not accept God's command

* Adopted from I. de Rachewiltz, Papal Envoys to the Great Khans (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 213-214.

and act contrary to Our command We shall regard you as enemies.

Thus We inform you. And if you act contrary thereto ,
what do We know of it , it is God who knows.

In the last days of Jumādā II of the year six hundred and
forty-four (3-11 November 1246).

APPENDIX V

GLOSSARY

A = Arabic	C = Chinese
M = Mongol	O = Others
P = Persian	T = Turkish

Ahl al-Dhimmah (A): Christians, Jews, and Sabians with whom the Muslims had made a covenant.

Ahl-i-Māl (P): Moneyed people.

^CAlī walī-Allāh (A): ^CAlī the Friend of God.

A^Cmāl (A): Districts in al-^CIrāq during the Mongol times.

^CĀil (A): Civil official in charge of taxation.

Amīr (A): Prince, or military commander.

Amr (A): Imperium.

^CAnwatan (A): Acquisition of land by force.

Asl-i Māl (P): Capital.

Astān (A): District in Sassanid and Muslim times in al-^CIrāq. See also a^Cmāl and kūrāh.

Atabeg (T): Guardian of a prince at the court.

Ātash-kuda (P): Pagoda.

^CAvarizat (P): Occasional taxes.

Bakhshi (O): Taoist, but the connotation had not be determined.

Balish (M): Silver ingot.

Basquq (T and M): Equivalent to Shaḥnah.

Al-Batā'ih (A): Great Swamps in southern al-^CIrāq.

- Bayt al-Māl (A): Treasury.
- Bīgār (P): Forced labor.
- Bitikchi (M): Revenue official.
- Bud-Khāna (P): Infidel house, i.e., Buddhist temple.
- Ch'ao (C): Paper money.
- Dāliyah (A): Water wheels.
- Dallāl (A): Auctioneer, or broker.
- Dāmin (A): Tax farmer.
- Dār al-Sulh (A): Territory submitted by capitulation to the Arabs.
- Darughu (M): Equivalent to Shahnah.
- Dīwān al-Asl (A): Main office concerned with administration.
- Dīwān al-Barīd (A): Department of Post, also of Intelligence.
- Dīwān al-Dār (A): Central office of Dīwān.
- Dīwān al-Dawāwīn (A): The chief dīwān.
- Dīwān al-Jund (A): Military Department, i.e., War Department.
- Dīwān al-Kharāj (A): Department of Revenues.
- Dīwān al-Khātām (A): Seal Department.
- Dīwān al-Mā' (A): Department of Water, i.e., Irrigation.
- Dīwān al-Rasā'il (A): Department of Documents.
- Dīwān al-Zimān (A): A bureau of surveillance concerned with audit and accounts.
- Dūlāb (A): Water wheel.
- Firman (T): Decree, or edict.
- Gharb (A): Bucket.
- Hājib (A): Chamberlain.
- Hājib al-Bāb (A): Chamberlain.


- Ḥakīm (A): Governor, or tax farmer.
- Ḥarb (A): Warfare.
- Ikhrājāt (A): Maintenance (of travels)
- Ilchi (M): Envoy of official traveler on government business.
- Jamā^cat (A): Communities.
- Jami^c al-Khalīfah (A): The Mosque of the Caliphs.
- Kalle Harri (O): Canal laborers.
- Kast-Buzud (P): Decrease-increase.
- Khār-bandah (P): Muleteer.
- Khatun (T): Lady.
- Khazān al-Dīwān (A): Treasurer of the dīwān.
- Khutbah (A): Friday prayer.
- Kūrah (A): District used in the ^cAbbāsīd times.
- Madrasah (A): Muslim religious school.
- Marā^ci (A): Cattle-tax.
- Mu^can: Contribution, and cooperation.
- Musā^cadah (A): A special levy in the Mongol time.
- Nā'ib (A): Representative deputy.
- Nā^cur (A): Water wheel.
- Nisf-^cushr (A): Half-tithe.
- Ordu (M): Domain.
- P'u-mai (C): Tax-farming.
- Qanūn (pl. qawānīn) (A): Register.
- Quriltai (M): Grand assembly.
- Rafidain (A): The Twin Rivers.
- Sadr (A): Chest, i.e., the head of a certain department.

- Ṣāhib al-Dīwān (A): Official of finance.
 Ṣalāt (A): Prayer.
 Sayyid (A): Descendant of the Prophet Muhammad.
 Shādūf (A): Loaded levers.
 Shurtah (T): Police.
 Sulhan (A): Peaceful acquisition of land by capitulation.
 Silslah (A): A chain of disciples in Sufism.
 Tariqah (A): School of Sufism.
 Tassūj (pl. Tasāsīj) (A): Subdivision of administrative district in the ^cAbbasid time.
 Tengri (M): Sky-power.
 Ulagh (P): Provision of mounts.
^cUlamā' (A): Muslim learned men.
^cUlūfāt (P): Food.
 Ulus (M): Fief.
^cUshr (A): Tithe.
 Al-Waqf (pl. wūqūf, or awqāf) (A): Muslim pious endowment.
 Al-Wasaya (A): Wills.
 Yam (M): Post-horse service.
 Yarliq (M): Decree and edict.
 Yasa(q) (M): Codes.

Map I

The Mongol Empire

Source: E. D. Phillips, The Mongols.




The Mongol Empire

Map II

Provinces of al-^cIrāq, al-Jazīrah, and Ādharbayjān


Source: G. Le Strange, Baghdad during the Abbasid Caliphate.



Map III

Later East Baghdad

Source: G. Le Strange, Baghdad during the Abbasid Caliphate.



REFERENCES TO MAP No. III.

1. The Hasanî Palace.
2. The Tâj Palace.
3. The Mosque of the Caliph.
4. The Mustansiriyah College overlooking the Wharf of the Needle-makers.
5. Palaces of the Princess.
6. The Rayhâniyîn Palace.
7. Palace of the Maydân Khâlîf.
8. Gate of the Willow-tree.
9. Gate of the Date Market.
10. The Badr Gate.
11. The Nubian Gate.
12. The Public Gate.
13. Outer Precincts, with the three Gates called Bâb-ad-Duwwâniât, Bâb 'Ullayân, and Bâb-al-Haram.
14. The Garden Gate.
15. Gate of Degrees.
16. Gate of the Sultan (Modern Bâb-al-Mu'azzam).
17. Gate of Khurâsân or Bâb-az-Zafariyah (Modern Bâb-al-Wustâni).
18. The Hallah Gate and the Belvedere (Modern Bâb-at-Talîsm).
19. Gate of Kalwâdhâ or Bâb-al-Basaliyah, later called Bâb-al-Khalaj (Modern Bâb-ash-Sharki).
20. Street of Bricks and Darb-al-Munirah.
21. Abraz Gate of older Wall and Cemetery of the Wardiyah.
22. The Tâjîyah College.
23. Archway of the Armourers.
24. Street of the Canal.
25. Archway of the Artificers.
26. The Great Square and the Perfumers' Market.
27. Tomb of Abul-al-Kâdir Gilânî.
28. The Persian Bastion.
29. The Arâj Gate.
30. The Zamlaward Monastery.
31. The Bahâiyah and the Tutushi Hospital, in the Tutushi Market.
32. The Nizâmiyah College, Wharf, and Market.
33. The Tomb of Ma'rûf Karkhî.
34. The Barley Gate (Bâb-ash-Sha'ir).
35. Palace of 'Aqul-ad-Din the Wazîr.
36. Shrine of 'Awn and Mu'in (site of the Modern Tomb of Zubaydah).
37. The Bayrah Gate.
38. The Mosque of Mansûr.
39. The Hospital of 'Aqul-ad-Dawlah.

Map IV

The ^cAbbāsīd Irrigation System, 9th Century A. D.

Source: Great Britain, Naval Intelligence Division.
Iraq and the Persian Gulf.

